William M. Liefert
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
William M. Liefert has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Olga Liefert
United States Department of Agriculture
4 shared publications- Mathew Shane
William Liefert, Olga Liefert and Mathew Shane are economists with the Market and Trade Economics Division of the Economic Research Service, USDA. The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not in any way represent official USDA views or policies.s:;;
2 shared publications - Olga Liefert
Consultant, Economic Research Service, USDA
2 shared publications John Wainio
Economic Research Service of USDA
1 shared publication- Michael A. Trueblood
Agricultural Economist, Economic Research Service, USDA
1 shared publication Paul Westcott
Economic Research Service of USDA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 12 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-94
Chapter 2: Russia’s Development as a Top Player in World Grain Trade
During the late Soviet period, Russia (along with the Soviet Union as a whole) was a major importer of grain, as well as soybeans and soybean meal, which were used to help feed the country’s growing livestock sector. The substantial reform-driven contraction in the livestock sector during the 1990s largely eliminated the need for grain imports. Beginning around 2000, Russia began to export grain, and into the 2010s it became major supplier on the world market. During 2016–2019, Russia exported on average 44 million metric tonnes a year, 10–14 percent of total world grain exports. The country’s dominant grain export is wheat, with Russia providing in the late 2010s around 20 percent of world market sales, thereby supplanting the United States as the world’s top wheat supplier. This chapter examines how Russia has developed into a major grain exporter, with the focus on how growing grain production since 2000 has generated surpluses for foreign sale.
- 12 November 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 69-94
Open AccessChapter 2: Russia’s Development as a Top Player in World Grain Trade
During the late Soviet period, Russia (along with the Soviet Union as a whole) was a major importer of grain, as well as soybeans and soybean meal, which were used to help feed the country’s growing livestock sector. The substantial reform-driven contraction in the livestock sector during the 1990s largely eliminated the need for grain imports. Beginning around 2000, Russia began to export grain, and into the 2010s it became major supplier on the world market. During 2016–2019, Russia exported on average 44 million metric tonnes a year, 10–14 percent of total world grain exports. The country’s dominant grain export is wheat, with Russia providing in the late 2010s around 20 percent of world market sales, thereby supplanting the United States as the world’s top wheat supplier. This chapter examines how Russia has developed into a major grain exporter, with the focus on how growing grain production since 2000 has generated surpluses for foreign sale.
- 12 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 231-245
The Development of the Eurasian Livestock and Grain Economies
- 12 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 231-245
The Development of the Eurasian Livestock and Grain Economies
- 3 September 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Eurasian Geography and Economics
- Vol. 56 (5) , 505-523
Russia’s potential to increase grain production by expanding area
Since 2000, Russia has substantially increased grain production and exports. The grain output growth has come from a rise in yields rather than area. After falling heavily during the 1990s, grain area stabilized during the 2000s and has remained flat, at about two-thirds the level of the late Soviet period. Using data on the regional structure of Russian grain production costs, this article examines the country’s potential to increase grain output further by returning the lost grain area to production. The analysis finds that if grain area were to grow beyond a certain level, one that is still well below the level of the late Soviet period, production costs would rise steeply. Therefore, any major expansion in grain area would require that world grain prices rise considerably beyond their level in the early 2010s to cover the high marginal costs of production.
- 3 September 2015
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Eurasian Geography and Economics
- Vol. 56 (5) , 505-523
Russia’s potential to increase grain production by expanding area
Since 2000, Russia has substantially increased grain production and exports. The grain output growth has come from a rise in yields rather than area. After falling heavily during the 1990s, grain area stabilized during the 2000s and has remained flat, at about two-thirds the level of the late Soviet period. Using data on the regional structure of Russian grain production costs, this article examines the country’s potential to increase grain output further by returning the lost grain area to production. The analysis finds that if grain area were to grow beyond a certain level, one that is still well below the level of the late Soviet period, production costs would rise steeply. Therefore, any major expansion in grain area would require that world grain prices rise considerably beyond their level in the early 2010s to cover the high marginal costs of production.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 37-75
Russian Agriculture during Transition: Performance, Global Impact, and Outlook
In the 2000s, Russia emerged as a major player in world agricultural markets, on both the supply (mainly grain) and demand side. This article examines Russia's agricultural transition experience, which has resulted in a complex system of diverse producers and institutions, as well as uneven performance. Using a model of transition agriculture, the article explores how key reform policies drove systemic change and commodity restructuring, and how the ensuing changes in the production, consumption, and trade of goods have affected world markets. The article also assesses the performance of Russian agriculture during transition, and provides an outlook for the future.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Wiley in Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy
- Vol. 34 (1) , 37-75
Open AccessRussian Agriculture during Transition: Performance, Global Impact, and Outlook
In the 2000s, Russia emerged as a major player in world agricultural markets, on both the supply (mainly grain) and demand side. This article examines Russia's agricultural transition experience, which has resulted in a complex system of diverse producers and institutions, as well as uneven performance. Using a model of transition agriculture, the article explores how key reform policies drove systemic change and commodity restructuring, and how the ensuing changes in the production, consumption, and trade of goods have affected world markets. The article also assesses the performance of Russian agriculture during transition, and provides an outlook for the future.
