Michael J. Mazzeo
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Michael J. Mazzeo has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Katja Seim
University of Pennsylvania;
2 shared publications Andrew Cohen
Federal Reserve Board of Governors
1 shared publication- Anne Gron
Department of Management and Strategy, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2001, USA
1 shared publication - David Dranove
Northwestern University
1 shared publication Jonathan H. Ashtor
1 shared publication- Mauricio Varela
Department of Economics University of Arizona Tucson Arizona
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (4) , 216-249
When Demand Increases Cause Shakeouts
Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton’s (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s–1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particularly in warm places. We do not find this effect in other industries that serve travelers, gasoline retailing, and restaurants, where quality competition does not involve fixed investments. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L15, L40, L83)
- 1 November 2019
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
- Vol. 11 (4) , 216-249
When Demand Increases Cause Shakeouts
Standard models that guide competition policy imply that demand increases should lead to more, not fewer firms. However, Sutton’s (1991) model shows that demand increases instead can lead to shakeouts if non-price competition takes the form of fixed investments. We investigate this effect in the 1960s–1980s hotel and motel industry, where quality competition arose through investments in swimming pools. We show that demand increases associated with highway openings led to fewer firms, particularly in warm places. We do not find this effect in other industries that serve travelers, gasoline retailing, and restaurants, where quality competition does not involve fixed investments. (JEL G34, K21, L13, L15, L40, L83)
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 980-1016
The Welfare Consequences of Mergers with Endogenous Product Choice
Merger simulations focus on the price changes that result once previously independent competitors set prices jointly and other market participants respond. We consider the incentives for firms to adjust the set of offered products after a merger. Using a model of product choice and pricing, we conduct simulations of equilibrium market outcomes of a merger in a variety of scenarios. Product offering adjustments result in additional effects on profitability and consumer welfare not realized by price responses only, particularly when the merging parties offer relatively similar products pre‐merger. Cost synergies may furthermore entail the pro‐competitive introduction of additional products.
- 1 December 2018
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 66 (4) , 980-1016
The Welfare Consequences of Mergers with Endogenous Product Choice
Merger simulations focus on the price changes that result once previously independent competitors set prices jointly and other market participants respond. We consider the incentives for firms to adjust the set of offered products after a merger. Using a model of product choice and pricing, we conduct simulations of equilibrium market outcomes of a merger in a variety of scenarios. Product offering adjustments result in additional effects on profitability and consumer welfare not realized by price responses only, particularly when the merging parties offer relatively similar products pre‐merger. Cost synergies may furthermore entail the pro‐competitive introduction of additional products.
- 9 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 46 (4) , 323-347
Specialization and Competition in the Venture Capital Industry
- 9 April 2015
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 46 (4) , 323-347
Specialization and Competition in the Venture Capital Industry
- 11 November 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 879-904
DO NPEs MATTER? NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES AND PATENT LITIGATION OUTCOMES
It is widely argued that so-called “patent trolls” are corrupting the U.S. patent system and endangering technology innovation and commercialization at large. For example, a recent White House report argued that “trolls” hurt firms of all sizes and advocated for specific policies aimed at curtailing practices thought to be particularly harmful. Yet the existence and extent of any systematic effects of so-called “troll-like” behavior, and the implications of modern patent assertion practices by Non-Practicing Entities (“NPEs”), remains unclear. This article develops novel empirical evidence to inform the debate over NPEs on patent litigation. Specifically, we conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of more than 1,750 patent infringement cases decided by a judge or jury in U.S. district courts between 1995 and 2011. We focus on case outcomes, including findings of validity and infringement, and the distributions and values of resulting damage awards. We find some relatively small differences in terms of lower success rates and award values in cases where the patent holders are NPEs. Yet across the subset of cases in which damages are awarded to the patent holders, we find no significant differences in the distribution of awards between NPEs and practicing entities. Nonetheless, there are substantial differences in litigation behavior, success rates, and award values among types of NPEs (that is, universities, individuals, and Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”)). Moreover, we find evidence of certain NPEs engaging in strategic and rational patent acquisition, assertion, and settlement-licensing practices. We posit that these practices may reflect, or perhaps derive from, the economic separation of patent rights from their underlying technologies that is represented in NPE approaches to patent assertion.
