Rob Fraser

This paper develops the key finding of Ozanne, Hogan and Colman (2001) that risk aversion among farmers ameliorates the moral hazard problem in relation to agrienvironmental policy compliance. It is shown that risk averse farmers who face uncertainty in their production income are more likely to comply with such a policy as a means of risk management. In addition, it is shown that a principal who has control over both the level of monitoring and the size of penalty, if detected, can reduce non‐compliance by adjustments to these instruments which increase the variance of farmers' income but leave the expected penalty unchanged. It is concluded that risk management by both principals and agents has the potential to diminish the moral hazard problem, especially given proposed developments in agri‐environmental policy in the European Union.

This paper proposes modifications to the existing EU set‐aside policy which are designed to alleviate the problem of output slippage associated with heterogeneous land quality by using “incentive‐compatible” mechanisms drawn from principal‐agent theory. Specifically, it is suggested that there should be differential reference yields based on land quality to discourage the “adverse selection” of lower quality land for set‐aside, and that the scope of set‐aside monitoring should be expanded to include both the quantity and the quality of land set‐aside so as to discourage “moral hazard” problems. The potential of these modifications is illustrated using a numerical analysis, which is also used to evaluate the role of a range of factors which determine the set‐aside decision. Finally, an estimate of the “benefits” from reducing slippage required to justify the costs of including these modifications is provided.