Vjollca Sadiraj
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Vjollca Sadiraj has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- James C. Cox
Experimental Economics Center and Department of Economics Georgia State University Atlanta Georgia USA
13 shared publications - Jan Tuinstra
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam School of Economics
2 shared publications John F. Sweeney
2 shared publicationsKurt E. Schnier
2 shared publications- Anya Samek
University of Southern California
1 shared publication Bodo Vogt
Faculty of Economics and Management, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 697-725
Morally monotonic choice in public good games
Rational choice theory, including models of social preferences, is challenged by decades of robust data from public good games. Provision of public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, does not crowd out private provision on a one-for-one basis. Provision games elicit more of a public good than payoff-equivalent appropriation games. This paper offers a morally monotonic choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points and is consistent with the two empirical findings. The model has idiosyncratic features that motivate a new experimental design. Data from our new experiment and three previous experiments favor moral monotonicity over alternative models including rational choice theory, prominent belief-based models of kindness, and popular reference-dependent models with loss aversion.
- 1 July 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 26 (3) , 697-725
Morally monotonic choice in public good games
Rational choice theory, including models of social preferences, is challenged by decades of robust data from public good games. Provision of public goods, funded by lump-sum taxation, does not crowd out private provision on a one-for-one basis. Provision games elicit more of a public good than payoff-equivalent appropriation games. This paper offers a morally monotonic choice theory that incorporates observable moral reference points and is consistent with the two empirical findings. The model has idiosyncratic features that motivate a new experimental design. Data from our new experiment and three previous experiments favor moral monotonicity over alternative models including rational choice theory, prominent belief-based models of kindness, and popular reference-dependent models with loss aversion.
- 20 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (2) , 819-833
AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward‐looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JELH26, C91)
- 20 November 2019
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (2) , 819-833
AUDIT STATE DEPENDENT TAXPAYER COMPLIANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM COLOMBIA
We develop and analyze a dynamic model of individual taxpayer compliance choice that predicts “audit state dependent taxpayer compliance,” by distinguishing between forward‐looking versus myopic versus naïve behavior. We then test experimentally the audit state dependent model by reporting the results from the first tax compliance experiment run in Colombia. We find that subjects' compliance rates increase with greater enforcement. We also find more novel results: fine rates should be increased after an audit, and “nudging” myopic individuals toward reporting a constant rather than a fluctuating proportion of income would benefit both the taxpayer and the tax authority.(JELH26, C91)
- 8 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (1) , 49-66
CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS
We report an experiment on payoff‐equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games with high‐ and low‐caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others' castes. Homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers. The success of mixed‐caste groups is somewhere between, which is inconsistent with a group identity model. Absent salient information on caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity. (JEL C93, H41, Z13)
- 8 October 2018
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 58 (1) , 49-66
CULTURAL IDENTITIES AND RESOLUTION OF SOCIAL DILEMMAS
We report an experiment on payoff‐equivalent, sequential provision and appropriation games with high‐ and low‐caste Indian villagers. A central question is whether caste identities affect resolution of social dilemmas. Making caste salient elicits striking changes in behavior compared to baseline treatment with no information about others' castes. Homogenous groups with high caste villagers are more successful in resolving social dilemmas than homogenous groups with low caste villagers. The success of mixed‐caste groups is somewhere between, which is inconsistent with a group identity model. Absent salient information on caste, behavior is inconsistent with unconditional social preferences but as predicted by reciprocity. (JEL C93, H41, Z13)
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 131, 24-35
Incentivizing cost-effective reductions in hospital readmission rates
- 1 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 131, 24-35
Incentivizing cost-effective reductions in hospital readmission rates
- Open Access
- 1 May 2016
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Moral Costs and Rational Choice: Theory and Experimental Evidence
The literature exploring other regarding behavior sheds important light on interesting social phenomena, yet less attention has been given to how the received results speak to foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes the empirical evidence, showing that recent work challenges convex preference theory but is largely consistent with rational choice theory. Guided by this understanding, we design a new, more demanding test of a central tenet of economics-the contraction axiom-within a sharing framework. Making use of more than 325 dictators participating in a series of allocation games, we show that sharing choices violate the contraction axiom. We advance a new theory that augments standard models with moral reference points to explain our experimental data. Our theory also organizes the broader sharing patterns in the received literature.
- 1 May 2016
- Published by National Bureau of Economic Research
Open AccessMoral Costs and Rational Choice: Theory and Experimental Evidence
The literature exploring other regarding behavior sheds important light on interesting social phenomena, yet less attention has been given to how the received results speak to foundational assumptions within economics. Our study synthesizes the empirical evidence, showing that recent work challenges convex preference theory but is largely consistent with rational choice theory. Guided by this understanding, we design a new, more demanding test of a central tenet of economics-the contraction axiom-within a sharing framework. Making use of more than 325 dictators participating in a series of allocation games, we show that sharing choices violate the contraction axiom. We advance a new theory that augments standard models with moral reference points to explain our experimental data. Our theory also organizes the broader sharing patterns in the received literature.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Wolters Kluwer Health in Journal of the American College of Surgeons
- Vol. 221 (4) , S123-S124
Discharge Decision-Making after Complex Surgery: Surgeon Behavior Compared to Predictive Modeling to Reduce Surgical Readmissions
Decision-support tools for discharge may utilize variables that are not routinely considered by healthcare providers. How providers will then respond to these atypical findings may affect implementation.
- 1 October 2015
- Published by Wolters Kluwer Health in Journal of the American College of Surgeons
- Vol. 221 (4) , S123-S124
Discharge Decision-Making after Complex Surgery: Surgeon Behavior Compared to Predictive Modeling to Reduce Surgical Readmissions
Decision-support tools for discharge may utilize variables that are not routinely considered by healthcare providers. How providers will then respond to these atypical findings may affect implementation.
- 8 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 20 (2) , 239-240
Alternative Payoff Mechanisms for Choice under Risk
- 8 January 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in International Advances in Economic Research
- Vol. 20 (2) , 239-240
Alternative Payoff Mechanisms for Choice under Risk
- 12 December 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 77 (4) , 443-454
Probabilistic risk attitudes and local risk aversion: a paradox
- 12 December 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 77 (4) , 443-454
Probabilistic risk attitudes and local risk aversion: a paradox
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 79 (3) , 496-512
Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Wiley in Southern Economic Journal
- Vol. 79 (3) , 496-512
Provision versus Appropriation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Social Dilemmas
Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.