WJWilliam Q. Judge

William Q. Judge

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


William Q. Judge has a total of 48 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Institutional Systems for Equitable Wealth Creation: Replication and an Update of Judge et al. (2014)

    by William Q. Judge, Stav Fainshmidt, J. Lee Brown

    This replication study was invited by the Editor in Chief of Management and Organization Review, Arie Y. Lewin. The original study by Judge, Fainshmidt, and Brown (2014) spanned the global financial crisis (2005–2010), and as such, this anomalous time period may not have been representative of most economies, or even the overall global economy. In this replication study we refine and extend Judge et al. (2014) which explored the provocative question – which form of capitalism works best in terms of ‘equitable wealth creation’? Similar to the earlier study, we find that there are multiple paths to macro-economic success. Notably, effective institutional configurations tend to combine high-quality regulatory institutions, effective skill development systems, and social cultures largely unaffected by corruption so there is some commonality amongst effective configurations. In contrast, ineffective institutional configurations tend to be relatively weak in one or several of these three critical sets of institutions. Importantly, we find some novel patterns emerging from the most recent data, including potentially new forms of capitalism associated with equitable wealth creation. In addition, we find that effective credit market institutions are more important, and collective bargaining institutions are less important than the original study suggested. We discuss implications for the comparative capitalism literature, policy makers, and the future of capitalism in the global economy.


  • Top Cited Papers

    Beyond tokenism: How strategic leaders influence more meaningful gender diversity on boards of directors

    by Orhun Guldiken, Mark R. Mallon, Stav Fainshmidt, William Q. Judge, Cynthia E. Clark

    Research Summary: We employ an exploratory approach to understand what differentiates boards that retain limited, potentially tokenistic, gender diversity (i.e., a single female director), and boards that more genuinely diversify their composition by appointing additional female directors. Previous studies have speculated that strategic leaders responsible for board appointments may influence this occurrence. Using longitudinal data on U.S. firms, we find that more female top managers and having the sole female director serve on the nominating committee increase the likelihood of additional female director appointments. Boards and nominating committees with younger members amplify these effects, respectively. We use interviews with board members and professional corporate governance consultants to discuss the probable causal mechanisms that underpin these relationships, highlighting novel theoretical insights related to gatekeeping and social psychology. Managerial Summary: We explore what compels firms to appoint additional female directors after the first one, as only one female director could be considered a token. Using data on U.S. firms, we find that more female top managers and having the sole female director serve on the nominating committee make firms more likely to appoint additional female directors. These likelihoods are highest when younger directors make up the board at large and/or nominating committee. Chief executive officers can be change agents for gender diversity in their organizations by hiring female top managers and pushing for better representation of women on boards. Likewise, younger directors appear to enhance board gender diversity. These findings can inform the director selection process.


  • Board Involvement in the Strategic Decision Making Process: A Comprehensive Review

    by William Q. Judge, Till Talaulicar

    The board of directors is legally responsible for setting the strategic direction of the firm and for ensuring the firm’s long-term performance in almost all governance environments. However, many boards delegate part or all of the task of creating and executing the firm’s strategy to a group of full-time professional managers. This separation between ownership and control creates many challenges for the modern-day firm, and the board’s role in the strategy formation process is arguably the seminal governance challenge confronting boards today. This study examines this seminal challenge by: (1) Introducing background information on this stream by defining key terms and discussing its importance to the wider corporate governance literature, describing three infamous case studies of firms based in the USA, Europe and Asia where the board was insufficiently involved, and noting situations where the board may become too involved; (2) Exploring previous reviews of this research stream on board strategic involvement, and discussing the evolution of this construct and related studies over time; (3) Analyzing previous research designs used in this research stream while identifying the frequency as well as costs and benefits associated with each; (4) Summarizing what we currently know about the multi-level antecedents of board involvement within single countries; (5) Specifying some of the national-level antecedents of board involvement identified in cross-national studies; (6) Identifying the subsequent multi-level effects of board involvement; and (7) Discussing the implications of this review and outlining future research directions.


  • Corporate governance and IPO underpricing in a cross‐national sample: A multilevel knowledge‐based view

    by William Q. Judge, Michael A. Witt, Alessandro Zattoni, Till Talaulicar, Jean Jinghan Chen, Krista Lewellyn, Helen Wei Hu, Dhirendra Shukla, R. Greg Bell (Robert), Jonas Gabrielsson, et al.

    Prior studies of IPO underpricing, mostly using agency theory and single‐country samples, have generally fallen short. In this study, we employ the knowledge‐based view ( KBV ) to explore underpricing across 17 countries. We find that agency indicators are insignificant predictors, board of director knowledge limits underpricing, and external knowledge both substitutes for and complements internal board knowledge. This third finding suggests that future KBV studies should consider how internal and external knowledge states interact with each other. Our study offers new insights into the antecedents of underpricing and extends our understanding of comparative governance and the KBV of the firm . Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


  • Entrepreneurship as a leap of faith

    by William Q. Judge, Thomas J. Douglas

    Entrepreneurial start-ups require a “leap of faith”. Since a person’s faith represents a belief in something for which there is limited information and considerable uncertainty, this suggests that the entrepreneur’s faith orientation may influence the start-up process for some entrepreneurs. Due to the paucity of research in this area and the need to better understand the start-up process, this study utilized an inductive, longitudinal research design. Specifically, we studied the new venture creation process for four entrepreneurs operating throughout the USA over a five-year period from 2005 to 2009. As a result of this study, new theoretical insights are generated on entrepreneurial motivations, creativity, expectations, and emotions for those entrepreneurs who seek to integrate their faith journey with a new entrepreneurial start-up.


