Lambert Schoonbeek
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lambert Schoonbeek has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adriaan R. Soetevent
Universiteit van Amsterdam;
1 shared publication - Allard van der Made
IEEF, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfskunde , Nettelbosje 2 , Groningen 9747AE , Netherlands
1 shared publication - Frans P. de Vries
University of Aberdeen
1 shared publication - Marco A. Haan
Department of Economics, Econometrics and Finance, Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Peter T. Dijkstra
Netherlands Authority for Consumers and Markets (ACM), 2500 BH The Hague, The Netherlands
1 shared publication - Pim Heijnen
CeNDEF, Department of Quantitative Economics, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 28 (6)
Teaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest
We consider a rent‐seeking contest where two players compete for a single prize. Each player can exert effort in two complementary activities to influence his probability of winning. Each player also has the option to hire a delegate to exert effort in one of these activities on his behalf. We show that if the probability of winning the contest is sensitive enough to the efforts, in equilibrium one of the players teams up with a delegate, whereas the other player does not do so. Hence, delegation by one player arises endogenously in this case.
- 9 November 2026
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 28 (6)
Open AccessTeaming up With a Delegate in a Rent‐Seeking Contest
We consider a rent‐seeking contest where two players compete for a single prize. Each player can exert effort in two complementary activities to influence his probability of winning. Each player also has the option to hire a delegate to exert effort in one of these activities on his behalf. We show that if the probability of winning the contest is sensitive enough to the efforts, in equilibrium one of the players teams up with a delegate, whereas the other player does not do so. Hence, delegation by one player arises endogenously in this case.
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 59 (1) , 13-36
Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication
- 27 October 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Industrial Organization
- Vol. 59 (1) , 13-36
Leniency Programs and the Design of Antitrust: Experimental Evidence with Free-Form Communication
- 2 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 1497-1510
INFORMATION AND ENDOGENOUS DELEGATION IN A RENT‐SEEKING CONTEST
We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent‐seeking contests. We consider a two‐player contest for a prize of common value. The players only know that the prize is high or low, with given probabilities. Each player can hire a delegate to act on his behalf. After a delegate is hired, she privately observes the true value of the prize. We derive the conditions under which, respectively, no player, only one player, or both players delegate in equilibrium. (JELD7)
- 2 March 2017
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 55 (3) , 1497-1510
INFORMATION AND ENDOGENOUS DELEGATION IN A RENT‐SEEKING CONTEST
We offer a new explanation for the occurrence of delegation in rent‐seeking contests. We consider a two‐player contest for a prize of common value. The players only know that the prize is high or low, with given probabilities. Each player can hire a delegate to act on his behalf. After a delegate is hired, she privately observes the true value of the prize. We derive the conditions under which, respectively, no player, only one player, or both players delegate in equilibrium. (JELD7)
- 28 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 38 (1) , 55-73
Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information
- 28 August 2014
- Published by Springer Nature in Decisions in Economics and Finance
- Vol. 38 (1) , 55-73
Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information
- Open Access
- 27 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 94-106
Environmental taxes and industry monopolization
- 27 March 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 36 (1) , 94-106
Open AccessEnvironmental taxes and industry monopolization
- Open Access
- 18 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 139 (1-2) , 153-158
Bribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
- 18 November 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 139 (1-2) , 153-158
Open AccessBribing potential entrants in a rent-seeking contest
- Open Access
- 15 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 43 (4) , 457-472
Entry Facilitation by Environmental Groups
- 15 October 2008
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 43 (4) , 457-472
Open AccessEntry Facilitation by Environmental Groups
- Open Access
- 5 June 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 379-396
Environmental groups in monopolistic markets
- 5 June 2007
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 379-396
Open AccessEnvironmental groups in monopolistic markets
- 15 December 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 131 (3-4) , 453-464
Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
- 15 December 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 131 (3-4) , 453-464
Delegation with multiple instruments in a rent-seeking contest
- 1 April 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
- Vol. 226 (2) , 208-232
Price-Setting Behavior in the Presence of Social Interactions
Summary We consider a market with a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm. Utility-maximizing consumers either buy one unit of the good or none at all. The demand for the good is influenced by local social interactions. That is, the utility which a consumer derives from the consumption of the good depends positively on the fraction of other consumers in his own social group that consume the good. We first consider a benchmark case where the population of consumers is not segmented and constitutes one social group. We derive the optimal price and profit of the firm for this case. Next, we analyse the optimal price and profit for the case where the population of consumers is partitioned into two different social groups. Comparing the results for the cases with one and two social groups, it turns out that the partition into groups does not unambiguously gives the firm the opportunity to raise its price and increase its profit. The effects depend on a non-trivial interplay between the strength of the social interaction effect and the specific composition of the social groups.
- 1 April 2006
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik
- Vol. 226 (2) , 208-232
Price-Setting Behavior in the Presence of Social Interactions
Summary We consider a market with a profit-maximizing monopolistic firm. Utility-maximizing consumers either buy one unit of the good or none at all. The demand for the good is influenced by local social interactions. That is, the utility which a consumer derives from the consumption of the good depends positively on the fraction of other consumers in his own social group that consume the good. We first consider a benchmark case where the population of consumers is not segmented and constitutes one social group. We derive the optimal price and profit of the firm for this case. Next, we analyse the optimal price and profit for the case where the population of consumers is partitioned into two different social groups. Comparing the results for the cases with one and two social groups, it turns out that the partition into groups does not unambiguously gives the firm the opportunity to raise its price and increase its profit. The effects depend on a non-trivial interplay between the strength of the social interaction effect and the specific composition of the social groups.