Seth Chin-Parker
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Seth Chin-Parker has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alexandra Bradner
Department of Philosophy, Kenyon College, Ascension Hall, Gambier, OH, 43022, USA
2 shared publicationsJessie Birdwhistell
Department of Education, University of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, USA
2 shared publicationsEric Brown
Denison University, USA
1 shared publicationEric Gerlach
Denison University, USA
1 shared publicationJulie Cantelon
Center for Applied Brain and Cognitive Sciences Tufts University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 24 (5) , 1387-1397
A contrastive account of explanation generation
In this article, we propose a contrastive account of explanation generation. Though researchers have long wrestled with the concepts of explanation and understanding, as well as with the procedures by which we might evaluate explanations, less attention has been paid to the initial generation stages of explanation. Before an explainer can answer a question, he or she must come to some understanding of the explanandum—what the question is asking—and of the explanatory form and content called for by the context. Here candidate explanations are constructed to respond to the particular interpretation of the question, which, according to the pragmatic approach to explanation, is constrained by a contrast class—a set of related but nonoccurring alternatives to the topic that emerge from the surrounding context and the explainer’s prior knowledge. In this article, we suggest that generating an explanation involves two operations: one that homes in on an interpretation of the question, and a second one that locates an answer. We review empirical work that supports this account, consider the implications of these contrastive processes, and identify areas for future study.
- 31 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 24 (5) , 1387-1397
A contrastive account of explanation generation
In this article, we propose a contrastive account of explanation generation. Though researchers have long wrestled with the concepts of explanation and understanding, as well as with the procedures by which we might evaluate explanations, less attention has been paid to the initial generation stages of explanation. Before an explainer can answer a question, he or she must come to some understanding of the explanandum—what the question is asking—and of the explanatory form and content called for by the context. Here candidate explanations are constructed to respond to the particular interpretation of the question, which, according to the pragmatic approach to explanation, is constrained by a contrast class—a set of related but nonoccurring alternatives to the topic that emerge from the surrounding context and the explainer’s prior knowledge. In this article, we suggest that generating an explanation involves two operations: one that homes in on an interpretation of the question, and a second one that locates an answer. We review empirical work that supports this account, consider the implications of these contrastive processes, and identify areas for future study.
- 17 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 450-468
Category learning with a goal: how goals constrain conceptual acquisition
A novel task was used to examine the roles that goals play in concept acquisition. In Experiment 1, we varied the type of interaction, and thus the task goal, of participants working in a novel domain. Following those interactions, participant responses showed that they had organized their knowledge in terms of goal-relevant features. Using a variation of the same methodology, Experiment 2 provided evidence that the goal relevance also played a role in how the participants structured their knowledge of the items, specifically what information about the items was associated with differentiating the categories encountered. The results suggest that the goals not only highlighted particular features, they determined the centrality of those features in the conceptual knowledge. We discuss the results in terms of the goal-framework hypothesis; the idea that goals structure information and provide coherence to the acquired concepts. We discuss how this approach informs category learning research.
- 17 January 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 29 (4) , 450-468
Category learning with a goal: how goals constrain conceptual acquisition
A novel task was used to examine the roles that goals play in concept acquisition. In Experiment 1, we varied the type of interaction, and thus the task goal, of participants working in a novel domain. Following those interactions, participant responses showed that they had organized their knowledge in terms of goal-relevant features. Using a variation of the same methodology, Experiment 2 provided evidence that the goal relevance also played a role in how the participants structured their knowledge of the items, specifically what information about the items was associated with differentiating the categories encountered. The results suggest that the goals not only highlighted particular features, they determined the centrality of those features in the conceptual knowledge. We discuss the results in terms of the goal-framework hypothesis; the idea that goals structure information and provide coherence to the acquired concepts. We discuss how this approach informs category learning research.
