Amadou Boly
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Amadou Boly has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Olivier Armantier
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-15
On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso
- 3 September 2013
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-15
On the effects of incentive framing on bribery: evidence from an experiment in Burkina Faso
- 1 May 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 241-253
On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the field
Several experimental studies have shown that the crowding-out effect of monitoring may outweigh its disciplining effect through intrinsic motivation destruction, thereby reducing effort. However, most of these experiments use numeric effort tasks that subjects may not be intrinsically motivated to complete. This paper aims to analyze the incentive effects of monitoring using a real-effort task for which intrinsic motivation is more likely to exist. We conducted two similar experiments, in the lab in Montreal and in the field in Ouagadougou. In contrast to the lab, subjects in the field are unaware they are taking part in an experiment.The following results are observed both in the lab and in the field. Relative to the baseline treatment, we find that our two monitoring treatments significantly increase effort, in line with agency theory. However, effort levels are not significantly different between the monitoring treatments. Finally, increasing the subjects’ wage is found to have no effect on effort.
- 1 May 2011
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 14 (2) , 241-253
On the incentive effects of monitoring: evidence from the lab and the field
Several experimental studies have shown that the crowding-out effect of monitoring may outweigh its disciplining effect through intrinsic motivation destruction, thereby reducing effort. However, most of these experiments use numeric effort tasks that subjects may not be intrinsically motivated to complete. This paper aims to analyze the incentive effects of monitoring using a real-effort task for which intrinsic motivation is more likely to exist. We conducted two similar experiments, in the lab in Montreal and in the field in Ouagadougou. In contrast to the lab, subjects in the field are unaware they are taking part in an experiment.The following results are observed both in the lab and in the field. Relative to the baseline treatment, we find that our two monitoring treatments significantly increase effort, in line with agency theory. However, effort levels are not significantly different between the monitoring treatments. Finally, increasing the subjects’ wage is found to have no effect on effort.