Zhong-Zhong Jiang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Zhong-Zhong Jiang has a total of 95 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Na He
5 shared publicationsXiaohong Chen
School of Business, Central South University, Changsha, China
5 shared publications- Na He
School of Business Administration & Institute of Behavioral and Service Operations Management, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China
4 shared publications - Wang Hung Ip
Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong, China
4 shared publications - Chunqiao Tan
School of Business, Central South University, Changsha, China
3 shared publications - Guoren Wang
Beijing Institute of Technology, Beijing, China
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 26 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 216-232
EVT2: Efficient and Verifiable Trajectory Top-k Queries in Hybrid-Storage Blockchains
- 26 September 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 216-232
EVT2: Efficient and Verifiable Trajectory Top-k Queries in Hybrid-Storage Blockchains
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 303
Digital platform selection and decision optimization for service-oriented manufacturing
- 13 September 2026
- Published by Elsevier in International Journal of Production Economics
- Vol. 303
Digital platform selection and decision optimization for service-oriented manufacturing
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in ENGINEERING Management
- p. 1-53
Data-driven behavior-based operations management for service-oriented manufacturing: A systematic review
- 29 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in ENGINEERING Management
- p. 1-53
Data-driven behavior-based operations management for service-oriented manufacturing: A systematic review
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 335 (3) , 919-932
Dual-perspective imbalance-aware feature selection for multi-label learning
- 17 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in European Journal of Operational Research
- Vol. 335 (3) , 919-932
Dual-perspective imbalance-aware feature selection for multi-label learning
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
Are Auction-Based Promotions More Profitable for Short Video Platforms than Fixed Pricing?
Short video platforms increasingly offer paid promotion tools that allow creators to boost the visibility of their content. These tools are typically priced through either fixed fees or auction-based bidding systems. We examine how these two promotion mechanisms affect platform revenue, creator incentives, and the engagement of promoted content. Our results show that auction-based promotion does not universally outperform fixed pricing. Auctions generate higher platform revenue only when competition for viewer attention is sufficiently intense—that is, when the number of creators relative to viewers is high. When competition among creators is limited, fixed pricing can produce greater revenue while maintaining stronger engagement. We also find that auctions attract more creators to promote their videos, but this broader participation can dilute engagement by allowing lower-appeal videos into the promotion queue. For creators, auctions tend to benefit those with very high-appeal or very low-appeal content, whereas those with moderately appealing content may be disadvantaged. These findings suggest that platforms should align their promotion policies with the maturity of their creator ecosystems, utilizing fixed pricing in early stages and shifting to auction mechanisms as competition intensifies. Ultimately, our framework empowers managers to dynamically adapt their pricing strategies as their user bases evolve.
- 21 April 2026
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Information Systems Research
Are Auction-Based Promotions More Profitable for Short Video Platforms than Fixed Pricing?
Short video platforms increasingly offer paid promotion tools that allow creators to boost the visibility of their content. These tools are typically priced through either fixed fees or auction-based bidding systems. We examine how these two promotion mechanisms affect platform revenue, creator incentives, and the engagement of promoted content. Our results show that auction-based promotion does not universally outperform fixed pricing. Auctions generate higher platform revenue only when competition for viewer attention is sufficiently intense—that is, when the number of creators relative to viewers is high. When competition among creators is limited, fixed pricing can produce greater revenue while maintaining stronger engagement. We also find that auctions attract more creators to promote their videos, but this broader participation can dilute engagement by allowing lower-appeal videos into the promotion queue. For creators, auctions tend to benefit those with very high-appeal or very low-appeal content, whereas those with moderately appealing content may be disadvantaged. These findings suggest that platforms should align their promotion policies with the maturity of their creator ecosystems, utilizing fixed pricing in early stages and shifting to auction mechanisms as competition intensifies. Ultimately, our framework empowers managers to dynamically adapt their pricing strategies as their user bases evolve.
