Laszlo A. Koczy
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Laszlo A. Koczy has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Balazs R. Sziklai
Institute of Economics, HUN-REN Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Budapest, Hungary
6 shared publications - P. Jean-Jacques Herings
Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, 5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands
6 shared publications - Péter Csóka
Corvinus University of Budapest; Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) - Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (HAS)
5 shared publications Balázs R. Sziklai
3 shared publicationsDávid Csercsik
3 shared publicationsLuc Lauwers
Center for Economic Studies
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 47 (5) , 195-224
A Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment
AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade natural gas in the European Union. Throughout the consultation process, AggregateEU has been mocked as ‘Tinder of the European gas markets’ as it helps consumers and suppliers find partners, but leaves it up to the matched partners to decide whether to contract for potential trade. The non-commitment nature leads to substantial overbidding and many non-realised matches. We propose a quantitative modelling framework to study the effect of overbidding in the AggergateEU demand aggregation or joint purchasing mechanism. We conclude that the mechanism is prone to overbidding and that overbidding has ambiguous effects on trade. Depending on the parameters, overbidding may facilitate trade, but may also result in highly inefficient outcomes when overbidding is combined with miscoordination over the delivery points. Suggested remedies include allowing for convex bids, restrictions on overbidding or giving up part of the non-binding character of the market. Our results suggest that a potential future mechanism allowing the coordination of multiple delivery points could enhance the efficiency of gas markets. JEL Classification : C72, Noncooperative Games; C63, Computational Techniques; Simulation Modelling; D40, Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General; Q40, Energy: General
- 27 July 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Energy Journal
- Vol. 47 (5) , 195-224
Open AccessA Model-Based Analysis of the AggregateEU Mechanism: Implications of Overbidding and Non-Commitment
AggregateEU is a new centralised mechanism that provides a no-commitment platform to trade natural gas in the European Union. Throughout the consultation process, AggregateEU has been mocked as ‘Tinder of the European gas markets’ as it helps consumers and suppliers find partners, but leaves it up to the matched partners to decide whether to contract for potential trade. The non-commitment nature leads to substantial overbidding and many non-realised matches. We propose a quantitative modelling framework to study the effect of overbidding in the AggergateEU demand aggregation or joint purchasing mechanism. We conclude that the mechanism is prone to overbidding and that overbidding has ambiguous effects on trade. Depending on the parameters, overbidding may facilitate trade, but may also result in highly inefficient outcomes when overbidding is combined with miscoordination over the delivery points. Suggested remedies include allowing for convex bids, restrictions on overbidding or giving up part of the non-binding character of the market. Our results suggest that a potential future mechanism allowing the coordination of multiple delivery points could enhance the efficiency of gas markets. JEL Classification : C72, Noncooperative Games; C63, Computational Techniques; Simulation Modelling; D40, Market Structure, Pricing, and Design: General; Q40, Energy: General
- Open Access
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 361 (2) , 727-750
One Man, One Vote, One Price
Introduced initially to allocate parliamentary seats among states or provinces, apportionment methods can distribute any discrete scarce resource based on a series of claims or budgets such as the states’ voting populations. Here, we focus on the price of representation: how one can turn the claims, such as the number of voters, into a share of the resource, such as parliamentary seats. The D’Hondt method naturally emerges as a competitive equilibrium. We show that the class of parametric divisor methods is fully characterised by a competitive equilibrium augmented by a uniform credit or debt with respect to the original claims. Based on the insight gained from the competitive equilibrium representation, we provide an alternative proof of majorization: divisor methods with smaller parameters favour players with smaller budgets and vice versa . While in a competitive equilibrium, all pay the same price, when the budget allows for the purchase of a few items, leftovers may constitute a substantial part of the original budget. In other words, not all are equally efficient at converting their budgets into items. Optimisation apportionment methods, such as the Leximin, assign individual prices; hence, each budget is fully spent, and focus on minimising price differences. We demonstrate how the D’Hondt and Adams methods can be formulated as optimisation methods and highlight their connection to the Leximin method.
