David S. Kraybill
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
David S. Kraybill has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Linda Lobao
The Ohio State University
2 shared publications - Abdoul G. Sam
Department of Agricultural, Environmental, and Development Economics The Ohio State University Columbus Ohio USA
1 shared publication Chang K. Seung
Department of Applied Economics and Statistics, University of Nevada, Reno
1 shared publication- Gracious M. Diiro
Department of Agribusiness and Natural Resource Economics, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda
1 shared publication - Mark D. Partridge
The Ohio State University
1 shared publication - Michael R. Betz
Department of Human Sciences, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Child Indicators Research
- Vol. 10 (3) , 609-632
Heterogeneous Effects of Maternal Labor Market Participation on the Nutritional Status of Children: Empirical Evidence from Rural India
- 18 March 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in Child Indicators Research
- Vol. 10 (3) , 609-632
Heterogeneous Effects of Maternal Labor Market Participation on the Nutritional Status of Children: Empirical Evidence from Rural India
- 20 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Growth and Change
- Vol. 43 (3) , 361-391
Why Do Localities Provide Economic Development Incentives? Geographic Competition, Political Constituencies, and Government Capacity
U.S. states and localities often engage in economic development policies using incentives and abatements for specific firms or industries. Yet, there is very little empirical evidence suggesting that such policies are successful. Why, then, do governments engage in these policies? In order to answer this question, we employ a model that considers not only geographic and economic factors, but also, in a novel application, local political conditions. A unique survey of U.S. county governments forms the basis for our empirical assessment of both traditional economic development policies and new‐wave policies. Using probit, Poisson, negative binomial, and spatial econometric models, we find evidence that the use of incentives is inversely related to local economic conditions. Furthermore, we find Republican counties are more apt to use incentives, though counties dominated by one political party are less likely to use them.
- 20 August 2012
- Published by Wiley in Growth and Change
- Vol. 43 (3) , 361-391
Why Do Localities Provide Economic Development Incentives? Geographic Competition, Political Constituencies, and Government Capacity
U.S. states and localities often engage in economic development policies using incentives and abatements for specific firms or industries. Yet, there is very little empirical evidence suggesting that such policies are successful. Why, then, do governments engage in these policies? In order to answer this question, we employ a model that considers not only geographic and economic factors, but also, in a novel application, local political conditions. A unique survey of U.S. county governments forms the basis for our empirical assessment of both traditional economic development policies and new‐wave policies. Using probit, Poisson, negative binomial, and spatial econometric models, we find evidence that the use of incentives is inversely related to local economic conditions. Furthermore, we find Republican counties are more apt to use incentives, though counties dominated by one political party are less likely to use them.
- 2 September 2009
- Published by Wiley in Growth and Change
- Vol. 40 (3) , 418-451
Poverty and Local Governments: Economic Development and Community Service Provision in an Era of Decentralization
Social scientists have given substantial attention to poverty across U.S. localities. However, most work views localities through the lens of population aggregates, not as units of government. Few poverty researchers question whether governments of poorer localities have the capacity to engage in economic development and service activities that might improve community well‐being. This issue is increasingly important as responsibilities for growth and redistribution are decentralized to local governments that vary dramatically in resources. Do poorer communities have less activist local governments? Are they more likely to be engaged in a race to the bottom, focusing on business attraction activities but neglecting services for families and working people? We bring together two distinct literatures, critical research on decentralization and research on local development efforts, that provide contrasting views about the penalty of poverty. Data are from a unique, national survey of county governments measuring activity across two time points. The most consistent determinants of activity are local government capacity, devolutionary pressures, and inertia or past use of strategies. Net of these factors, levels and changes in poverty do not significantly impact government activity. There is no evidence the nations' poorest counties are racing to the bottom. Findings challenge views that poverty is a systematic structural barrier to pursuing innovative economic development policies and suggest that even poorer communities can take steps to build local capacity, resources, and networks that expand programs for local businesses and low‐wage people.
