Russell Powell
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Russell Powell has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Allen Buchanan
Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, USA
2 shared publications- Julian Savulescu
Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Katrien Devolder
Uehiro Oxford Institute, University of Oxford, Suite 1 Littlegate House, St Ebbe's Street, Oxford, Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK
1 shared publication Pablo Stafforini
University of Oxford
1 shared publication- Simon Rippon
University of Oxford
1 shared publication - Steve Clarke
School of Social Work and Arts, Charles Sturt University, Wagga Wagga, New South Wales, Australia
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 31 January 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 35 (2) , 90-91
An ethical and prudential argument for prioritizing the reduction of parasite-stress in the allocation of health care resources
The link between parasite-stress and complex psychological dispositions implies that the social, political, and economic benefits likely to flow from public health interventions that reduce rates of non-zoonotic infectious disease are far greater than have traditionally been thought. We sketch a prudential and ethical argument for increasing public health resources globally and redistributing these to focus on the alleviation of parasite-stress in human populations.
- 31 January 2012
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 35 (2) , 90-91
An ethical and prudential argument for prioritizing the reduction of parasite-stress in the allocation of health care resources
The link between parasite-stress and complex psychological dispositions implies that the social, political, and economic benefits likely to flow from public health interventions that reduce rates of non-zoonotic infectious disease are far greater than have traditionally been thought. We sketch a prudential and ethical argument for increasing public health resources globally and redistributing these to focus on the alleviation of parasite-stress in human populations.
- 12 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 36 (1) , 6-27
Breaking Evolution's Chains: The Prospect of Deliberate Genetic Modification in Humans
Many philosophers invoke the “wisdom of nature” in arguing for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural selection as akin to a master engineer that creates functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II, we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA). By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted evolution, we show how intentional genetic modification can overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good. Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it is based on the same “strong adaptationist” interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA, and second, the etiological concept of function on which it relies provides indirect and potentially misleading information about the likely consequences of genetic intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic modification, the causal structure of the living world gives us good moral reason to pursue it.
- 12 January 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 36 (1) , 6-27
Breaking Evolution's Chains: The Prospect of Deliberate Genetic Modification in Humans
Many philosophers invoke the “wisdom of nature” in arguing for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural selection as akin to a master engineer that creates functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II, we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA). By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted evolution, we show how intentional genetic modification can overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good. Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it is based on the same “strong adaptationist” interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA, and second, the etiological concept of function on which it relies provides indirect and potentially misleading information about the likely consequences of genetic intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic modification, the causal structure of the living world gives us good moral reason to pursue it.
- 23 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 10 (7) , 16-18
Resisting Sparrow's SexyReductio: Selection Principles and the Social Good
(2010). Resisting Sparrow's Sexy Reductio: Selection Principles and the Social Good. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 16-18.
- 23 June 2010
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 10 (7) , 16-18
Resisting Sparrow's SexyReductio: Selection Principles and the Social Good
(2010). Resisting Sparrow's Sexy Reductio: Selection Principles and the Social Good. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 10, No. 7, pp. 16-18.
- 25 February 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 37 (3) , 204-225
The Evolutionary Biological Implications of Human Genetic Engineering
A common worry about the genetic engineering of human beings is that it will reduce human genetic diversity, creating a biological monoculture that could not only increase our susceptibility to disease but also hasten the extinction of our species. Thus far, however, the evolutionary implications of human genetic modification remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I consider whether the widespread use of genetic engineering technology is likely to narrow the present range of genetic variation, and if so, whether this would in fact lead to the evolutionary harms that some authors envision. By examining the nature of biological variation and its relation to population immunity and evolvability, I show that not only will genetic engineering have a negligible impact on human genetic diversity, but also that it will be more likely to ensure rather than undermine the health and longevity of the human species.
- 25 February 2010
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine
- Vol. 37 (3) , 204-225
The Evolutionary Biological Implications of Human Genetic Engineering
A common worry about the genetic engineering of human beings is that it will reduce human genetic diversity, creating a biological monoculture that could not only increase our susceptibility to disease but also hasten the extinction of our species. Thus far, however, the evolutionary implications of human genetic modification remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I consider whether the widespread use of genetic engineering technology is likely to narrow the present range of genetic variation, and if so, whether this would in fact lead to the evolutionary harms that some authors envision. By examining the nature of biological variation and its relation to population immunity and evolvability, I show that not only will genetic engineering have a negligible impact on human genetic diversity, but also that it will be more likely to ensure rather than undermine the health and longevity of the human species.
- 1 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Political Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (3) , 326-349
Survey Article: Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are They Compatible?*
- 1 September 2008
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Political Philosophy
- Vol. 16 (3) , 326-349
Survey Article: Constitutional Democracy and the Rule of International Law: Are They Compatible?*