Kasaundra M. Tomlin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Kasaundra M. Tomlin has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Benjamin H. Liebman
St. Joseph’s University, Philadelphia, PA, USA
2 shared publicationsRonald B. Davies
University College Dublin, Belfield, Ireland
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 19 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 86 (2) , 503-529
Assessing the Efficacy of Consumer Boycotts of U.S. Target Firms: A Shareholder Wealth Analysis
This article analyzes the effectiveness of 125 U.S. boycotts from 1978 to 2017. On average, the results suggest that actual consumer boycott calls against U.S. target firms (treatment firms) had a negative and statistically significant effect on the shareholder wealth of U.S. target firms. The synthetic control method and the placebo tests confirmed that the negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) observed here are robust and not due to idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to the announced boycotts. Negative and statistically significant boycott effects were also found for boycott threats and categorical issues related to union issues, animal rights, living wages in less‐developed countries, racial/sexual discrimination, ideological issues, and political/religious boycotts. The results also show that firms with a higher level of competition and advertising activity experienced larger negative boycott effects; and firms with higher net income observed mitigated boycott effects.
- 19 August 2019
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 86 (2) , 503-529
Assessing the Efficacy of Consumer Boycotts of U.S. Target Firms: A Shareholder Wealth Analysis
This article analyzes the effectiveness of 125 U.S. boycotts from 1978 to 2017. On average, the results suggest that actual consumer boycott calls against U.S. target firms (treatment firms) had a negative and statistically significant effect on the shareholder wealth of U.S. target firms. The synthetic control method and the placebo tests confirmed that the negative cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) observed here are robust and not due to idiosyncratic shocks unrelated to the announced boycotts. Negative and statistically significant boycott effects were also found for boycott threats and categorical issues related to union issues, animal rights, living wages in less‐developed countries, racial/sexual discrimination, ideological issues, and political/religious boycotts. The results also show that firms with a higher level of competition and advertising activity experienced larger negative boycott effects; and firms with higher net income observed mitigated boycott effects.
- 7 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 28 (8) , 935-959
Trade liberalization in services: Investor responses to NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions
We investigate the response of US trucking firms to the removal of barriers to cross-border trucking under NAFTA. This was done via a program implemented in 2007, cancelled in 2009, and reinstated in 2011. We use a model of endogenous exporting to show that this can arise from incorrect expectations of import competition. We find that, unsurprisingly, the program’s start resulted in lower stock returns, particularly for border firms. However, later policy changes indicate that investors, and particularly those investing in US multinationals, viewed the pilot as beneficial.
- 7 May 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development
- Vol. 28 (8) , 935-959
Trade liberalization in services: Investor responses to NAFTA’s cross-border trucking provisions
We investigate the response of US trucking firms to the removal of barriers to cross-border trucking under NAFTA. This was done via a program implemented in 2007, cancelled in 2009, and reinstated in 2011. We use a model of endogenous exporting to show that this can arise from incorrect expectations of import competition. We find that, unsurprisingly, the program’s start resulted in lower stock returns, particularly for border firms. However, later policy changes indicate that investors, and particularly those investing in US multinationals, viewed the pilot as beneficial.
- 23 July 2007
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 40 (3) , 812-842
Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: a shareholder wealth perspective
Abstract. This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001–3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive ‘abnormal’ returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of −5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream‐consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.
- 23 July 2007
- Published by Wiley in Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique
- Vol. 40 (3) , 812-842
Steel safeguards and the welfare of U.S. steel firms and downstream consumers of steel: a shareholder wealth perspective
Abstract. This paper analyses the steel safeguards applied during 2001–3. Results reveal that for shareholders of U.S. steel companies safeguards generated positive ‘abnormal’ returns of approximately 6%. The cancellation of the safeguards resulted in wealth gains of about 5%. Steel shareholders experienced negative abnormal returns of −5% in response to the WTO ruling that the U.S. had violated WTO law. Our results are consistent with the neoclassical view that producers gain at the expense of consumers. Also, findings indicate that downstream‐consuming firms that diversify production in NAFTA countries avert some trade policy risk associated with higher steel costs caused by safeguard protection.