Helena De Preester
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Helena De Preester has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Gertrudis Van de Vijver
Ghent University
1 shared publication - John Dorsch
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK
1 shared publication - Manos Tsakiris
Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 11-30
Unconvincing Realism: The Experience of Alterity and the Art of Character Design in Conversational Agents and Social Robots
- 11 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 11-30
Unconvincing Realism: The Experience of Alterity and the Art of Character Design in Conversational Agents and Social Robots
- 5 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY
- Vol. 54 (1) , 65-92
Descartes on the Passions of the Soul and Internal Emotions: Two Challenges for Interoception Research in Emotions
On the basis of Descartes’s account of the passions of the soul, we argue that current interoception-based theories of emotions cannot account for the hallmark of a passion of the soul, i.e., that its effects are felt as being in the soul itself. We also pay attention to the epistemic functions of the passions and to Descartes’s category of emotions that are caused and occur in the soul alone. Certain passions of the soul and certain internal (or intellectual) emotions are similar to what are today called ‘epistemic (or noetic) feelings’ and ‘epistemic emotions.’ Descartes’s work reflects another challenge for contemporary embodied cognition: how might epistemic affect be embodied? Since the signature of embodiment is increasingly understood as interoceptive, the challenge to interoceptive research is demonstrating the degree to which (epistemic) affect results from interoception. This challenge also implies that the locus of emotional experience is taken into account.
- 5 November 2021
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY
- Vol. 54 (1) , 65-92
Descartes on the Passions of the Soul and Internal Emotions: Two Challenges for Interoception Research in Emotions
On the basis of Descartes’s account of the passions of the soul, we argue that current interoception-based theories of emotions cannot account for the hallmark of a passion of the soul, i.e., that its effects are felt as being in the soul itself. We also pay attention to the epistemic functions of the passions and to Descartes’s category of emotions that are caused and occur in the soul alone. Certain passions of the soul and certain internal (or intellectual) emotions are similar to what are today called ‘epistemic (or noetic) feelings’ and ‘epistemic emotions.’ Descartes’s work reflects another challenge for contemporary embodied cognition: how might epistemic affect be embodied? Since the signature of embodiment is increasingly understood as interoceptive, the challenge to interoceptive research is demonstrating the degree to which (epistemic) affect results from interoception. This challenge also implies that the locus of emotional experience is taken into account.
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (2) , 581-585
The object that technology is not and how we can relate to it
- 31 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (2) , 581-585
The object that technology is not and how we can relate to it
- Open Access
- 8 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (1) , 125-140
Subjectivity and Transcendental Illusions in the Anthropocene
This contribution focuses on one member in particular of the anthropocenic triad Earth – technology – humankind, namely the current form of human subjectivity that characterizes humankind in the Anthropocene. Because knowledge, desire and behavior are always embedded in a particular form of subjectivity, it makes sense to look at the current subjective structure that embeds knowledge, desire and behavior. We want to move beyond the common psychological explanations that subjects are unable to correctly assess the consequences of their current technological lifestyle or unable to change their lifestyle because well-intended behavior is modified by factors such as laziness, lack of knowledge, seduction by convenience, etc. Instead, we will argue from a philosophical point of view that transcendental illusions play a central role in a contemporary account of subjectivity. Consumerism is considered as a means of not becoming a subject and framed in a profound ambivalence at the heart of our acting (consuming) against better knowledge. We appeal to collective transcendental conditions of subjectivity in the Anthropocene in terms of illusions without owners – a term borrowed from Robert Pfaller’s work on interpassivity. Central in our account is the idea that illusions without owners are the conditions of possibility for the disconnection between knowledge and behavior – the characteristic par excellence of the Anthropocene.
- 8 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 27 (1) , 125-140
Open AccessSubjectivity and Transcendental Illusions in the Anthropocene
This contribution focuses on one member in particular of the anthropocenic triad Earth – technology – humankind, namely the current form of human subjectivity that characterizes humankind in the Anthropocene. Because knowledge, desire and behavior are always embedded in a particular form of subjectivity, it makes sense to look at the current subjective structure that embeds knowledge, desire and behavior. We want to move beyond the common psychological explanations that subjects are unable to correctly assess the consequences of their current technological lifestyle or unable to change their lifestyle because well-intended behavior is modified by factors such as laziness, lack of knowledge, seduction by convenience, etc. Instead, we will argue from a philosophical point of view that transcendental illusions play a central role in a contemporary account of subjectivity. Consumerism is considered as a means of not becoming a subject and framed in a profound ambivalence at the heart of our acting (consuming) against better knowledge. We appeal to collective transcendental conditions of subjectivity in the Anthropocene in terms of illusions without owners – a term borrowed from Robert Pfaller’s work on interpassivity. Central in our account is the idea that illusions without owners are the conditions of possibility for the disconnection between knowledge and behavior – the characteristic par excellence of the Anthropocene.
