Markus Reisinger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Markus Reisinger has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Emanuele Tarantino
University of Mannheim and CEPR
1 shared publication - Martin Peitz
Department of Economics and MaCCI, University of Mannheim , 68131 Mannheim
1 shared publication - Monika Schnitzer
Department of Economics, University of Munich, Munich, Germany
1 shared publication - Simon Loertscher
University of Melbourne
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 461-479
Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency
We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.
- 22 July 2015
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 461-479
Vertical integration, foreclosure, and productive efficiency
We analyze the consequences of vertical integration by a monopoly producer dealing with two retailers (downstream firms) of varying efficiency via secret two‐part tariffs. When integrated with the inefficient retailer, the monopoly producer does not foreclose the rival retailer due to an output‐shifting effect. This effect can induce the integrated firm to engage in below‐cost pricing at the wholesale level, thereby rendering integration procompetitive. Output shifting arises with homogeneous and differentiated products. Moreover, we show that integration with an inefficient retailer emerges in a model with uncertainty over retailers' costs, and this merger can be procompetitive in expectation.
- 22 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 62 (4) , 709-755
Indirect Taxation in Vertical Oligopoly
- 22 December 2014
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 62 (4) , 709-755
Indirect Taxation in Vertical Oligopoly
- 25 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (3) , 471-494
Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration
- 25 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 45 (3) , 471-494
Market structure and the competitive effects of vertical integration
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 60 (4) , 537-577
Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry
- 20 December 2012
- Published by Wiley in The Journal of Industrial Economics
- Vol. 60 (4) , 537-577
Successive Oligopolies with Differentiated Firms and Endogeneous Entry