Borys Grochulski
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Borys Grochulski has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Yuzhe Zhang
Texas A&M University
4 shared publicationsFederal Reserve Bank Of Richmond
2 shared publicationsTexas A&M University
2 shared publicationsDaniel Schwam
1 shared publicationHarvard Business School
1 shared publicationRussell Wong
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 381-419
Termination as an incentive device
In this paper, we study the conditions under which termination is a useful incentive device in the canonical dynamic principal‐agent moral hazard model of Sannikov (2008). We find that temporary suspension of the agent after poor performance dominates termination if the principal's outside option is low and the agent's outside option is moderate. In suspension, the agent performs tasks free of moral hazard and receives no compensation, which rebuilds his “skin in the game” and allows for incentives to be restored without terminating. If the agent's outside option is low, suspension is ineffective because it rebuilds the agent's skin in the game too slowly. If the agent's outside option is high, the profitability of the relationship with the agent is low, so the principal prefers to terminate rather than extend the relationship through temporary suspension. Because the optimal use of suspension versus termination after poor performance can be highly sensitive to the principal's and agent's outside options, similar jobs can have vastly different average job durations, purely for incentive reasons.
- 1 January 2023
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 18 (1) , 381-419
Open AccessTermination as an incentive device
In this paper, we study the conditions under which termination is a useful incentive device in the canonical dynamic principal‐agent moral hazard model of Sannikov (2008). We find that temporary suspension of the agent after poor performance dominates termination if the principal's outside option is low and the agent's outside option is moderate. In suspension, the agent performs tasks free of moral hazard and receives no compensation, which rebuilds his “skin in the game” and allows for incentives to be restored without terminating. If the agent's outside option is low, suspension is ineffective because it rebuilds the agent's skin in the game too slowly. If the agent's outside option is high, the profitability of the relationship with the agent is low, so the principal prefers to terminate rather than extend the relationship through temporary suspension. Because the optimal use of suspension versus termination after poor performance can be highly sensitive to the principal's and agent's outside options, similar jobs can have vastly different average job durations, purely for incentive reasons.
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 68 (4) , 967-1015
Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
- 22 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Economic Theory
- Vol. 68 (4) , 967-1015
Optimal liquidity policy with shadow banking
- 16 August 2018
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Economic Quarterly
- Vol. 104 (1) , 1-33
Cyclical Properties of Bank Margins: Small versus Large Banks
- 16 August 2018
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Economic Quarterly
- Vol. 104 (1) , 1-33
Cyclical Properties of Bank Margins: Small versus Large Banks
- 29 September 2017
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers
Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk
- 29 September 2017
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond in Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Working Papers
Optimal incentive contracts with job destruction risk
- 29 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 58 (2) , 331-382
MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES
- 29 May 2017
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 58 (2) , 331-382
MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES