Daniel Gottlieb
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Daniel Gottlieb has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Humberto Moreira
Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation
2 shared publications - Aloisio Araujo
IMPA and EPGE/FGV
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 14 (4) , 601-623
Should Educational Policies Be Regressive?
- 24 July 2012
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 14 (4) , 601-623
Should Educational Policies Be Regressive?
- 9 July 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (4) , 673-684
Competition over Time‐Inconsistent Consumers
How do firms respond to consumers' time inconsistency? This paper studies the optimal design of nonexclusive contracts under competition. It shows that nonexclusivity creates a stark asymmetry between immediate‐costs goods and immediate‐rewards goods. For immediate‐cost goods nonexclusivity does not affect the equilibrium and, when consumers are sophisticated, the efficient allocation is achieved. When consumers are partially naive, the optimal sales tax may be either positive or negative and depends on parameters that are hard to estimate. In the case of immediate‐rewards goods, however, the equilibrium features marginal‐cost pricing and is always inefficient. Moreover, the optimal tax does not depend on the consumers' degree of naiveté and is a function of parameters that are easy to assess.
- 9 July 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 10 (4) , 673-684
Competition over Time‐Inconsistent Consumers
How do firms respond to consumers' time inconsistency? This paper studies the optimal design of nonexclusive contracts under competition. It shows that nonexclusivity creates a stark asymmetry between immediate‐costs goods and immediate‐rewards goods. For immediate‐cost goods nonexclusivity does not affect the equilibrium and, when consumers are sophisticated, the efficient allocation is achieved. When consumers are partially naive, the optimal sales tax may be either positive or negative and depends on parameters that are hard to estimate. In the case of immediate‐rewards goods, however, the equilibrium features marginal‐cost pricing and is always inefficient. Moreover, the optimal tax does not depend on the consumers' degree of naiveté and is a function of parameters that are easy to assess.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1020-1043
A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling
We develop a job‐market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.
- 1 December 2007
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 38 (4) , 1020-1043
A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling
We develop a job‐market signalling model where signals convey two pieces of information. This model is employed to study countersignalling (signals nonmonotonic in ability) and the GED exam. A result of the model is that countersignalling is more likely to occur in jobs that require a combination of skills that differs from the combination used in the schooling process. The model also produces testable implications consistent with evidence on the GED: (i) it signals both high cognitive and low noncognitive skills and (ii) it does not affect wages.