- 3 February 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 361 (2) , 727-750
Open AccessOne Man, One Vote, One Price
Introduced initially to allocate parliamentary seats among states or provinces, apportionment methods can distribute any discrete scarce resource based on a series of claims or budgets such as the states’ voting populations. Here, we focus on the price of representation: how one can turn the claims, such as the number of voters, into a share of the resource, such as parliamentary seats. The D’Hondt method naturally emerges as a competitive equilibrium. We show that the class of parametric divisor methods is fully characterised by a competitive equilibrium augmented by a uniform credit or debt with respect to the original claims. Based on the insight gained from the competitive equilibrium representation, we provide an alternative proof of majorization: divisor methods with smaller parameters favour players with smaller budgets and vice versa . While in a competitive equilibrium, all pay the same price, when the budget allows for the purchase of a few items, leftovers may constitute a substantial part of the original budget. In other words, not all are equally efficient at converting their budgets into items. Optimisation apportionment methods, such as the Leximin, assign individual prices; hence, each budget is fully spent, and focus on minimising price differences. We demonstrate how the D’Hondt and Adams methods can be formulated as optimisation methods and highlight their connection to the Leximin method.
- Open Access
Apportionment methods in resource allocation
- Open Access
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Strategy Reviews
- Vol. 44
Nord Stream 2: A prelude to war
- 3 November 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Strategy Reviews
- Vol. 44
Open AccessNord Stream 2: A prelude to war
- Open Access
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 99
Does risk sorting explain overpricing in experimental asset markets?
- 20 April 2022
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 99
Open AccessDoes risk sorting explain overpricing in experimental asset markets?
- Open Access
- 23 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 318 (2) , 1001-1027
Core-stability over networks with widespread externalities
The Covid-19 epidemic highlighted the significance of externalities: contacts with other people affect the chances of getting infected for our entire network. We study endogenous network formation where not only players or pairs but larger coalitions can, cooperatively change the network. We introduce a model for coalitional network stability for networks with widespread externalities. The network function form generalises the partition function form of cooperative games in allowing the network to be taken into account. The recursive core for network function form games generalises the recursive core for such environments. We present two simple examples to illustrate positive and negative externalities. The first is of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries; this simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. The second models social contacts during an epidemic and finds social bubbles as the solution.
- 23 March 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 318 (2) , 1001-1027
Open AccessCore-stability over networks with widespread externalities
The Covid-19 epidemic highlighted the significance of externalities: contacts with other people affect the chances of getting infected for our entire network. We study endogenous network formation where not only players or pairs but larger coalitions can, cooperatively change the network. We introduce a model for coalitional network stability for networks with widespread externalities. The network function form generalises the partition function form of cooperative games in allowing the network to be taken into account. The recursive core for network function form games generalises the recursive core for such environments. We present two simple examples to illustrate positive and negative externalities. The first is of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries; this simple setting also models economic situations such as airline networks. The second models social contacts during an epidemic and finds social bubbles as the solution.
- Open Access
Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council
Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.
Open AccessExits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council
Debates on an EU-leaving referendum arose in several member states after Brexit. We want to highlight how the exit of an additional country affects the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. We inspect the power indices of the member states both with and without the country which might leave the union. Our results show a pattern connected to a change in the number of states required to meet the 55% threshold. An exit that modifies this number benefits the countries with high population, while an exit that does not cause such a change benefits the small member states. According to our calculations, only the exit of Poland would be supported by the qualified majority of the Council.
- Open Access
Brexit and Power in the Council of the European Union
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley–Shubik power index, we calculate the member states’ powers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat’s latest population projections. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members’ powers while decreasing the smallest ones’ powers.
Open AccessBrexit and Power in the Council of the European Union
The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union has had profound economic and political effects. Here, we look at a particular aspect, the power distribution in the Council of the European Union. Using the Shapley–Shubik power index, we calculate the member states’ powers with and without the United Kingdom and update earlier power forecasts using the Eurostat’s latest population projections. There is a remarkably sharp relation between population size and the change in power: Brexit increases the largest members’ powers while decreasing the smallest ones’ powers.
- Open Access
- 20 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 127, 67-79
The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- 20 February 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 127, 67-79
Open AccessThe equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games
- Open Access
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 144
The impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Policy
- Vol. 144
Open AccessThe impact of Nord Stream 2 on the European gas market bargaining positions