Yongmin Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Yongmin Chen has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David E. M. Sappington
Department of Economics, University of Florida, Gainesville, USA
3 shared publications - Marius Schwartz
Georgetown University
3 shared publications - Michael H. Riordan
Columbia University New York New York U.S.A.
3 shared publications - Jianpei Li
University of International Business and Economics, Department of Economics
2 shared publications - Tianle Zhang
Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong
2 shared publications Chuan He
Leeds School of Business, University of Colorado at Boulder
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 100-124
Competitive differential pricing
We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.
- 2 March 2021
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 52 (1) , 100-124
Competitive differential pricing
We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 62, 101482
Improving market performance in the digital economy
- 1 August 2020
- Published by Elsevier in China Economic Review
- Vol. 62, 101482
Top Cited PapersImproving market performance in the digital economy
- 2 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 49 (2) , 370-397
An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation
We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum transfer between innovators. Such linear rules can sometimes induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.
- 2 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 49 (2) , 370-397
An optimal rule for patent damages under sequential innovation
We analyze the optimal design of damages for patent infringement when a follow‐on innovator may infringe the patent of an initial innovator. We consider damage rules that are linear combinations of the popular “lost profit” (LP) and “unjust enrichment” (UE) rules, coupled with a lump‐sum transfer between innovators. Such linear rules can sometimes induce the socially optimal levels of sequential innovation and the optimal allocation of industry output. The optimal linear rule achieves the highest welfare among all rules that ensure a balanced budget for the industry, and often secures substantially more welfare than either the LP rule or the UE rule.
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 159, 116-127
Bundled procurement
- 1 March 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 159, 116-127
Bundled procurement
- 26 April 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (608) , 55-80
Entry and Welfare in Search Markets
- 26 April 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 128 (608) , 55-80
Entry and Welfare in Search Markets
- 14 March 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 33 (2) , 237-267
Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability
A firm’s incentive to invest in product safety is affected by both market environment and product liability. We investigate the relationship between competition and product liability in a spatial model of oligopoly, where reputation provides a market incentive for safety investment and higher liability may distort consumers’ incentive for product care. We find that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate firms to make safety investment. Increased competition due to less product differentiation diminishes a firm’s gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desired product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces the benefit from maintaining reputation, but has a non-monotonic effect on the potential gain from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured. (JEL L13, L15, K13)
- 14 March 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 33 (2) , 237-267
Competition, Product Safety, and Product Liability
A firm’s incentive to invest in product safety is affected by both market environment and product liability. We investigate the relationship between competition and product liability in a spatial model of oligopoly, where reputation provides a market incentive for safety investment and higher liability may distort consumers’ incentive for product care. We find that partial liability, together with reputation concerns, can motivate firms to make safety investment. Increased competition due to less product differentiation diminishes a firm’s gain from maintaining reputation and raises the socially desired product liability. On the other hand, an increase in the number of competitors reduces the benefit from maintaining reputation, but has a non-monotonic effect on the potential gain from cutting back safety investment; consequently, the optimal liability may vary non-monotonically with the number of competitors. In general, therefore, the relationship between competition and product liability is subtle, depending on how competition is measured. (JEL L13, L15, K13)
- 30 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 549-568
Prices, Profits, and Preference Dependence
We develop a new approach to discrete choice demand for differentiated products, using copulas to separate the marginal distribution of consumer values for product varieties from their dependence relationship, and apply it to the issue of how preference dependence affects market outcomes in symmetric multiproduct industries. We show that greater dependence lowers prices and profits under certain conditions, suggesting that preference dependence is a distinct indicator of product differentiation. We also find new sufficient conditions for the symmetric multiproduct monopoly and the symmetric single‐product oligopoly prices to be above or below the single‐product monopoly price.
- 30 December 2015
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 63 (4) , 549-568
Prices, Profits, and Preference Dependence
We develop a new approach to discrete choice demand for differentiated products, using copulas to separate the marginal distribution of consumer values for product varieties from their dependence relationship, and apply it to the issue of how preference dependence affects market outcomes in symmetric multiproduct industries. We show that greater dependence lowers prices and profits under certain conditions, suggesting that preference dependence is a distinct indicator of product differentiation. We also find new sufficient conditions for the symmetric multiproduct monopoly and the symmetric single‐product oligopoly prices to be above or below the single‐product monopoly price.
- 23 April 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (2) , 442-460
Differential pricing when costs differ: a welfare analysis
This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.
- 23 April 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (2) , 442-460
Differential pricing when costs differ: a welfare analysis
This article analyzes the welfare effects of monopoly differential pricing in the important, but largely neglected, case where costs of service differ across consumer groups. Cost‐based differential pricing is shown to increase total welfare and consumer welfare relative to uniform pricing for broad classes of demand functions, even when total output falls or the output allocation between consumers worsens. We discuss why cost‐based differential pricing tends to be more beneficial for consumers than its demand‐based counterpart, third‐degree price discrimination. We also provide sufficient conditions for welfare‐improving differential pricing when costs and demands differ across consumer groups.
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 98, 115-124
(When) Do stronger patents increase continual innovation?
- 1 February 2014
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 98, 115-124
(When) Do stronger patents increase continual innovation?
- 10 July 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 513-528
Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition
In contrast to Arrow's result for process innovations, we show that the gain from a product innovation can be larger to a secure monopolist than to a rivalrous firm that would face competition from independent sellers of the old product. A monopolist incurs profit diversion from its old good but may gain more than a rivalrous firm on the new good by coordinating the prices. In a Hotelling framework, we find simple conditions for the monopolist's gain to be larger. We also explain why the ranking of innovation incentives differs under vertical product differentiation.
- 10 July 2013
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 22 (3) , 513-528
Product Innovation Incentives: Monopoly vs. Competition
In contrast to Arrow's result for process innovations, we show that the gain from a product innovation can be larger to a secure monopolist than to a rivalrous firm that would face competition from independent sellers of the old product. A monopolist incurs profit diversion from its old good but may gain more than a rivalrous firm on the new good by coordinating the prices. In a Hotelling framework, we find simple conditions for the monopolist's gain to be larger. We also explain why the ranking of innovation incentives differs under vertical product differentiation.