- 18 October 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 94 (2) , 435-441
Alternative Policies to Agricultural Export Bans that are Less Market‐Distorting
- 18 October 2011
- Published by Wiley in American Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 94 (2) , 435-441
Alternative Policies to Agricultural Export Bans that are Less Market‐Distorting
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in Eurochoices
- Vol. 9 (3) , 43-49
Russia’s Agricultural Imports: Will the High Growth of the 2000s Continue? Les importations agricoles russes : la forte croissance des années 2000 va-t-elle se poursuivre ? Russlands Agrarimporte: Wird das starke Wachstum aus den 2000er Jahren anhalten?
- 1 December 2010
- Published by Wiley in Eurochoices
- Vol. 9 (3) , 43-49
Russia’s Agricultural Imports: Will the High Growth of the 2000s Continue? Les importations agricoles russes : la forte croissance des années 2000 va-t-elle se poursuivre ? Russlands Agrarimporte: Wird das starke Wachstum aus den 2000er Jahren anhalten?
- 28 September 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 62 (1) , 119-136
Decomposing Changes in Agricultural Producer Prices
This article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices. The method builds on a procedure used by the World Bank, with the main variables in the decomposition being trade prices, exchange rates and trade policies. We expand on the World Bank decomposition procedure by broadening the analysis of policy effects, adding the effect from incomplete transmission of changes in trade prices and exchange rates to producer prices, and handling the effect on prices from interactions between variables as they change simultaneously. Decomposition results are presented for various commodities for the major emerging markets of Brazil, China and South Africa.
- 28 September 2010
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 62 (1) , 119-136
Decomposing Changes in Agricultural Producer Prices
This article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural producer prices. The method builds on a procedure used by the World Bank, with the main variables in the decomposition being trade prices, exchange rates and trade policies. We expand on the World Bank decomposition procedure by broadening the analysis of policy effects, adding the effect from incomplete transmission of changes in trade prices and exchange rates to producer prices, and handling the effect on prices from interactions between variables as they change simultaneously. Decomposition results are presented for various commodities for the major emerging markets of Brazil, China and South Africa.
- 14 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 40 (1) , 15-28
Decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps: an application to Russia
The article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps, defined as the difference between a commodity's domestic producer and border prices. We use OECD's procedure for decomposing changes in the market price support part of producer support estimates as the starting point for our decomposition method, and our method provides a basis for critiquing OECD's decomposition approach. The transmission of changes in border prices (world prices and the exchange rate) to domestic prices is a key element in the decomposition. The method is demonstrated using Russian agricultural price gaps. The results support the argument that for Russian agriculture during the transition period, the main cause of changes in price gaps has been incomplete transmission of changes in the exchange rate to domestic prices, and where the weak transmission results mainly not from policy intervention, but rather from deficient market conditions, in particular poor market infrastructure. The policy implication is that underdeveloped infrastructure has strongly limited the benefits to the Russian economy from agricultural trade liberalization.