- 11 November 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Competition Law & Economics
- Vol. 9 (4) , 879-904
DO NPEs MATTER? NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES AND PATENT LITIGATION OUTCOMES
It is widely argued that so-called “patent trolls” are corrupting the U.S. patent system and endangering technology innovation and commercialization at large. For example, a recent White House report argued that “trolls” hurt firms of all sizes and advocated for specific policies aimed at curtailing practices thought to be particularly harmful. Yet the existence and extent of any systematic effects of so-called “troll-like” behavior, and the implications of modern patent assertion practices by Non-Practicing Entities (“NPEs”), remains unclear. This article develops novel empirical evidence to inform the debate over NPEs on patent litigation. Specifically, we conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of more than 1,750 patent infringement cases decided by a judge or jury in U.S. district courts between 1995 and 2011. We focus on case outcomes, including findings of validity and infringement, and the distributions and values of resulting damage awards. We find some relatively small differences in terms of lower success rates and award values in cases where the patent holders are NPEs. Yet across the subset of cases in which damages are awarded to the patent holders, we find no significant differences in the distribution of awards between NPEs and practicing entities. Nonetheless, there are substantial differences in litigation behavior, success rates, and award values among types of NPEs (that is, universities, individuals, and Patent Assertion Entities (“PAEs”)). Moreover, we find evidence of certain NPEs engaging in strategic and rational patent acquisition, assertion, and settlement-licensing practices. We posit that these practices may reflect, or perhaps derive from, the economic separation of patent rights from their underlying technologies that is represented in NPE approaches to patent assertion.
- 18 March 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-21
Investment Strategies and Market Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Bank Branching Decisions
- 18 March 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 38 (1) , 1-21
Investment Strategies and Market Structure: An Empirical Analysis of Bank Branching Decisions
- 21 January 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 7 (2) , 105-146
Beyond plain vanilla: Modeling joint product assortment and pricing decisions
- 21 January 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Quantitative Marketing and Economics
- Vol. 7 (2) , 105-146
Beyond plain vanilla: Modeling joint product assortment and pricing decisions
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 54 (3) , 323-350
THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATION ENTRY AND MARKET EVOLUTION: 1999–2002*
We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.
- 1 September 2006
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 54 (3) , 323-350
THE ROLE OF DIFFERENTIATION STRATEGY IN LOCAL TELECOMMUNICATION ENTRY AND MARKET EVOLUTION: 1999–2002*
We examine the role of differentiation among competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs) in nearly 1,200 U.S. cities in 1999 and 2002, before and after a valuation crash affecting communications firms. We test and reject the null hypothesis of homogeneous competitors. We also find strong evidence that differentiated CLECs account for both potential market demand and the business strategies of competitors when making their entry decisions. Finally, product heterogeneity in markets in 1999 helps predict how the structure of markets evolved through 2002. We conclude that the policy debate for local telecommunications regulation should account for differentiated behavior.
- 13 October 2004
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 13 (4) , 599-615
Retail Contracting and Organizational Form: Alternatives to Chain Affiliation in the Motel Industry
Most of the existing empirical literature on franchising investigates the share of company‐owned versus franchised establishments within large retail firms. This literature typically has not considered the decision of a business owner to operate an independent business or to become a franchisee. This paper empirically analyzes what determines whether independent ownership or affiliation is observed, using data on the affiliation status of 2,293 motel establishments located throughout the United States. Heterogeneity in the underlying economic environment helps explain affiliation choices at the establishment level. The results also suggest that failure to consider independent establishments may explain the puzzling negative correlation between risk and vertical integration commonly found in the empirical franchising literature.
- 13 October 2004
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 13 (4) , 599-615
Retail Contracting and Organizational Form: Alternatives to Chain Affiliation in the Motel Industry
Most of the existing empirical literature on franchising investigates the share of company‐owned versus franchised establishments within large retail firms. This literature typically has not considered the decision of a business owner to operate an independent business or to become a franchisee. This paper empirically analyzes what determines whether independent ownership or affiliation is observed, using data on the affiliation status of 2,293 motel establishments located throughout the United States. Heterogeneity in the underlying economic environment helps explain affiliation choices at the establishment level. The results also suggest that failure to consider independent establishments may explain the puzzling negative correlation between risk and vertical integration commonly found in the empirical franchising literature.
- 28 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 433-454
Differentiation and Competition in HMO Markets
This paper examines how differentiation among Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) affects local market competition. Most markets for HMOs appear sufficiently unconcentrated; however, differences among HMOs may make competition less intense than the number of competitors would suggest. To investigate this possibility, we distinguish HMOs that serve only local markets from those that operate regional or national networks. We analyze how HMOs of one type affect the profitability of the other using an equilibrium model of entry and product choice. While the two types of HMOs have strong competitive effects within segments, the competitive effect of differentiated firms is negligible.
- 28 November 2003
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 433-454
Differentiation and Competition in HMO Markets
This paper examines how differentiation among Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) affects local market competition. Most markets for HMOs appear sufficiently unconcentrated; however, differences among HMOs may make competition less intense than the number of competitors would suggest. To investigate this possibility, we distinguish HMOs that serve only local markets from those that operate regional or national networks. We analyze how HMOs of one type affect the profitability of the other using an equilibrium model of entry and product choice. While the two types of HMOs have strong competitive effects within segments, the competitive effect of differentiated firms is negligible.