- 26 August 2016
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 41 (6) , 1645-1655
Contrastive Constraints Guide Explanation‐Based Category Learning
This paper provides evidence for a contrastive account of explanation that is motivated by pragmatic theories that recognize the contribution that context makes to the interpretation of a prompt for explanation. This study replicates the primary findings of previous work in explanation‐based category learning (Williams & Lombrozo, 2010), extending that work by illustrating the critical role of the context in this type of learning. Participants interacted with items from two categories either by describing the items or explaining their category membership. We manipulated the feature overlap between the categories and examined both the explanations generated and acquired knowledge of the categories. Explanations for membership in a given category were influenced by the unprompted contrast category, indicating an important role for contrastive processing in the generation of explanations. The influence of the contrast category was similarly seen in the transfer performance of the participants.
- 26 August 2016
- Published by Wiley in Cognitive Science
- Vol. 41 (6) , 1645-1655
Contrastive Constraints Guide Explanation‐Based Category Learning
This paper provides evidence for a contrastive account of explanation that is motivated by pragmatic theories that recognize the contribution that context makes to the interpretation of a prompt for explanation. This study replicates the primary findings of previous work in explanation‐based category learning (Williams & Lombrozo, 2010), extending that work by illustrating the critical role of the context in this type of learning. Participants interacted with items from two categories either by describing the items or explaining their category membership. We manipulated the feature overlap between the categories and examined both the explanations generated and acquired knowledge of the categories. Explanations for membership in a given category were influenced by the unprompted contrast category, indicating an important role for contrastive processing in the generation of explanations. The influence of the contrast category was similarly seen in the transfer performance of the participants.
- 27 October 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Processing
- Vol. 11 (3) , 227-249
Background shifts affect explanatory style: how a pragmatic theory of explanation accounts for background effects in the generation of explanations
Cognitive scientists are interested in explanation because it provides a window into the cognition that underlies one’s understanding of the world. We argue that the study of explanation has tended to focus on what makes an explanation “bona fide” as opposed to the processes involved in how the explanation is generated. In the current study, we asked participants to respond to the request for an explanation within a novel domain after we manipulated their initial exposure to the domain, and thus the background of the request. In two experiments, we found evidence that the background shaped participants’ interpretations of the prompt for the explanation and that this, in turn, influenced whether they used a causal or functional style of explanation when responding to the prompt. We also asked participants to evaluate a number of explanations and found that the manipulation of the background did not have the same effect on the evaluative tasks. Our data support a pragmatic approach (e.g. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) to the study of explanation generation, a philosophical approach which argues that the background influences the interpretation of the question, the development of a relevance relation which connects the question and explanation, and the identification of some set of candidate answers. We also suggest there is an important difference between the process of generating an explanation and evaluating an explanation, a difference that has escaped the attention of cognitive scientists thus far.
- 27 October 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Cognitive Processing
- Vol. 11 (3) , 227-249
Background shifts affect explanatory style: how a pragmatic theory of explanation accounts for background effects in the generation of explanations
Cognitive scientists are interested in explanation because it provides a window into the cognition that underlies one’s understanding of the world. We argue that the study of explanation has tended to focus on what makes an explanation “bona fide” as opposed to the processes involved in how the explanation is generated. In the current study, we asked participants to respond to the request for an explanation within a novel domain after we manipulated their initial exposure to the domain, and thus the background of the request. In two experiments, we found evidence that the background shaped participants’ interpretations of the prompt for the explanation and that this, in turn, influenced whether they used a causal or functional style of explanation when responding to the prompt. We also asked participants to evaluate a number of explanations and found that the manipulation of the background did not have the same effect on the evaluative tasks. Our data support a pragmatic approach (e.g. The scientific image. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) to the study of explanation generation, a philosophical approach which argues that the background influences the interpretation of the question, the development of a relevance relation which connects the question and explanation, and the identification of some set of candidate answers. We also suggest there is an important difference between the process of generating an explanation and evaluating an explanation, a difference that has escaped the attention of cognitive scientists thus far.
- 1 January 2008
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Beyond the Solution: Problem Solving As Category Learning
- 1 January 2008
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA)
Beyond the Solution: Problem Solving As Category Learning