WDWalter R. Dowdle

Walter R. Dowdle

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Walter R. Dowdle has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • The principles and feasibility of disease eradication

    by Walter R. Dowdle, Stephen L. Cochi


    • 7 October 2011
      • Vol. 60  (4) , 27-34

    Laboratory contributions to public health.

    by Walter R Dowdle, Leonard W Mayer, Karen K Steinberg, Neelam D Ghiya, Tanja Popovic


  • Containment of Polioviruses After Eradication and OPV Cessation: Characterizing Risks to Improve Management

    by Walter Dowdle, Harrie Van Der Avoort, Esther De Gourville, Francis Delpeyroux, Jagadish Desphande, Tapani Hovi, Javier Martin, Mark Pallansch, Olen Kew, Chris Wolff

    The goal of the World Health Organization is to stop routine use of oral poliovirus vaccine shortly after interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. A key component of this goal is to minimize the risk of reintroduction by destruction of polioviruses except in an absolute minimum number of facilities that serve essential functions and implement effective containment. Effective containment begins with a complete facility risk assessment. This article focuses on characterizing the risks of exposure to polioviruses from the essential vaccine production, quality control, and international reference and research facilities that remain. We consider the potential exposure pathways that might lead to a poliovirus reintroduction, including para‐occupational exposures and releases to the environment, and review the literature to provide available estimates and a qualitative assessment of containment risks. Minimizing the risk of poliovirus transmission from a poliovirus facility to increasingly susceptible communities is a crucial and ongoing effort requiring understanding and actively managing the potential exposure pathways.


  • Open Access

    Influenza Pandemic Periodicity, Virus Recycling, and the Art of Risk Assessment

    by Walter R. Dowdle

    Influenza pandemic risk assessment is an uncertain art. The theory that influenza A virus pandemics occur every 10 to 11 years and seroarcheologic evidence of virus recycling set the stage in early 1976 for risk assessment and risk management of the Fort Dix, New Jersey, swine influenza outbreak. Additional data and passage of time proved the theory untenable. Much has been learned about influenza A virus and its natural history since 1976, but the exact conditions that lead to the emergence of a pandemic strain are still unknown. Current avian influenza events parallel those of swine influenza in 1976 but on a larger and more complex scale. Pre- and postpandemic risk assessment and risk management are continuous but separate public health functions.


    • 26 February 2004
      • Vol. 82  (1) , 59-62

    Will containment of wild poliovirus in laboratories and inactivated poliovirus vaccine production sites be effective for global certification?

    by Walter R Dowdle, Christopher Wolff, Raymond Sanders, Scott Lambert, Maureen Best

    The absolute laboratory containment of any virus cannot be guaranteed, but a wealth of experience indicates that effective containment of wild poliovirus materials for global certification is technically and operationally feasible. Effective containment is based on the principles of minimal wild poliovirus infectious and potentially infectious materials in laboratories; minimal risks of operations in laboratories and inactivated poliovirus vaccine production facilities; minimal susceptibility of workers to wild poliovirus infection and shedding; and minimal susceptibility of populations to wild poliovirus spread. Each principle alone is imperfect, but collectively they greatly minimize the risks of transmitting wild poliovirus from the laboratory to the community.


  • The role of surveillance in polio eradication and identification of emerging viral encephalitis

    by E. Gourville, W. R. Dowdle

    Summary In 1988, when the World Health Assembly resolved to eradicate paralytic poliomyelitis, polio was endemic in 125 countries on 5 continents with an estimated 350,000 cases annually. By 2002 , the number of countries was reduced to 7 and the number of cases by greater than 99%. Instrumental in this extraordinary progress is the timely detection and investigation of all cases of acute flaccid paralysis and the examination of stool samples in an accredited WHO Global Network laboratory. The Network consists of 124 National Poliovirus Laboratories, 15 Regional Reference Laboratories, and 7 Global Specialized Laboratories. Network Laboratories are held accountable to rigid performance standards for quality and timeliness in testing more than 60,000 stool samples annually. The Network is a hierarchical system in which polioviruses are isolated and identified in National Laboratories, differentiated as to wild or vaccine origin in Regional Reference Laboratories, and sequenced in Specialized Laboratories. Findings are promptly relayed to Regional and national program managers for immunization strategic planning, monitoring surveillance quality, and assessing eradication progress. Lessons from the Polio Laboratory Network demonstrate the value of a central coordinating body, an effective communication infrastructure, and full partnerships with peer epidemiology and medical sectors. Post-eradication polio surveillance will continue for many years. The Network legacy for other public health initiatives is access to an existing laboratory infrastructure and human resources with the proven ability to achieve technology transfer and quality laboratory performance even in resource-poor countries. Keywords Stool Sample Proficiency Test Acute Flaccid Paralysis Viral Encephalitis Oral Polio Vaccine These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

  • Polio eradication: the OPV paradox

    by Walter R. Dowdle, Esther De Gourville, Olen M. Kew, Mark A. Pallansch, David J. Wood

    Routine and mass administration of oral polio vaccine (OPV) since 1961 has prevented many millions of cases of paralytic poliomyelitis. The public health value of this inexpensive and easily administered product has been extraordinary. Progress of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative has further defined the value of OPV as well as its risk through vaccine‐associated paralytic poliomyelitis (VAPP) and vaccine‐derived polioviruses (VDPV). Although both are rare, once wild poliovirus transmission has been interrupted by OPV, the only poliomyelitis due to poliovirus will be caused by OPV. Poliovirus will be eradicated only when OPV use is discontinued. This paradox provides a major incentive for eventually stopping polio immunization or replacing OPV, but it also introduces complexity into the process of identifying safe and scientifically sound strategies for doing so. The core post eradication immunization issues include the risk/benefits of continued OPV use, the extent of OPV replacement with IPV, possible strategies for discontinuing OPV, and the potential for development and licensure of a safe and effective replacement for OPV. Formulation of an informed post eradication immunization policy requires careful evaluation of polio epidemiology, surveillance capability, vaccine availability, laboratory containment, and the risks posed by the very tool responsible for successful interruption of wild poliovirus transmission. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Open Access

    Preventing Polio from Becoming a Reemerging Disease

    by Walter R. Dowdle, Stephen L. Cochi, Steve Oberste, Roland Sutter