- 14 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Agricultural Economics
- Vol. 40 (1) , 15-28
Decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps: an application to Russia
The article develops a method for decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps, defined as the difference between a commodity's domestic producer and border prices. We use OECD's procedure for decomposing changes in the market price support part of producer support estimates as the starting point for our decomposition method, and our method provides a basis for critiquing OECD's decomposition approach. The transmission of changes in border prices (world prices and the exchange rate) to domestic prices is a key element in the decomposition. The method is demonstrated using Russian agricultural price gaps. The results support the argument that for Russian agriculture during the transition period, the main cause of changes in price gaps has been incomplete transmission of changes in the exchange rate to domestic prices, and where the weak transmission results mainly not from policy intervention, but rather from deficient market conditions, in particular poor market infrastructure. The policy implication is that underdeveloped infrastructure has strongly limited the benefits to the Russian economy from agricultural trade liberalization.
- 21 March 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative Economic Studies
- Vol. 47 (1) , 214-223
The Allocative Efficiency of Material Input Use in Russian Agriculture
- 21 March 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Comparative Economic Studies
- Vol. 47 (1) , 214-223
The Allocative Efficiency of Material Input Use in Russian Agriculture
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in Eurochoices
- Vol. 2 (3) , 18-23
Can Russia be Competitive in Agriculture?
Summary: Can Russia be competitive inAgriculture?Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid‐1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis‐à‐vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4–5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years–with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports–and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russepourrait‐elle être compétitive ?Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro‐fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro‐fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable que la Russie reste un gros importateur de viandes ‐ le niveau des taxes sur le hors quotas déterminant les niveaux d'importation ‐, et un modeste exportateur de céréales. Kann Russland auf dem Agrarsektorwettbewerbsfähig sein?Die russische Landwirtschaft ist hinsichtlich der Kosten momentan nicht international wettbewerbsfähig. Seit Mitte der 1990er importiert Russland große Mengen an Fleisch, während der Getreidehandel in den meisten Jahren zwischen geringen Nettoimporten und ‐exporten schwankte. Russland hat jedoch große Mengen an wichtigen landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen, unter anderem 80% seiner Düngerproduktion, hauptsächlich in EU‐Länder exportiert. Forschungsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Russland in der Produktion von Getreide verglichen mit Fleisch einen komparativen Vorteil besitzt; dies trifft jedoch ebenfalls auf die Produktion von landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen verglichen mit landwirtschaftlichen Endprodukten zu. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die erwartete reale Aufwertung des russischen Rubel gegenüber den westlichen Währungen eine zusätzliche Verschlechterung der russischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Kosten im Bereich Fleisch und Getreide nach sich zieht; dies sollte sich jedoch durch ein moderates Produktivitätswachstum ausgleichen. Der erwartete Anstieg der Verbrauchereinkommen, der sich aus dem relativ hohen jährlichen Bruttoin‐landsproduktzuwachs von ca. 4–5 Prozent ableitet, sollte sich ebenfalls stimulierend auf die Nachfrage nach Fleischimporten auswirken. Im Frühjahr 2003 führte Russland Zolltarifkontingente für seine Schweine‐ und Rindfleischimporte ein und belegte seine Geflügelfleischimporte mit einem Importkontingent. Im Hinblick auf weitere Agrarerzeugnisse drängt Russland in den WTO‐Beitrittsverhandlungen darauf, höhere Einfuhrzölle als die gegenwärtig geltenden zuzulassen. In Anbetracht all dieser Veränderungen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland auch für die kommenden zehn Jahre große Mengen an Fleisch importieren–wobei möglicherweise Zolltarifkontingente die Menge bestimmen werden–und sich zu einem mäßigen Getreideexporteur entwickeln wird.
- 1 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in Eurochoices
- Vol. 2 (3) , 18-23
Can Russia be Competitive in Agriculture?
Summary: Can Russia be competitive inAgriculture?Russian agriculture currently is not internationally cost competitive. Since the mid‐1990s Russia has imported large volumes of meat, while the grain trade has fluctuated in most years between small net imports and exports. Russia has, however, exported large quantities of key agricultural inputs, including 80 per cent of fertilizer output, mainly to EU countries. Research indicates that Russia has a comparative advantage in producing grain compared to meat, but also a comparative advantage in producing agricultural inputs compared to agricultural outputs. The expected real appreciation of the Russian rouble vis‐à‐vis Western currencies should further damage Russia's cost competitiveness in meat and grain, but this should be offset by modest productivity growth. An expected rise in consumer income, deriving from relatively high annual GDP growth of about 4–5 per cent, should also stimulate demand for meat imports. In spring 2003, Russia imposed tariff rate quotas on its imports of beef and pork, and a pure quota on imports of poultry. For other agricultural commodities, Russia is pushing in its WTO accession negotiations for allowable agricultural import tariffs that are higher than current levels. Taking these changes together, it is likely that Russia will continue as a big meat importer for about the next ten years–with tariff rate quotas probably determining the level of meat imports–and will become a moderate grain exporter. L'agriculture russepourrait‐elle être compétitive ?Actuellement, l'agriculture russe n'est pas compétitive. La Russie a importé de gros volumes de viande depuis le milieu des années 90, tandis que la balance des échanges de céréales oscillait entre les faibles excédents et les faibles déficits. Cependant, la Russie est grande exportatrice d'agro‐fournitures dont, en particulier, 80% de sa production d'engrais, principalement vers l'Europe. On montre ici que l'avantage comparatif de la Russie se situe dans les céréales plutôt que dans la viande et, surtout, dans les agro‐fournitures plutôt que dans les denrées agricoles. La remontée, à laquelle il faut s'attendre, du rouble vis à vis des devises occidentales, devrait encore diminuer la compétitivité de la Russie en matière de viandes et de céréales, ce qui devrait être compensé par des gains de productivité même faibles. La hausse attendue des revenus des consommateurs, engenderée par une croissance élevée du revenu national, de l'ordre de 4 à 5% par an, devrait aussi stimuler la demande de viande importée. Au printemps 2003, la Russie s'est dotée d'un système de droits sur ses importations hors quotas de viande de bæuf et de pore, ainsi que d'un quota d'importation pour les produits avicoles. En ce qui conceme les autres produits agricoles, dans le cadre des négociations relatives à son entrée dans l'OMC, la Russie s'efforce d'obtenir l'autorisation d'augmenter les taxes à l'importation par rapport à leur niveau actuel. Au total done, à un horizon de l'ordre de dix ans, il est probable que la Russie reste un gros importateur de viandes ‐ le niveau des taxes sur le hors quotas déterminant les niveaux d'importation ‐, et un modeste exportateur de céréales. Kann Russland auf dem Agrarsektorwettbewerbsfähig sein?Die russische Landwirtschaft ist hinsichtlich der Kosten momentan nicht international wettbewerbsfähig. Seit Mitte der 1990er importiert Russland große Mengen an Fleisch, während der Getreidehandel in den meisten Jahren zwischen geringen Nettoimporten und ‐exporten schwankte. Russland hat jedoch große Mengen an wichtigen landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen, unter anderem 80% seiner Düngerproduktion, hauptsächlich in EU‐Länder exportiert. Forschungsergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Russland in der Produktion von Getreide verglichen mit Fleisch einen komparativen Vorteil besitzt; dies trifft jedoch ebenfalls auf die Produktion von landwirtschaftlichen Vorieistungen verglichen mit landwirtschaftlichen Endprodukten zu. Es ist anzunehmen, dass die erwartete reale Aufwertung des russischen Rubel gegenüber den westlichen Währungen eine zusätzliche Verschlechterung der russischen Wettbewerbsfähigkeit hinsichtlich der Kosten im Bereich Fleisch und Getreide nach sich zieht; dies sollte sich jedoch durch ein moderates Produktivitätswachstum ausgleichen. Der erwartete Anstieg der Verbrauchereinkommen, der sich aus dem relativ hohen jährlichen Bruttoin‐landsproduktzuwachs von ca. 4–5 Prozent ableitet, sollte sich ebenfalls stimulierend auf die Nachfrage nach Fleischimporten auswirken. Im Frühjahr 2003 führte Russland Zolltarifkontingente für seine Schweine‐ und Rindfleischimporte ein und belegte seine Geflügelfleischimporte mit einem Importkontingent. Im Hinblick auf weitere Agrarerzeugnisse drängt Russland in den WTO‐Beitrittsverhandlungen darauf, höhere Einfuhrzölle als die gegenwärtig geltenden zuzulassen. In Anbetracht all dieser Veränderungen ist es wahrscheinlich, dass Russland auch für die kommenden zehn Jahre große Mengen an Fleisch importieren–wobei möglicherweise Zolltarifkontingente die Menge bestimmen werden–und sich zu einem mäßigen Getreideexporteur entwickeln wird.