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics
- Vol. 38 (10) , 3444-3459
The paradox of stringent environmental policies: the feedback between regulatory uncertainty and green technology adoption in competitive shipping
Purpose: Carriers face complex green strategic decisions, which are further complicated by regulatory uncertainty, particularly when enforcement intensity is influenced by endogenous factors such as industry-wide technology adoption. This study aimed to understand the impact of the feedback between regulatory uncertainty and green strategies in the shipping market. Design/methodology/approach: This article develops a two-period game-theoretic model to examine how dual regulatory uncertainty (occurrence uncertainty and stringency uncertainty) – modulated by feedback from carriers' green strategies – affects equilibrium results in a competitive freight market. Carriers choose between operational and technical compliance pathways and simultaneously set freight prices. The model captures the dynamic interplay between regulatory expectations, adoption behavior and market competition. Findings: This study derives conditions under which stringent regulation can paradoxically reduce carriers' incentives for early green investment. Additionally, the results show that regulatory uncertainty can lead to asymmetric profitability outcomes among competing carriers, thereby accelerating market concentration. Originality/value: The framework contributes to the literature by endogenizing regulatory evolution within a strategic decision-making model, offering generalizable insights into policy-induced market distortions and strategic underinvestment. The findings have implications for the design of adaptive environmental regulations in freight transport systems.
- 3 April 2026
- Published by Emerald Publishing in Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics
- Vol. 38 (10) , 3444-3459
The paradox of stringent environmental policies: the feedback between regulatory uncertainty and green technology adoption in competitive shipping
Purpose: Carriers face complex green strategic decisions, which are further complicated by regulatory uncertainty, particularly when enforcement intensity is influenced by endogenous factors such as industry-wide technology adoption. This study aimed to understand the impact of the feedback between regulatory uncertainty and green strategies in the shipping market. Design/methodology/approach: This article develops a two-period game-theoretic model to examine how dual regulatory uncertainty (occurrence uncertainty and stringency uncertainty) – modulated by feedback from carriers' green strategies – affects equilibrium results in a competitive freight market. Carriers choose between operational and technical compliance pathways and simultaneously set freight prices. The model captures the dynamic interplay between regulatory expectations, adoption behavior and market competition. Findings: This study derives conditions under which stringent regulation can paradoxically reduce carriers' incentives for early green investment. Additionally, the results show that regulatory uncertainty can lead to asymmetric profitability outcomes among competing carriers, thereby accelerating market concentration. Originality/value: The framework contributes to the literature by endogenizing regulatory evolution within a strategic decision-making model, offering generalizable insights into policy-induced market distortions and strategic underinvestment. The findings have implications for the design of adaptive environmental regulations in freight transport systems.
- 28 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
- Vol. 73 (7) , 1067-1083
Offering Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping as a Service: Electric Vehicle Manufacturers or Battery Producers?
To accelerate electric vehicle (EV) adoption and overcome the limitations of traditional EV charging—such as long charging time and lack of access to home chargers for urban residents—Battery as a Service (BaaS) has emerged as a promising alternative. Implementing the BaaS model requires investment and operation of battery swapping stations. As both EV manufacturers and battery producers venture into this domain, it raises the question: which party is better positioned to build and operate such infrastructure? We develop a game‐theoretical model with one battery supplier and one vehicle manufacturer to compare two BaaS operating models: “manufacturer‐operated” model (Model‐M) and “supplier‐operated” model (Model‐S), which differ fundamentally in supply chain structure. In the base model, Model‐S induces a larger number of battery swapping stations built. However, Model‐M entices more customers to adopt EVs and generates higher profits for the manufacturer. Interestingly, Model‐M may also be preferred by the supplier, despite requiring the supplier to cede some decision‐making authority. Extending the analysis to a setting with two competing EV manufacturers, we show that the relative efficiency between Model‐M and Model‐S depends on the degree of downstream competition. Specifically, Model‐M tends to be socially optimal in low‐competition environments, whereas Model‐S gains ground as competition intensifies. Finally, we show that as battery‐related costs account for a larger share of total network costs for each additional station built, Model‐S becomes the preferred structure for both the manufacturer and supplier over a larger range of parameters. Our paper offers insights for industry leaders and policymakers in determining which party should lead the effort of investing and operating the BaaS model.
- 28 March 2026
- Published by Wiley in Naval Research Logistics (NRL)
- Vol. 73 (7) , 1067-1083
Offering Electric Vehicle Battery Swapping as a Service: Electric Vehicle Manufacturers or Battery Producers?
