Tevfik Bultan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Tevfik Bultan has a total of 29 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Constance Heitmeyer
Naval Research Laboratory
2 shared publications - Jianwen Su
University of California
2 shared publications - Lucas Bang
Harvey Mudd College
2 shared publications - Seemanta Saha
Harvey Mudd College 91711 Claremont CA USA
2 shared publications Xiang Fu
2 shared publications- Abdulbaki Aydin
University of California
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 14 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 30-35
Quantifying Information Leakage Using Model Counting Constraint Solvers
- 14 March 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- p. 30-35
Quantifying Information Leakage Using Model Counting Constraint Solvers
- Open Access
Incremental Adaptive Attack Synthesis
Information leakage is a significant problem in modern software systems. Information leaks due to side channels are especially hard to detect and analyze. In this paper, we present techniques for automated synthesis of adaptive side-channel attacks that recover secret values. Our attack synthesis techniques iteratively generate inputs which, when fed to code that accesses the secret, reveal partial information about the secret based on the side-channel observations, reducing the remaining uncertainty about the secret in each attack step. Our approach is incremental, reusing results from prior iterations in each attack step to improve the efficiency of attack synthesis. We use symbolic execution to extract path constraints, automata-based model counting to estimate probabilities of execution paths, and meta-heuristics to maximize information gain based on entropy in order to minimize the number of synthesized attack steps.
Open AccessIncremental Adaptive Attack Synthesis
Information leakage is a significant problem in modern software systems. Information leaks due to side channels are especially hard to detect and analyze. In this paper, we present techniques for automated synthesis of adaptive side-channel attacks that recover secret values. Our attack synthesis techniques iteratively generate inputs which, when fed to code that accesses the secret, reveal partial information about the secret based on the side-channel observations, reducing the remaining uncertainty about the secret in each attack step. Our approach is incremental, reusing results from prior iterations in each attack step to improve the efficiency of attack synthesis. We use symbolic execution to extract path constraints, automata-based model counting to estimate probabilities of execution paths, and meta-heuristics to maximize information gain based on entropy in order to minimize the number of synthesized attack steps.
- 12 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Automated Software Engineering
- Vol. 26 (2) , 379-416
Inductive verification of data model invariants in web applications using first-order logic
- 12 December 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Automated Software Engineering
- Vol. 26 (2) , 379-416
Inductive verification of data model invariants in web applications using first-order logic
- Open Access
- 12 July 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-37
Symbolic path cost analysis for side-channel detection
Side-channels in software are an increasingly significant threat to the confidentiality of private user information, and the static detection of such vulnerabilities is a key challenge in secure software development. In this paper, we introduce a new technique for scalable detection of side-channels in software. Given a program and a cost model for a side-channel (such as time or memory usage), we decompose the control flow graph of the program into nested branch and loop components, and compositionally assign a symbolic cost expression to each component. Symbolic cost expressions provide an over-approximation of all possible observable cost values that components can generate. Queries to a satisfiability solver on the difference between possible cost values of a component allow us to detect the presence of imbalanced paths (with respect to observable cost) through the control flow graph. When combined with taint analysis that identifies conditional statements that depend on secret information, our technique answers the following question: Does there exist a pair of paths in the program's control flow graph, differing only on branch conditions influenced by the secret, that differ in observable side-channel value by more than some given threshold? Additional optimization queries allow us to identify the minimal number of loop iterations necessary for the above to hold or the maximal cost difference between paths in the graph. We perform symbolic execution based feasibility analyses to eliminate control flow paths that are infeasible. We implemented our techniques in a prototype, and we demonstrate its favourable * This material is based on research sponsored by NSF under grant CCF-1548848 and by DARPA under the agreement number FA8750-15-2-0087. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
- 12 July 2018
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 27-37
Open AccessSymbolic path cost analysis for side-channel detection
Side-channels in software are an increasingly significant threat to the confidentiality of private user information, and the static detection of such vulnerabilities is a key challenge in secure software development. In this paper, we introduce a new technique for scalable detection of side-channels in software. Given a program and a cost model for a side-channel (such as time or memory usage), we decompose the control flow graph of the program into nested branch and loop components, and compositionally assign a symbolic cost expression to each component. Symbolic cost expressions provide an over-approximation of all possible observable cost values that components can generate. Queries to a satisfiability solver on the difference between possible cost values of a component allow us to detect the presence of imbalanced paths (with respect to observable cost) through the control flow graph. When combined with taint analysis that identifies conditional statements that depend on secret information, our technique answers the following question: Does there exist a pair of paths in the program's control flow graph, differing only on branch conditions influenced by the secret, that differ in observable side-channel value by more than some given threshold? Additional optimization queries allow us to identify the minimal number of loop iterations necessary for the above to hold or the maximal cost difference between paths in the graph. We perform symbolic execution based feasibility analyses to eliminate control flow paths that are infeasible. We implemented our techniques in a prototype, and we demonstrate its favourable * This material is based on research sponsored by NSF under grant CCF-1548848 and by DARPA under the agreement number FA8750-15-2-0087. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
- 31 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Automated Software Engineering
- Vol. 24 (4) , 863-864
Guest editorial: emerging areas in automated software engineering research
- 31 August 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Automated Software Engineering
- Vol. 24 (4) , 863-864
Guest editorial: emerging areas in automated software engineering research
- 27 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-9
String Analysis for Vulnerability Detection and Repair
- 27 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 3-9
String Analysis for Vulnerability Detection and Repair
- 16 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 255-272
Automata-Based Model Counting for String Constraints
- 16 July 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 255-272
Automata-Based Model Counting for String Constraints
- 5 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Formal Methods in System Design
- Vol. 44 (1) , 44-70
Automata-based symbolic string analysis for vulnerability detection
- 5 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Formal Methods in System Design
- Vol. 44 (1) , 44-70
Automata-based symbolic string analysis for vulnerability detection