Arne Nygaard
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Arne Nygaard has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Harald Biong
BI Norwegian Business School
3 shared publications - Ragnhild Silkoset
Department of Marketing BI Norwegian Business School Oslo Norway
2 shared publications - Roland E. Kidwell
University of Wyoming
2 shared publications - Emily Plant
University of Montana
1 shared publication Robert Dahlstrom
School of Management, College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky
1 shared publication- Robert Dahlstrom
Gatton College of Business and Economics, University of Kentucky
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2012 (1)
Differential Effects of Governance Mechanisms on Franchisor-Franchisee Unit Opportunism
Using evidence from franchisor-franchisee dyads, this study identifies the differential impact of ownership mechanisms that may curb opportunism in franchise systems. Although potentially destructive effects of opportunism can be limited by centralized decision making and formalization as governance dimensions in a plural-form arrangement of company-owned and franchised units, these mechanisms has different effects based on unit status, i.e., company-owned versus franchisee. Results support the contention that competition limits opportunism across inter-firm relationships regardless of unit status. Drawing on a theoretical perspective derived from the economics, marketing and management literatures, this study presents a unique basis for further investigation by placing franchising in the context of relational pluralism among large and small organizations.
- 1 July 2012
- Published by Academy of Management in Academy of Management Proceedings
- Vol. 2012 (1)
Differential Effects of Governance Mechanisms on Franchisor-Franchisee Unit Opportunism
Using evidence from franchisor-franchisee dyads, this study identifies the differential impact of ownership mechanisms that may curb opportunism in franchise systems. Although potentially destructive effects of opportunism can be limited by centralized decision making and formalization as governance dimensions in a plural-form arrangement of company-owned and franchised units, these mechanisms has different effects based on unit status, i.e., company-owned versus franchisee. Results support the contention that competition limits opportunism across inter-firm relationships regardless of unit status. Drawing on a theoretical perspective derived from the economics, marketing and management literatures, this study presents a unique basis for further investigation by placing franchising in the context of relational pluralism among large and small organizations.
- 1 May 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
- Vol. 35 (3) , 467-482
A Strategic Deviance Perspective on the Franchise Form of Organizing
Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, we propose that franchisors cannot assess and control opportunism absent comparative information provided by owning and operating some of their outlets and by franchising others. Moving beyond dyadic perspectives, we propose that the concept of strategic deviance suggests why franchisors accept deviant behavior resulting from vertical and horizontal agency problems in multiagent contracts. A plural form provides efficiency and quality benchmark information that curbs even greater levels of shirking and free–riding behaviors and enhances system performance. Opportunistic behaviors by company managers and franchisees are addressed through self–enforced social control and social comparison mechanisms.
- 1 May 2011
- Published by SAGE Publications in Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice
- Vol. 35 (3) , 467-482
A Strategic Deviance Perspective on the Franchise Form of Organizing
Drawing on various theoretical perspectives, we propose that franchisors cannot assess and control opportunism absent comparative information provided by owning and operating some of their outlets and by franchising others. Moving beyond dyadic perspectives, we propose that the concept of strategic deviance suggests why franchisors accept deviant behavior resulting from vertical and horizontal agency problems in multiagent contracts. A plural form provides efficiency and quality benchmark information that curbs even greater levels of shirking and free–riding behaviors and enhances system performance. Opportunistic behaviors by company managers and franchisees are addressed through self–enforced social control and social comparison mechanisms.
- 30 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 839-847
Exploring the Role of Governance in Sustainable Franchised Distribution Channels
- 30 December 2010
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 839-847
Exploring the Role of Governance in Sustainable Franchised Distribution Channels
- Open Access
- 23 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (3) , 339
Erratum to: The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- 23 November 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (3) , 339
Open AccessErratum to: The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- 16 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (3) , 341-363
The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- 16 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (3) , 341-363
The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- 11 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (1) , 87-108
The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- 11 June 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 97 (1) , 87-108
The Influence of Retail Management’s Use of Social Power on Corporate Ethical Values, Employee Commitment, and Performance
- Open Access
- 1 May 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 160-170
An Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels
This study focuses on organizational efforts to constrain ex post transaction costs in interorganizational exchange. The theoretical model frames opportunism as a determinant of transaction costs and implicates cooperation and formalization as control structures that alleviate opportunism. The model also examines whether the proposed theoretical relationships are enduring. Franchisee–franchisor relationships in the Norwegian distribution system of a multinational oil refiner provide the context for analysis. A test of the model using multisample data across two time periods indicates that opportunistic behavior consistently increases transaction costs. Furthermore, cooperative interaction curbs bargaining costs, and formalization reduces opportunism. The authors discuss implications for interorganizational theory and franchising management.
- 1 May 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Marketing Research
- Vol. 36 (2) , 160-170
Open AccessAn Empirical Investigation of Ex Post Transaction Costs in Franchised Distribution Channels
This study focuses on organizational efforts to constrain ex post transaction costs in interorganizational exchange. The theoretical model frames opportunism as a determinant of transaction costs and implicates cooperation and formalization as control structures that alleviate opportunism. The model also examines whether the proposed theoretical relationships are enduring. Franchisee–franchisor relationships in the Norwegian distribution system of a multinational oil refiner provide the context for analysis. A test of the model using multisample data across two time periods indicates that opportunistic behavior consistently increases transaction costs. Furthermore, cooperative interaction curbs bargaining costs, and formalization reduces opportunism. The authors discuss implications for interorganizational theory and franchising management.