QLQianhua Ling

Qianhua Ling

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Qianhua Ling has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Identical ratios: a red flag of ratio management

    by Qianhua Ling, Andrea Alston Roberts

    This paper identifies a helpful red flag stakeholders can use to detect whether a nonprofit has managed its financial information. This red flag is reporting an identical program ratio—that is, the nonprofit organization reports the exact same ratio in multiple years—while reporting a large change in total spending. We find nonprofits are more likely to report identical program ratios when resource providers rely on ratios; pay is determined, at least in part, by performance; and the potential for regulatory interference is high. This paper also identifies the cost allocation techniques and the specific expenses nonprofits likely manage. We find most nonprofits alter the allocations of multiple expenses and find the specific expenses most likely manipulated are ones where managers have a high degree of discretion over how much to allocate to programs.


  • The Adoption and Use of the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index in Nonprofit Research: Does Revenue Diversification Measurement Matter?

    by Grace L. Chikoto, Qianhua Ling, Daniel Gordon Neely

    Since its introduction by Tuckman and Chang (Nonprofit Volunt Sector Q 20(4):445–460, 1991), the Hirschman–Herfindahl Index (HHI) has been widely adopted into the nonprofit literature as a precise measure of revenue concentration. This widespread adoption has been characterized by diverse composition, with the HHI’s calculation being largely determined by the nature of the available data and the degree to which it contained disaggregated measures of revenue. Using the NCCS 990 Digitized Data, we perform an acid test on whether different HHI measures yield significantly different results. Four measures of revenue concentration—an aggregated measure based on three revenue streams, an aggregated measure separating government grants from other contributions, a more nuanced measure based on seven revenue streams, and a fully disaggregated measure based on thirteen revenue streams—are used to predict two dominant nonprofit financial health dimensions: financial volatility and financial capacity. Overall, our results show that aggregation in HHI measurement matters; aggregation often downplays relationships by influencing the significance levels and magnitudes of estimates in a non-trivial way.


  • Open Access

    Implications of Being a Highly Rated Organization: Evidence from Four-Star Rated Nonprofits

    by Qianhua (Q.) Ling, Daniel Gordon Neely

    This study examines a group of nonprofits rated four stars by Charity Navigator. The purpose is to determine whether this select group of charities exhibits characteristics associated with top charitable organizations, or whether the four-star rating achieved is limited to the more narrow financial metrics employed in the methodology utilized by Charity Navigator. This study finds that organizations rated four stars by Charity Navigator show a lower level of excess cash holdings, report a lower level of compensation expenses and exhibit lower sensitivity of compensation to performance. Financially, these organizations are less vulnerable than their lower rated peers. The results from this study shed light on the continuing debate of the effectiveness of rating agencies to accurately identify top performing charitable organizations.


  • Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Timely Disclosures of Bad News

    by Qianhua Ling

    This study explores the puzzle of CEO severance agreements by examining the association between the existence of ex ante severance agreements and the timeliness of bad news disclosures. Classifying severance agreements by type and the way boards grant them, this article documents a positive association between the timeliness of bad news disclosures and the existence of an ex ante single-trigger severance agreement, especially when it is granted alone. This association remains positive in the CEO’s last year of tenure where performance is poor. Further analyses show that this association is stronger among CEOs with a high-variable pay structure than among CEOs with a low-variable pay structure. These results suggest that an ex ante single-trigger severance agreement may play a role in forming timely disclosures of bad news and that paring it with a high-variable pay structure enhances the chance of its success.