Ronald Fagin
Ronald Fagin has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Moshe Y. Vardi
Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
4 shared publications - Joseph Y. Halpern
Cornell University
3 shared publications - Joseph Y. Halpern
IBM Almaden Research Center
2 shared publications Albert Atserias
Universitat Politecnica de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
1 shared publication- Arnaud Durand
Université de Caen
1 shared publication Balder Ten Cate
University of California, Santa Cruz, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 49 (2) , 365-366
Foreword
- 20 April 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory of Computing Systems
- Vol. 49 (2) , 365-366
Foreword
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 191-222
Schema Mapping Evolution Through Composition and Inversion
- 16 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 191-222
Schema Mapping Evolution Through Composition and Inversion
- 17 August 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 28 (3) , 331-365
The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge
- 17 August 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 28 (3) , 331-365
The hierarchical approach to modeling knowledge and common knowledge
- Open Access
Common knowledge revisited
We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised by Halpern and Moses: common knowledge is necessary for agreement and coordination, but common knowledge is unattainable in the real world because of temporal imprecision. We discuss two solutions to this paradox: (1) modeling the world with a coarser granularity, and (2) relaxing the requirements for coordination.
Open AccessCommon knowledge revisited
We consider the common-knowledge paradox raised by Halpern and Moses: common knowledge is necessary for agreement and coordination, but common knowledge is unattainable in the real world because of temporal imprecision. We discuss two solutions to this paradox: (1) modeling the world with a coarser granularity, and (2) relaxing the requirements for coordination.
- 28 July 1997
- Published by Springer Nature in Distributed Computing
- Vol. 10 (4) , 199-225
Knowledge-based programs
- 28 July 1997
- Published by Springer Nature in Distributed Computing
- Vol. 10 (4) , 199-225
Knowledge-based programs
- 1 January 1997
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Logic Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (4) , 431-455
Comparing the Power of Games on Graphs
- 1 January 1997
- Published by Wiley in Mathematical Logic Quarterly
- Vol. 43 (4) , 431-455
Comparing the Power of Games on Graphs
- 1 January 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 16 (2) , 215-232
Efficiently Extendible Mappings for Balanced Data Distribution
- 1 January 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 16 (2) , 215-232
Efficiently Extendible Mappings for Balanced Data Distribution
- 1 December 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 79 (2) , 203-240
A nonstandard approach to the logical omniscience problem
- 1 December 1995
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 79 (2) , 203-240
A nonstandard approach to the logical omniscience problem
- 12 March 1994
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 59 (1) , 209-252
A quantitative analysis of modal logic
We do a quantitative analysis of modal logic. For example, for each Kripke structure M, we study the least ordinal μ such that for each state of M, the beliefs up to level μ characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend these beliefs to higher levels). As another example, we show the equivalence of three conditions, that on the face of it look quite different, for what it means to say that the agents' beliefs have a countable description, or putting it another way, have a “countable amount of information”. The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language, where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). The fact that all of these conditions are equivalent shows the robustness of the concept of the agents' beliefs having a “countable description”.
- 12 March 1994
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Symbolic Logic
- Vol. 59 (1) , 209-252
A quantitative analysis of modal logic
We do a quantitative analysis of modal logic. For example, for each Kripke structure M, we study the least ordinal μ such that for each state of M, the beliefs up to level μ characterize the agents' beliefs (that is, there is only one way to extend these beliefs to higher levels). As another example, we show the equivalence of three conditions, that on the face of it look quite different, for what it means to say that the agents' beliefs have a countable description, or putting it another way, have a “countable amount of information”. The first condition says that the beliefs of the agents are those at a state of a countable Kripke structure. The second condition says that the beliefs of the agents can be described in an infinitary language, where conjunctions of arbitrary countable sets of formulas are allowed. The third condition says that countably many levels of belief are sufficient to capture all of the uncertainty of the agents (along with a technical condition). The fact that all of these conditions are equivalent shows the robustness of the concept of the agents' beliefs having a “countable description”.