Judith Kelley
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Judith Kelley has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrew Heiss
Georgia State University, Public Management and Policy
1 shared publication Anton Strezhnev
1 shared publicationBeth A. Simmons
Department of Political Science, Wharton Business School, and Penn Carey Law School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, U.S.A.
1 shared publication- Beth A. Simmons
University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 25 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 75 (1) , 71-102
Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights Really Part of the “Problem”?
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an intervention—the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal mechanisms.
- 25 January 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 75 (1) , 71-102
Testing for Negative Spillovers: Is Promoting Human Rights Really Part of the “Problem”?
The international community often seeks to promote political reforms in recalcitrant states. Recently, some scholars have argued that, rather than helping, international law and advocacy create new problems because they have negative spillovers that increase rights violations. We review three mechanisms for such spillovers: backlash, trade-offs, and counteraction and concentrate on the last of these. Some researchers assert that governments sometimes “counteract” international human rights pressures by strategically substituting violations in adjacent areas that are either not targeted or are harder to monitor. However, most such research shows only that both outcomes correlate with an intervention—the targeted positively and the spillover negatively. The burden of proof, however, should be as rigorous as those for studies of first-order policy consequences. We show that these correlations by themselves are insufficient to demonstrate counteraction outside of the narrow case where the intervention is assumed to have no direct effect on the spillover, a situation akin to having a valid instrumental variable design. We revisit two prominent findings and show that the evidence for the counteraction claim is weak in both cases. The article contributes methodologically to the study of negative spillovers in general by proposing mediation and sensitivity analysis within an instrumental variables framework for assessing such arguments. It revisits important prior findings that claim negative consequences to human rights law and/or advocacy, and raises critical normative questions regarding how we empirically evaluate hypotheses about causal mechanisms.
- 28 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Theory
- Vol. 13 (1) , 169-178
Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems
This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority. This article discusses the ways in which Michael Zürn's diagnosis of governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise of such ranking systems. These play into favored paradigms that give information and market performance greater social acceptance than rules, laws, and directives designed by international organizations. We discuss how and why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the evidence regarding their effects on actors’ behaviors. Zürn's book provides a useful context for understanding the rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke competition among states, shaping outcomes without directly legislating performance.
- 28 December 2020
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Theory
- Vol. 13 (1) , 169-178
Governance by Other Means: Rankings as Regulatory Systems
This article takes the challenges of global governance and legitimacy seriously and looks at new ways in which international organizations (IOs) have attempted to ‘govern’ without explicit legal or regulatory directives. Specifically, we explore the growth of global performance indicators as a form of social control that appears to have certain advantages even as states and civil society actors push back against international regulatory authority. This article discusses the ways in which Michael Zürn's diagnosis of governance dilemmas helps to explain the rise of such ranking systems. These play into favored paradigms that give information and market performance greater social acceptance than rules, laws, and directives designed by international organizations. We discuss how and why these schemes can constitute governance systems, and some of the evidence regarding their effects on actors’ behaviors. Zürn's book provides a useful context for understanding the rise and effectiveness of Governance by Other Means: systems that ‘inform’ and provoke competition among states, shaping outcomes without directly legislating performance.
- 30 April 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 151-181
From Reputational Concerns to Effects on Laws, Practices, and Norms
Scorecard Diplomacy - by Judith G. Kelley May 2017
- 30 April 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 151-181
From Reputational Concerns to Effects on Laws, Practices, and Norms
Scorecard Diplomacy - by Judith G. Kelley May 2017
- 1 April 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 79 (2) , 732-741
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: International NGOs and the Dual Pressures of Donors and Host Governments
- 1 April 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Politics
- Vol. 79 (2) , 732-741
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: International NGOs and the Dual Pressures of Donors and Host Governments
- 25 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Rights Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 137-138
Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
- 25 February 2010
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Rights Review
- Vol. 12 (1) , 137-138
Lee Feinstein and Tod Lindberg, Means to an End: US Interests in the International Criminal Court
- 12 February 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 7 (1) , 59-64
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argues that the availability of many different organizations facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked for political reasons. Furthermore, when different international election monitoring agencies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.
- 12 February 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- Vol. 7 (1) , 59-64
The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election Monitoring Organizations
As the pressure to invite international election monitors rose at the end of the Cold War, states refused to grant the United Nations a dominant role. Thus, today multiple intergovernmental, regional, and international non-governmental organizations often monitor the same elections with equal authority. This article examines the costs and benefits of this complex regime to highlight some possible broader implications of regime complexity. It argues that the availability of many different organizations facilitates action that might otherwise have been blocked for political reasons. Furthermore, when different international election monitoring agencies agree, their consensus can bolster their individual legitimacy as well as the legitimacy of the international norms they stress, and thus magnify their influence on domestic politics. Unfortunately the election monitoring example also suggests that complex regimes can engender damaging inter-organizational politics and that the different biases, capabilities, and standards of organizations sometime can lead organizations to outright contradict each other or work at cross-purposes.
- 8 June 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 42 (2) , 153-173
Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq
- 8 June 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in International Politics
- Vol. 42 (2) , 153-173
Strategic Non-cooperation as Soft Balancing: Why Iraq was not Just about Iraq