Björn Tyrefors Hinnerich
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Björn Tyrefors Hinnerich has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Ellis Iverman
Department of Economics , Stockholm University , SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publicationErik Höglin
National Institute of Economic Research, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication- Magnus Johannesson
Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication - Per Pettersson-Lidbom
Stockholm University
1 shared publication Ragnar Bengtsson
Department of Economics , Stockholm University , SE-106 91, Stockholm, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 24 March 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Education Economics
- Vol. 23 (6) , 660-676
Discrimination against students with foreign backgrounds: evidence from grading in Swedish public high schools
We rigorously test for discrimination against students with foreign backgrounds in high school grading in Sweden. We analyse a random sample of national tests in the Swedish language graded both non-blindly by the student's own teacher and blindly without any identifying information. The increase in the test score due to non-blind grading is significantly higher for students with a Swedish background. This discrimination effect is sizeable, about 10% of the mean or 20% of the standard deviation of the blind test score.
- 24 March 2014
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Education Economics
- Vol. 23 (6) , 660-676
Discrimination against students with foreign backgrounds: evidence from grading in Swedish public high schools
We rigorously test for discrimination against students with foreign backgrounds in high school grading in Sweden. We analyse a random sample of national tests in the Swedish language graded both non-blindly by the student's own teacher and blindly without any identifying information. The increase in the test score due to non-blind grading is significantly higher for students with a Swedish background. This discrimination effect is sizeable, about 10% of the mean or 20% of the standard deviation of the blind test score.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (3) , 961-993
Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919-1938
In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes—direct versus representative democracy—redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's choice of democracy to implement a regression-discontinuity design. The results indicate that direct democracies spend 40–60 percent less on public welfare. Our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite's potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization.
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (3) , 961-993
Democracy, Redistribution, and Political Participation: Evidence From Sweden 1919-1938
In this paper, we compare how two different types of political regimes—direct versus representative democracy—redistribute income toward the relatively poor segments of society after the introduction of universal and equal suffrage. Swedish local governments are used as a testing ground since this setting offers a number of attractive features for a credible impact evaluation. Most importantly, we exploit the existence of a population threshold, which partly determined a local government's choice of democracy to implement a regression-discontinuity design. The results indicate that direct democracies spend 40–60 percent less on public welfare. Our interpretation is that direct democracy may be more prone to elite capture than representative democracy since the elite's potential to exercise de facto power is likely to be greater in direct democracy after democratization.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 19 (1) , 1-5
Gender and ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market
We use a field experiment to measure discrimination in the housing market in Stockholm. Four fictitious persons, of different gender, with distinct-sounding Arabic or Swedish names, are randomly assigned to vacant apartments. We extend the study by Ahmed and Hammarstedt ( 2008 Ahmed, A. M. and Hammarstedt, M. 2008. Discrimination in the rental housing market. Journal of Urban Economics, 64: 362–72. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ). There are two new results. First, we provide evidence that there is no or little gender premium for the female with the Arabic name, which suggests that ethnic discrimination dominates the effects of gender. Second, discriminatory behaviour is only found in the suburbs or satellite cities/towns of Stockholm County not in the densely populated, affluent, city centre. Moreover, we can replicate that there is a gender premium for females with Swedish names. However, we are not able to confirm that males with Arabic names face discrimination.
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 19 (1) , 1-5
Gender and ethnic discrimination in the rental housing market
We use a field experiment to measure discrimination in the housing market in Stockholm. Four fictitious persons, of different gender, with distinct-sounding Arabic or Swedish names, are randomly assigned to vacant apartments. We extend the study by Ahmed and Hammarstedt ( 2008 Ahmed, A. M. and Hammarstedt, M. 2008. Discrimination in the rental housing market. Journal of Urban Economics, 64: 362–72. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] [Google Scholar] ). There are two new results. First, we provide evidence that there is no or little gender premium for the female with the Arabic name, which suggests that ethnic discrimination dominates the effects of gender. Second, discriminatory behaviour is only found in the suburbs or satellite cities/towns of Stockholm County not in the densely populated, affluent, city centre. Moreover, we can replicate that there is a gender premium for females with Swedish names. However, we are not able to confirm that males with Arabic names face discrimination.