Gerhard Schurz
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Gerhard Schurz has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Paul Weingartner
University of Salzburg
3 shared publications B. Chirikov
2 shared publicationsR. W. Batterman
2 shared publicationsA. Wunderlin
1 shared publication- Alexander Gebharter
Center for Philosophy, Science, and Policy (CPSP), Department of Biomedical Sciences and Public Health, Marche Polytechnic University, Ancona, Italy
1 shared publication D. Miller
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 9 (2) , 151-170
META-INDUCTION IN EPISTEMIC NETWORKS AND THE SOCIAL SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE
Indicators of the reliability of informants are essential for social learning in a society that is initially dominated by ignorance or superstition. Such reliability indicators should be based on meta-induction over records of truth-success. This is the major claim of this paper, and it is supported in two steps. (1) One needs a non-circular justification of the method of meta-induction, as compared to other (non-inductive) learning methods. An approach to this problem (a variant of Hume's problem) has been developed in earlier papers and is reported in section 2. It is based on the predictive optimality of meta-inductive learning, under the assumption that objective success records are globally available. (2) The rest of the paper develops an extension of this approach, so-called local meta-induction. Here individuals can access only success records of individuals in their immediate epistemic neighborhood. It is shown that local meta-inductive learning can spread reliable information over the entire population, and has clear advantages compared to success-independent social learning methods such as peer-imitation and authority-imitation.
- 1 June 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Episteme
- Vol. 9 (2) , 151-170
META-INDUCTION IN EPISTEMIC NETWORKS AND THE SOCIAL SPREAD OF KNOWLEDGE
Indicators of the reliability of informants are essential for social learning in a society that is initially dominated by ignorance or superstition. Such reliability indicators should be based on meta-induction over records of truth-success. This is the major claim of this paper, and it is supported in two steps. (1) One needs a non-circular justification of the method of meta-induction, as compared to other (non-inductive) learning methods. An approach to this problem (a variant of Hume's problem) has been developed in earlier papers and is reported in section 2. It is based on the predictive optimality of meta-inductive learning, under the assumption that objective success records are globally available. (2) The rest of the paper develops an extension of this approach, so-called local meta-induction. Here individuals can access only success records of individuals in their immediate epistemic neighborhood. It is shown that local meta-inductive learning can spread reliable information over the entire population, and has clear advantages compared to success-independent social learning methods such as peer-imitation and authority-imitation.
- 23 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 21 (3) , 643-648
For a better understanding of causality
- 23 March 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Metascience
- Vol. 21 (3) , 643-648
For a better understanding of causality
- 8 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 74 (1) , 137-142
Alexander Bird: Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and properties
- 8 October 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Erkenntnis
- Vol. 74 (1) , 137-142
Alexander Bird: Nature’s Metaphysics. Laws and properties
- 22 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 172 (3) , 415-436
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude
- 22 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 172 (3) , 415-436
Zwart and Franssen’s impossibility theorem holds for possible-world-accounts but not for consequence-accounts to verisimilitude
- 4 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 89 (2) , 257-283
Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without σ-Additivity
- 4 July 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Studia Logica
- Vol. 89 (2) , 257-283
Finitistic and Frequentistic Approximation of Probability Measures with or without σ-Additivity
- 1 July 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 75 (3) , 278-305
The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem
This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based onmeta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which areaccessibleto her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world.
- 1 July 2008
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 75 (3) , 278-305
The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume's Problem
This article suggests a ‘best alternative’ justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based onmeta-induction. The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which areaccessibleto her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is mathematically analytical. It implies, however, an a posteriori justification of object-induction based on the experiences in our world.
- 5 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 23 (1) , 9-28
Third-Person Internalism: A Critical Examination of Externalism and a Foundation-Oriented Alternative
- 5 February 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Acta Analytica
- Vol. 23 (1) , 9-28
Third-Person Internalism: A Critical Examination of Externalism and a Foundation-Oriented Alternative
- 22 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 38 (2) , 393-395
Hannes Leitgeb, Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition
- 22 November 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
- Vol. 38 (2) , 393-395
Hannes Leitgeb, Inference on the Low Level: An Investigation into Deduction, Nonmonotonic Reasoning, and the Philosophy of Cognition
- Top Cited Papers
- 14 August 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 164 (2) , 201-234
Patterns of abduction
- 14 August 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 164 (2) , 201-234
Top Cited PapersPatterns of abduction
- 22 December 2006
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 280-283
Discussion of Arne Wunderlin's paper