  • National Governance Bundles and Equitable Wealth Creation

    by William Q Judge, Stav Fainshmidt, J. Lee Brown, Pushpika Vishwanathan, Hans Van Oosterhout, Lucas C.P.M. Meijs, Abhijith Holehonnur, Yuan Li, Zhi Cao, Yi Liu, et al.

    In this study, we argue that a successful economy creates wealth and distributes that wealth equitably. Economic institutionalism tells us that the governance mechanisms within a society create the “rules of the game” to help create and insure legitimate economic outcomes. Employing insights from institutional theory and the comparative governance literature, we analyze how formal and informal governance mechanisms configure within governance bundles to influence national economic outcomes for 48 countries. Using fuzzy set analysis, we find that there are three functional and two dysfunctional configurations of national governance bundles; and that informal social norms coupled with public governance mechanisms appear to be the primary drivers of macroeconomic well-being. These findings provide interesting new theoretical insights to institutional theorists and governance scholars, as well as practical and important ideas for economic policy-makers and heads of state.

  • What Are the Correlates of Interdisciplinary Research Impact? The Case of Corporate Governance Research

    by William Q. Judge, Thomas Weber, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle

    We explore the concept of interdisciplinary research impact and better understand what factors might be associated with it. Using the field of corporate governance research as a case study and linking our research impact concept to a novel measure of scholarly citation rates, we seek to understand why some corporate governance scholars are cited more than others. We first developed a comprehensive ranking of the top-100 scholars cited for their research in corporate governance and then compared that “high-impact” group with scholars who had published governance research that was not yet cited. We hypothesized that indicators from the social network perspective would be predictive of interdisciplinary research impact. Our data largely supported our hypotheses using this new and improved measure of research impact, and robustness tests also supported our results.


  • Antecedents of Shareholder Activism in Target Firms: Evidence from a Multi‐Country Study

    by William Q. Judge, Ajai Gaur, Maureen I. Muller‐Kahle

    Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study seeks to better understand the antecedents of shareholder activism targeted at firms located in three common law countries (i.e., USA, UK, and Australia) and three civil law countries (Japan, Germany, and South Korea) during the 2003–07 time period.Research Findings/Insights: Our findings suggest that the antecedents of shareholder activism vary by the motivation of the activist. We demonstrate that activists target firms with two motives (a) to improve the financial performance, and (b) to improve the social performance of the firm. With respect to the target firm level antecedents, we find that firm size is unrelated to financial activism, but positively related to social activism; ownership concentration is negatively related to both financial and social activism; and prior profitability is negatively related to financial activism, but positively related to social activism. Further, these relationships in the case of financial activism are generally stronger in common law legal systems, whereas those in the case of social activism are generally stronger in environments with a greater level of income inequality.Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our findings suggest that future research should differentiate between the motivations of the activism event. Further, we find that while agency logic works well for financial activism, institutional theory provides stronger explanations for social activism. Overall, we demonstrate the complementary nature of these two theories in explaining shareholder activism.Practitioner/Policy Implications: We found that the “exposure” to shareholder activism varies by the motivation of the activist, and the nature of the firm and its national context. An understanding of these issues would help firms develop proper response strategies to activism events.


  • Top Cited Papers

    National Adoption of International Accounting Standards: An Institutional Perspective

    by William Judge, Shaomin Li, Robert Pinsker

    Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: Effective corporate governance requires accurate and reliable financial information. Historically, each nation has developed and pursued its own financial standards; however, as financial markets consolidate into a global market, there is a need for a common set of financial standards. As a result, there is a movement towards harmonization of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) throughout the global economy. While there has been considerable research on the effects of IFRS adoption, there has been relatively little systematic study as to the antecedents of IFRS adoption. Consequently, this study seeks to understand why some economies have quickly embraced IFRS standards while others partially adopt IFRS and still others continue to resist.Research Findings/Results: After controlling for market capitalization and GDP growth, we find that foreign aid, import penetration, and level of education achieved within a national economy are all predictive of the degree to which IFRS standards are adopted across 132 developing, transitional and developed economies.Theoretical/Academic Implications: We found that all three forms of isomorphic pressures (i.e., coercive, mimetic, and normative) are predictive of IFRS adoption. Consequently, institutional theory with its emphasis on legitimacy‐seeking by social actors was relatively well supported by our data. This suggests that the IFRS adoption process is driven more by social legitimization pressures, than it is by economic logic.Practitioner/Policy Implications: For policy makers, our findings suggest that the institutional pressures within an economy are the key drivers of IFRS adoption. Consequently, policy makers should seek to influence institutional pressures that thwart and/or enhance adoption of IFRS. For executives of multinational firms, our findings provide insights that can help to explain and predict future IFRS adoption within economies where their foreign subsidiaries operate. This ability could be useful for creating competitive advantages for foreign subsidiaries where IFRS adoption was resisted, or avoiding competitive disadvantages for foreign subsidiaries unfamiliar with IFRS standards.