Job Swank
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Interests
Job Swank has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bauke Visser
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute
1 shared publication - Eric van Damme
Department of Economics Tilburg University
1 shared publication - Jules Theeuwes
SEO Economic Research, University of Amsterdam
1 shared publication - M. M. G. Fase1 shared publication
Otto H. Swank
Erasmus University Rotterdam and Tinbergen Institute
1 shared publication- Philip Hans Franses
Econometric Institute, Erasmus School of Economics, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in De Economist
- Vol. 157 (2) , 267-269
Jury Report on the KVS Award for the Best Doctoral Thesis in Economics of the Academic Years 2006–2007 and 2007–2008
- 16 June 2009
- Published by Springer Nature in De Economist
- Vol. 157 (2) , 267-269
Open AccessJury Report on the KVS Award for the Best Doctoral Thesis in Economics of the Academic Years 2006–2007 and 2007–2008
- 1 April 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 6 (2-3) , 478-486
How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC
Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision- makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g., by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting the two propositions. Keywords: Committees, pre-meetings, reputational concerns, trans- parency, FOMC. JEL codes: D71, D72, D82
- 1 April 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 6 (2-3) , 478-486
How Committees of Experts Interact with the Outside World: Some Theory, and Evidence from the FOMC
Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision- makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g., by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting the two propositions. Keywords: Committees, pre-meetings, reputational concerns, trans- parency, FOMC. JEL codes: D71, D72, D82