To accelerate electric vehicle (EV) adoption and overcome the limitations of traditional EV charging—such as long charging time and lack of access to home chargers for urban residents—Battery as a Service (BaaS) has emerged as a promising alternative. Implementing the BaaS model requires investment and operation of battery swapping stations. As both EV manufacturers and battery producers venture into this domain, it raises the question: which party is better positioned to build and operate such infrastructure? We develop a game‐theoretical model with one battery supplier and one vehicle manufacturer to compare two BaaS operating models: “manufacturer‐operated” model (Model‐M) and “supplier‐operated” model (Model‐S), which differ fundamentally in supply chain structure. In the base model, Model‐S induces a larger number of battery swapping stations built. However, Model‐M entices more customers to adopt EVs and generates higher profits for the manufacturer. Interestingly, Model‐M may also be preferred by the supplier, despite requiring the supplier to cede some decision‐making authority. Extending the analysis to a setting with two competing EV manufacturers, we show that the relative efficiency between Model‐M and Model‐S depends on the degree of downstream competition. Specifically, Model‐M tends to be socially optimal in low‐competition environments, whereas Model‐S gains ground as competition intensifies. Finally, we show that as battery‐related costs account for a larger share of total network costs for each additional station built, Model‐S becomes the preferred structure for both the manufacturer and supplier over a larger range of parameters. Our paper offers insights for industry leaders and policymakers in determining which party should lead the effort of investing and operating the BaaS model.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 64 (5) , 1968-1982
Inducing consumers’ anticipated regret or not? The optimal selling strategy with group buying
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Production Research
- Vol. 64 (5) , 1968-1982
Inducing consumers’ anticipated regret or not? The optimal selling strategy with group buying
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (12) , 3775-3792
Contract Selection and Piracy Surveillance for Video Platforms in the Age of Social Media
Pirated video clips, a new form of piracy, have spread rapidly in recent years with the vigorous development of short‐video social media platforms such as TikTok and Douyin . This has led to a huge loss of revenue for the film and TV drama industry where the negative economic impact trickles down from legitimate video platforms to content creators. As video platforms fight back against copyright infringement, they need to decide how much effort to invest in detecting and taking down pirated video clips that emerge on social media platforms. In addition, they need to decide whether a lump sum or unit price contract should be used to secure the playing rights for a video from the content creator. A content creator has no incentive to engage in piracy surveillance together with the video platform after signing a lump sum contract but has an incentive to do so after signing a unit price contract because he/she would receive royalties each time someone watches the copyrighted video. Using an analytical model framework, we find that the video platform should use a unit price contract when production of the video is less costly for the same quality (e.g., music‐based, horror, and romance movies) but a lump sum contract when production is costly (e.g., Sci‐fi, animation, and fantasy genres). We show that in equilibrium, the total surveillance effort between the video platform and the content creator is smaller and the video platform charges customers less to watch the copyrighted video under the lump sum contract compared to the unit price contract. As a result, the lump sum contract not only achieves higher consumer surplus compared to the unit price contract but also leads to a higher percentage of customers legally accessing the video program. Finally, the content creator's revenue is the same under both contracts, but the content creator may prefer the lump sum contract because it attracts more (legal or illegal) viewers and the increased visibility could be beneficial in the long run.
- 14 November 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Production and Operations Management
- Vol. 34 (12) , 3775-3792
Top Cited PapersContract Selection and Piracy Surveillance for Video Platforms in the Age of Social Media
Pirated video clips, a new form of piracy, have spread rapidly in recent years with the vigorous development of short‐video social media platforms such as TikTok and Douyin . This has led to a huge loss of revenue for the film and TV drama industry where the negative economic impact trickles down from legitimate video platforms to content creators. As video platforms fight back against copyright infringement, they need to decide how much effort to invest in detecting and taking down pirated video clips that emerge on social media platforms. In addition, they need to decide whether a lump sum or unit price contract should be used to secure the playing rights for a video from the content creator. A content creator has no incentive to engage in piracy surveillance together with the video platform after signing a lump sum contract but has an incentive to do so after signing a unit price contract because he/she would receive royalties each time someone watches the copyrighted video. Using an analytical model framework, we find that the video platform should use a unit price contract when production of the video is less costly for the same quality (e.g., music‐based, horror, and romance movies) but a lump sum contract when production is costly (e.g., Sci‐fi, animation, and fantasy genres). We show that in equilibrium, the total surveillance effort between the video platform and the content creator is smaller and the video platform charges customers less to watch the copyrighted video under the lump sum contract compared to the unit price contract. As a result, the lump sum contract not only achieves higher consumer surplus compared to the unit price contract but also leads to a higher percentage of customers legally accessing the video program. Finally, the content creator's revenue is the same under both contracts, but the content creator may prefer the lump sum contract because it attracts more (legal or illegal) viewers and the increased visibility could be beneficial in the long run.
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 359 (2) , 2149-2187
A multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on incremental support vector regression for the irregular strip packing problem
- 1 May 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 359 (2) , 2149-2187
A multi-objective evolutionary algorithm based on incremental support vector regression for the irregular strip packing problem