Brentyn J. Ramm
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Brentyn J. Ramm has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kirsty Kitto
University of Technology Sydney
2 shared publications - Laurianne Sitbon
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
2 shared publications - Peter Bruza
Faculty of Science, Queensland University of Technology
2 shared publications - Tarrant D. R. Cummins
School of Psychological Sciences, Monash University, Melbourne, VIC, Australia
1 shared publication - Virginia Slaughter
School of Psychology The University of Queensland Brisbane Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 March 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 66 (3) , 394-416
Pure awareness experience
I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time.
- 16 March 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- Vol. 66 (3) , 394-416
Pure awareness experience
I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognising pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual-spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time.
- 17 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (3) , 449-467
First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence
- 17 February 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Vol. 9 (3) , 449-467
First-Person Experiments: A Characterisation and Defence
- Open Access
A probabilistic framework for analysing the compositionality of conceptual combinations
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases utilized in everyday language. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive science and philosophy. Additionally, the principle of semantic compositionality is underspecified, which means that notions of both "strong" and "weak" compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction between these is contextually sensitive. Utilizing formal frameworks developed for analyzing composite systems in quantum theory, we present two methods that allow the semantics of conceptual combinations to be classified as "compositional" or "non-compositional". Compositionality is first formalised by factorising the joint probability distribution modeling the combination, where the terms in the factorisation correspond to individual concepts. This leads to the necessary and sufficient condition for the joint probability distribution to exist. A failure to meet this condition implies that the underlying concepts cannot be modeled in a single probability space when considering their combination, and the combination is thus deemed "non-compositional". The formal analysis methods are demonstrated by applying them to an empirical study of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations.
Open AccessA probabilistic framework for analysing the compositionality of conceptual combinations
Conceptual combination performs a fundamental role in creating the broad range of compound phrases utilized in everyday language. This article provides a novel probabilistic framework for assessing whether the semantics of conceptual combinations are compositional, and so can be considered as a function of the semantics of the constituent concepts, or not. While the systematicity and productivity of language provide a strong argument in favor of assuming compositionality, this very assumption is still regularly questioned in both cognitive science and philosophy. Additionally, the principle of semantic compositionality is underspecified, which means that notions of both "strong" and "weak" compositionality appear in the literature. Rather than adjudicating between different grades of compositionality, the framework presented here contributes formal methods for determining a clear dividing line between compositional and non-compositional semantics. In addition, we suggest that the distinction between these is contextually sensitive. Utilizing formal frameworks developed for analyzing composite systems in quantum theory, we present two methods that allow the semantics of conceptual combinations to be classified as "compositional" or "non-compositional". Compositionality is first formalised by factorising the joint probability distribution modeling the combination, where the terms in the factorisation correspond to individual concepts. This leads to the necessary and sufficient condition for the joint probability distribution to exist. A failure to meet this condition implies that the underlying concepts cannot be modeled in a single probability space when considering their combination, and the combination is thus deemed "non-compositional". The formal analysis methods are demonstrated by applying them to an empirical study of twenty-four non-lexicalised conceptual combinations.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Axiomathes
- Vol. 21 (2) , 331-345
Quantum Theory Beyond the Physical: Information in Context
- 14 January 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Axiomathes
- Vol. 21 (2) , 331-345
Open AccessQuantum Theory Beyond the Physical: Information in Context
- 10 March 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Visual Cognition
- Vol. 18 (6) , 898-919
Specifying the human body configuration
Three experiments investigated the specific spatial relations that define the human body configuration. In Experiment 1, participants searched for scrambled bodies amongst normal distractors. In Experiments 2 and 3 participants were asked to identify whether single body images (upright or inverted) were scrambled or normal. Scrambled bodies had head or limbs displaced to either symmetrical or asymmetrical positions. Experiment 1 showed that asymmetrical violations are recognized faster than symmetrical violations. All three experiments revealed that when the number of structural violations is held constant, head violations are recognized faster than limb violations. Experiment 3 also showed a greater inversion effect for scrambled bodies that maintained head on top and vertical symmetry, providing evidence that these are key spatial relations in the human body configuration. Overall, the results supported our hypothesis that the human body configuration is defined primarily by a head at the apex of a vertically symmetrical body.
- 10 March 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Visual Cognition
- Vol. 18 (6) , 898-919
Specifying the human body configuration
Three experiments investigated the specific spatial relations that define the human body configuration. In Experiment 1, participants searched for scrambled bodies amongst normal distractors. In Experiments 2 and 3 participants were asked to identify whether single body images (upright or inverted) were scrambled or normal. Scrambled bodies had head or limbs displaced to either symmetrical or asymmetrical positions. Experiment 1 showed that asymmetrical violations are recognized faster than symmetrical violations. All three experiments revealed that when the number of structural violations is held constant, head violations are recognized faster than limb violations. Experiment 3 also showed a greater inversion effect for scrambled bodies that maintained head on top and vertical symmetry, providing evidence that these are key spatial relations in the human body configuration. Overall, the results supported our hypothesis that the human body configuration is defined primarily by a head at the apex of a vertically symmetrical body.