Michael L. Stern
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Michael L. Stern has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- T. Randolph Beard
Auburn University
3 shared publications - David L. Kaserman
Department of Economics, Auburn University, Auburn, AL 36849, USA
1 shared publication George S. Ford
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economics Public Policy Studies Washington DC USA
1 shared publication- Joachim Zietz
EBS University of Business and Law
1 shared publication - John M. Nunley
University of Wisconsin - La Crosse
1 shared publication Lawrence J. Spiwak
Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal and Economics Public Policy Studies Washington DC USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 27 June 2018
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 39 (6) , 638-651
Regulating, joint bargaining, and the demise of precedent
Recent decades have seen a fundamental shift in the nature of economic regulation in the United States. Unauthorized by congress, and largely unnoted in legal and academic circles, regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission have changed the regulatory process by linking otherwise unrelated regulatory issues. Examples include tying merger approval to firm commitments to engage in conceptually unrelated build‐outs and other projects of political importance. This linking of issues has several effects, the most prominent being (a) tying regulatory issues changes the outcomes obtained, plausibly in predictable ways; (b) tying in some circumstances allows regulators to extend their authority to issues for which they have little or no legal authority; and (c) tied regulatory bargaining fails to produce valid legal precedent for firm decision making. We provide an analysis of these conclusions by examining the increasing use of consent decrees, voluntary merger commitments, and merger conditions by the Federal Communications Commission, referencing our discussion with a simple model of joint bargaining applicable to regulatory practice.
- 27 June 2018
- Published by Wiley in Managerial and Decision Economics
- Vol. 39 (6) , 638-651
Regulating, joint bargaining, and the demise of precedent
Recent decades have seen a fundamental shift in the nature of economic regulation in the United States. Unauthorized by congress, and largely unnoted in legal and academic circles, regulatory agencies such as the Federal Communications Commission have changed the regulatory process by linking otherwise unrelated regulatory issues. Examples include tying merger approval to firm commitments to engage in conceptually unrelated build‐outs and other projects of political importance. This linking of issues has several effects, the most prominent being (a) tying regulatory issues changes the outcomes obtained, plausibly in predictable ways; (b) tying in some circumstances allows regulators to extend their authority to issues for which they have little or no legal authority; and (c) tied regulatory bargaining fails to produce valid legal precedent for firm decision making. We provide an analysis of these conclusions by examining the increasing use of consent decrees, voluntary merger commitments, and merger conditions by the Federal Communications Commission, referencing our discussion with a simple model of joint bargaining applicable to regulatory practice.
- 12 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Economic Policy
- Vol. 34 (3) , 483-499
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON PROPERTY CRIME
Using U.S. data from 1950 to 2010, we analyze to what extent inflation raises the incidence of property crime. To match our theoretical predictions, we consider different types of property crime (larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery) and broad and narrow definitions of inflation separately. We control for the state of the business cycle and demographic changes over time explicitly. Unobserved or difficult‐to‐measure determinants of property crime are captured through a stochastic‐trend specification within a state‐space framework. We find a robust statistical link between inflation and each of the four property crime rates. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of inflation and the inclusion or exclusion of different control variables. In terms of policy, our findings suggest that monetary policy that creates inflation has costly spillover effects. (JEL J10, J11)
- 12 November 2015
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Economic Policy
- Vol. 34 (3) , 483-499
THE IMPACT OF INFLATION ON PROPERTY CRIME
Using U.S. data from 1950 to 2010, we analyze to what extent inflation raises the incidence of property crime. To match our theoretical predictions, we consider different types of property crime (larceny, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and robbery) and broad and narrow definitions of inflation separately. We control for the state of the business cycle and demographic changes over time explicitly. Unobserved or difficult‐to‐measure determinants of property crime are captured through a stochastic‐trend specification within a state‐space framework. We find a robust statistical link between inflation and each of the four property crime rates. Our findings are robust to alternative definitions of inflation and the inclusion or exclusion of different control variables. In terms of policy, our findings suggest that monetary policy that creates inflation has costly spillover effects. (JEL J10, J11)
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 76 (2) , 500-512
Price Discrimination and Efficient Distribution
- 1 October 2009
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 76 (2) , 500-512
Price Discrimination and Efficient Distribution
- 22 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 840-861
CONTINUOUS CROSS SUBSIDIES AND QUANTITY RESTRICTIONS*
- 22 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 56 (4) , 840-861
CONTINUOUS CROSS SUBSIDIES AND QUANTITY RESTRICTIONS*
- 17 June 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 8 (1)
Expected Equity Returns and the Demand for Money
This paper investigates the role of equity markets in the determination of money demand. Expected equity returns are found to be significant determinants of money demand in the long run. We also uncover a strong positive drift in the elasticity of money demand with respect to expected equity returns. Moreover, this elasticity has recently become positive. We explain the puzzle of positive interest elasticity by modifying a conventional model of money demand. We show that if equities are also allowed to provide some liquidity, then the model can support both positive and negative elasticities with respect to expected returns.
- 17 June 2008
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics
- Vol. 8 (1)
Expected Equity Returns and the Demand for Money
This paper investigates the role of equity markets in the determination of money demand. Expected equity returns are found to be significant determinants of money demand in the long run. We also uncover a strong positive drift in the elasticity of money demand with respect to expected equity returns. Moreover, this elasticity has recently become positive. We explain the puzzle of positive interest elasticity by modifying a conventional model of money demand. We show that if equities are also allowed to provide some liquidity, then the model can support both positive and negative elasticities with respect to expected returns.
- 30 October 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 86-94
Bounding consumer surplus by monopoly profits
- 30 October 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 34 (1) , 86-94
Bounding consumer surplus by monopoly profits
- 4 October 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 29 (1) , 49-70
Endogenous time preference and optimal growth
- 4 October 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 29 (1) , 49-70
Endogenous time preference and optimal growth