Morteza Zadimoghaddam
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Morteza Zadimoghaddam has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hamid Mahini
Sharif University of Technology, Computer Engineering Department, P.O. Box 11155-9517, Tehran, Iran
2 shared publications Erik D. Demaine
1 shared publication- Erik D. Demaine
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA
1 shared publication - Mohammad Ghodsi
Sharif University of Technology
1 shared publication - MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi
AT&T Labs–Research & University of Maryland
1 shared publication - Vahab S. Mirrokni
Microsoft Research
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 January 2013
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
- p. 1369-1379
Learning Disjunctions: Near-Optimal Trade-off between Mistakes and “I Don't Knows”
- 6 January 2013
- Published by Society for Industrial & Applied Mathematics (SIAM)
- p. 1369-1379
Learning Disjunctions: Near-Optimal Trade-off between Mistakes and “I Don't Knows”
- 16 December 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 60 (4) , 853-876
Permutation Betting Markets: Singleton Betting with Extra Information
- 16 December 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in Algorithmica
- Vol. 60 (4) , 853-876
Permutation Betting Markets: Singleton Betting with Extra Information
- Open Access
The Price of Anarchy in Cooperative Network Creation Games
In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while selfishly minimizing the link creation costs plus the sum of the distances to all other players (usage cost). In this paper, we pursue two important facets of the network creation game. First, we study extensively a natural version of the game, called the cooperative model, where nodes can collaborate and share the cost of creating any edge in the host graph. We prove the first nontrivial bounds in this model, establishing that the price of anarchy is polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete host graphs. This bound is the first result of this type for any version of the network creation game; most previous general upper bounds are polynomial in n. Interestingly, we also show that equilibrium graphs have polylogarithmic diameter for the most natural range of \alpha (at most n polylg n). Second, we study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general graph, not necessarily complete. This model is a simple example of nonuniform creation costs among the edges (effectively allowing weights of \alpha and \infty). We prove the first assemblage of upper and lower bounds for this context, stablishing nontrivial tight bounds for many ranges of \alpha, for both the unilateral and cooperative versions of network creation. In particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both versions and many ranges of \alpha, even for this simple nonuniform cost model, which sharply contrasts the conjectured constant bounds for these games in complete (uniform) graphs.
Open AccessThe Price of Anarchy in Cooperative Network Creation Games
In general, the games are played on a host graph, where each node is a selfish independent agent (player) and each edge has a fixed link creation cost \alpha. Together the agents create a network (a subgraph of the host graph) while selfishly minimizing the link creation costs plus the sum of the distances to all other players (usage cost). In this paper, we pursue two important facets of the network creation game. First, we study extensively a natural version of the game, called the cooperative model, where nodes can collaborate and share the cost of creating any edge in the host graph. We prove the first nontrivial bounds in this model, establishing that the price of anarchy is polylogarithmic in n for all values of α in complete host graphs. This bound is the first result of this type for any version of the network creation game; most previous general upper bounds are polynomial in n. Interestingly, we also show that equilibrium graphs have polylogarithmic diameter for the most natural range of \alpha (at most n polylg n). Second, we study the impact of the natural assumption that the host graph is a general graph, not necessarily complete. This model is a simple example of nonuniform creation costs among the edges (effectively allowing weights of \alpha and \infty). We prove the first assemblage of upper and lower bounds for this context, stablishing nontrivial tight bounds for many ranges of \alpha, for both the unilateral and cooperative versions of network creation. In particular, we establish polynomial lower bounds for both versions and many ranges of \alpha, even for this simple nonuniform cost model, which sharply contrasts the conjectured constant bounds for these games in complete (uniform) graphs.