Hans Rott
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hans Rott has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eduardo Fermé
Universidade da Madeira
1 shared publication - Hannes Leitgeb
Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy LMU Munich Munich Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 June 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 75 (1) , 1-3
Editorial
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 301-339
Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 301-339
Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-Beliefs and Disbeliefs
- 7 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 269-296
Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators
- 7 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 269-296
Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators
- 30 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 88 (1) , 113-136
A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision
- 30 January 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 88 (1) , 113-136
A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision
- 1 November 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 61 (2-3) , 469-493
Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief into Knowledge
- 1 November 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 61 (2-3) , 469-493
Stability, Strength and Sensitivity:Converting Belief into Knowledge
- 31 August 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 157 (1-2) , 5-47
Revision by comparison
- 31 August 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Artificial Intelligence
- Vol. 157 (1-2) , 5-47
Revision by comparison
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 139 (2) , 225-240
A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 139 (2) , 225-240
A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation
- 1 February 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Logic and Computation
- Vol. 13 (1) , 111-145
Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief II: Iterated Belief Change without Dispositional Coherence
This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be satisfied. One‐step belief change generated by ‘basic entrenchment’ is combined with a natural conservative method of revising entrenchment relations. A logical characterization of this method is presented, and it is compared with three other methods known from the literature which I call ‘external’, ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ belief revision. While conservative belief change turns out to be incoherent in its treatment of the recency of information, moderate belief change is more satisfactory in this respect.
- 1 February 2003
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Logic and Computation
- Vol. 13 (1) , 111-145
Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief II: Iterated Belief Change without Dispositional Coherence
This paper studies the idea of conservatism with respect to belief change strategies in the setting of unary, iterated belief revision functions (based on the conclusions of Rott, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief, Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 1999, 387–412). Special attention is paid to the case of ‘basic belief change’ where neither the (weak) AGM postulates concerning conservatism with respect to beliefs nor the (stong) supplementary AGM postulates concerning dispositional coherence need to be satisfied. One‐step belief change generated by ‘basic entrenchment’ is combined with a natural conservative method of revising entrenchment relations. A logical characterization of this method is presented, and it is compared with three other methods known from the literature which I call ‘external’, ‘radical’ and ‘moderate’ belief revision. While conservative belief change turns out to be incoherent in its treatment of the recency of information, moderate belief change is more satisfactory in this respect.