Dinah Rosenberg
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Dinah Rosenberg has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nicolas Vieille
Department of Economics and Decision Sciences HEC Paris 1, rue de la Libération 78 351 Jouy-en-Josas France
6 shared publications - Eilon Solan
School of Mathematical Sciences, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv 69978, Israel
4 shared publications - Eilon Solan
Northwestern University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Statistics & Probability Letters
- Vol. 80 (5-6) , 381-385
On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems
- 1 March 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Statistics & Probability Letters
- Vol. 80 (5-6) , 381-385
On the optimal amount of experimentation in sequential decision problems
- Open Access
On the Optimal Amount of Experimentation in Sequential Decision Problems
We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.
Open AccessOn the Optimal Amount of Experimentation in Sequential Decision Problems
We provide a tight bound on the amount of experimentation under the optimal strategy in sequential decision problems. We show the applicability of the result by providing a bound on the cut-off in a one-arm bandit problem.
- 1 December 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 32 (1) , 133-150
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
- 1 December 2003
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 32 (1) , 133-150
The MaxMin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
- Open Access
On the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume each player observes the state and his own action. We propose a candidate for the max-min value, which does not depend on the information structure of player 2. We prove that player 2 can defend the proposed max-min value, and that in absorbing games player 1 can guarantee it. Analogous results hold for the min-max value. This paper thereby unites several results due to Coulomb.
Open AccessOn the maxmin value of stochastic games with imperfect monitoring
We study zero-sum stochastic games in which players do not observe the actions of the opponent. Rather, they observe a stochastic signal that may depend on the state, and on the pair of actions chosen by the players. We assume each player observes the state and his own action. We propose a candidate for the max-min value, which does not depend on the information structure of player 2. We prove that player 2 can defend the proposed max-min value, and that in absorbing games player 1 can guarantee it. Analogous results hold for the min-max value. This paper thereby unites several results due to Coulomb.
- 1 February 2000
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 25 (1) , 23-35
The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side
We prove the existence of the maxmin of zero-sum recursive games with one sided information.
- 1 February 2000
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Mathematics of Operations Research
- Vol. 25 (1) , 23-35
The Maxmin of Recursive Games with Incomplete Information on one Side
We prove the existence of the maxmin of zero-sum recursive games with one sided information.