- 2 September 2009
- Published by Wiley in Growth and Change
- Vol. 40 (3) , 418-451
Poverty and Local Governments: Economic Development and Community Service Provision in an Era of Decentralization
Social scientists have given substantial attention to poverty across U.S. localities. However, most work views localities through the lens of population aggregates, not as units of government. Few poverty researchers question whether governments of poorer localities have the capacity to engage in economic development and service activities that might improve community well‐being. This issue is increasingly important as responsibilities for growth and redistribution are decentralized to local governments that vary dramatically in resources. Do poorer communities have less activist local governments? Are they more likely to be engaged in a race to the bottom, focusing on business attraction activities but neglecting services for families and working people? We bring together two distinct literatures, critical research on decentralization and research on local development efforts, that provide contrasting views about the penalty of poverty. Data are from a unique, national survey of county governments measuring activity across two time points. The most consistent determinants of activity are local government capacity, devolutionary pressures, and inertia or past use of strategies. Net of these factors, levels and changes in poverty do not significantly impact government activity. There is no evidence the nations' poorest counties are racing to the bottom. Findings challenge views that poverty is a systematic structural barrier to pursuing innovative economic development policies and suggest that even poorer communities can take steps to build local capacity, resources, and networks that expand programs for local businesses and low‐wage people.
- 1 January 2002
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 42 (4) , 703-730
The Effect of State Economic Development Incentives on Employment Growth of Establishments
This paper examines the effects of state economic development incentives on the growth of 366 Ohio manufacturing and nonmanufacturing establishments that launched major expansions between 1993 and 1995. Growth is measured as the actual employment change that occurred in these establishments and as the employment growth announced when expansions were launched. Empirical findings indicate that incentives have very little (or even a negative) effect on actual growth and they have a substantial positive effect on announced growth. Findings also suggest that establishments that received incentives overestimated their announced employment targets more than establishments that did not receive incentives.
- 1 January 2002
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Regional Science
- Vol. 42 (4) , 703-730
The Effect of State Economic Development Incentives on Employment Growth of Establishments
This paper examines the effects of state economic development incentives on the growth of 366 Ohio manufacturing and nonmanufacturing establishments that launched major expansions between 1993 and 1995. Growth is measured as the actual employment change that occurred in these establishments and as the employment growth announced when expansions were launched. Empirical findings indicate that incentives have very little (or even a negative) effect on actual growth and they have a substantial positive effect on announced growth. Findings also suggest that establishments that received incentives overestimated their announced employment targets more than establishments that did not receive incentives.
- 1 April 2001
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Regional Science Review
- Vol. 24 (2) , 261-281
The Effects of Infrastructure Investment: A Two-Sector Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for Ohio
The effects of increased public investment on regional output and welfare in Ohio are investigated using a regional dynamic computable general equilibrium model. Public investment affects the growth of the state economy, although the magnitude of the effect depends on the public capital elasticity. Our simulations indicate that public capital is underprovided in Ohio in base year 1990. Accounting for congestion in the use of infrastructure diminishes the positive effects of increased public investment only slightly. Beyond some level, more infrastructure investment does not increase the household welfare and can actually reduce it.
- 1 April 2001
- Published by SAGE Publications in International Regional Science Review
- Vol. 24 (2) , 261-281
The Effects of Infrastructure Investment: A Two-Sector Dynamic Computable General Equilibrium Analysis for Ohio
The effects of increased public investment on regional output and welfare in Ohio are investigated using a regional dynamic computable general equilibrium model. Public investment affects the growth of the state economy, although the magnitude of the effect depends on the public capital elasticity. Our simulations indicate that public capital is underprovided in Ohio in base year 1990. Accounting for congestion in the use of infrastructure diminishes the positive effects of increased public investment only slightly. Beyond some level, more infrastructure investment does not increase the household welfare and can actually reduce it.