- 24 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 25 (4) , 503-520
The sensory component of imagination: The motor theory of imagination as a present-day solution to Sartre's critique
Several recent accounts claim that imagination is a matter of simulating perceptual acts. Although this point of view receives support from both phenomenological and empirical research, I claim that Jean-Paul Sartre's worry formulated in L'imagination (1936) still holds. For a number of reasons, Sartre heavily criticizes theories in which the sensory material of imaginative acts consists in reviving sensory impressions. Based on empirical and philosophical insights, this article explains how simulation theories of imagination can overcome Sartre's critique by paying attention to the motor dimension of imagination. Intending to clarify the status of the sensory in imagination, a motor theory of imagination is presented in which the sensory component of imagination is interpreted in terms of anticipated sensory consequences of preparation for motor action.
- 24 January 2012
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 25 (4) , 503-520
The sensory component of imagination: The motor theory of imagination as a present-day solution to Sartre's critique
Several recent accounts claim that imagination is a matter of simulating perceptual acts. Although this point of view receives support from both phenomenological and empirical research, I claim that Jean-Paul Sartre's worry formulated in L'imagination (1936) still holds. For a number of reasons, Sartre heavily criticizes theories in which the sensory material of imaginative acts consists in reviving sensory impressions. Based on empirical and philosophical insights, this article explains how simulation theories of imagination can overcome Sartre's critique by paying attention to the motor dimension of imagination. Intending to clarify the status of the sensory in imagination, a motor theory of imagination is presented in which the sensory component of imagination is interpreted in terms of anticipated sensory consequences of preparation for motor action.
- 3 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 171-184
Merleau-Ponty’s sexual schema and the sexual component of body integrity identity disorder
Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), formerly also known as apotemnophilia, is characterized by a desire for amputation of a healthy limb and is claimed to straddle or to even blur the boundary between psychiatry and neurology. The neurological line of approach, however, is a recent one, and is accompanied or preceded by psychodynamical, behavioural, philosophical, and psychiatric approaches and hypotheses. Next to its confusing history in which the disorder itself has no fixed identity and could not be classified under a specific discipline, its sexual component has been an issue of unclarity and controversy, and its assessment a criterion for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia, a paraphilia. Scholars referring to the lived body—a phenomenon primarily discussed in the phenomenological tradition in philosophy—seem willing to exclude the sexual component as inessential, whereas other authors notice important similarities with gender identity disorder or transsexualism, and thus precisely focus attention on the sexual component. This contribution outlines the history of BIID highlighting the vicissitudes of its sexual component, and questions the justification for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia and thus for omitting the sexual component as essential. Second, we explain a hardly discussed concept from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945a), the sexual schema, and investigate how the sexual schema could function in interaction with the body image in an interpretation of BIID which starts from the lived body while giving the sexual component its due.
- 3 December 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (2) , 171-184
Merleau-Ponty’s sexual schema and the sexual component of body integrity identity disorder
Body integrity identity disorder (BIID), formerly also known as apotemnophilia, is characterized by a desire for amputation of a healthy limb and is claimed to straddle or to even blur the boundary between psychiatry and neurology. The neurological line of approach, however, is a recent one, and is accompanied or preceded by psychodynamical, behavioural, philosophical, and psychiatric approaches and hypotheses. Next to its confusing history in which the disorder itself has no fixed identity and could not be classified under a specific discipline, its sexual component has been an issue of unclarity and controversy, and its assessment a criterion for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia, a paraphilia. Scholars referring to the lived body—a phenomenon primarily discussed in the phenomenological tradition in philosophy—seem willing to exclude the sexual component as inessential, whereas other authors notice important similarities with gender identity disorder or transsexualism, and thus precisely focus attention on the sexual component. This contribution outlines the history of BIID highlighting the vicissitudes of its sexual component, and questions the justification for distinguishing BIID from apotemnophilia and thus for omitting the sexual component as essential. Second, we explain a hardly discussed concept from Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (1945a), the sexual schema, and investigate how the sexual schema could function in interaction with the body image in an interpretation of BIID which starts from the lived body while giving the sexual component its due.
- 5 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 17 (4) , 385-390
Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man’
- 5 October 2011
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 17 (4) , 385-390
Technology and the Myth of ‘Natural Man’
- 10 March 2011
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 307-322
Transcendentalism and Original Beginnings
- 26 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 16 (2-3) , 119-137
Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment
- 26 September 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Foundations of Science
- Vol. 16 (2-3) , 119-137
Technology and the Body: the (Im)Possibilities of Re-embodiment
- 5 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 33 (2-3) , 339-345
Postphenomenology, Embodiment and Technics
- 5 August 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Studies
- Vol. 33 (2-3) , 339-345
Postphenomenology, Embodiment and Technics