Bernd Irlenbusch
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Bernd Irlenbusch has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Nils Köbis
Research Center Trustworthy Data Science and Security, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany
3 shared publications - Andreas Glöckner
Department of Psychology, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
2 shared publications - Angela Rachael Dorrough
Social Cognition Center Cologne, University of Cologne, Cologne, Germany
2 shared publications - Dirk Sliwka
Faculty of Management, Economics, and Social Sciences, University of Cologne, 50923 Cologne, Germany
2 shared publications - Rainer Michael Rilke
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management
2 shared publications - Shaul Shalvi
University of Amsterdam
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 20 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 72-75
Behavioural ethics of Artificial Intelligence
- 20 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 72-75
Behavioural ethics of Artificial Intelligence
- 20 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 187-190
Experimental economics in immersive virtual environments
- 20 February 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 187-190
Experimental economics in immersive virtual environments
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 134 (658) , 766-784
Corrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty
Artificial intelligence increasingly becomes an indispensable advisor. New ethical concerns arise if artificial intelligence persuades people to behave dishonestly. In an experiment, we study how artificial intelligence advice (generated by a natural language processing algorithm) affects (dis)honesty, compare it to equivalent human advice and test whether transparency about the advice source matters. We find that dishonesty-promoting advice increases dishonesty, whereas honesty-promoting advice does not increase honesty. This is the case for both artificial intelligence and human advice. Algorithmic transparency, a commonly proposed policy to mitigate artificial intelligence risks, does not affect behaviour. The findings mark the first steps towards managing artificial intelligence advice responsibly.
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Economic Journal
- Vol. 134 (658) , 766-784
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessCorrupted by Algorithms? How AI-generated and Human-written Advice Shape (Dis)honesty
Artificial intelligence increasingly becomes an indispensable advisor. New ethical concerns arise if artificial intelligence persuades people to behave dishonestly. In an experiment, we study how artificial intelligence advice (generated by a natural language processing algorithm) affects (dis)honesty, compare it to equivalent human advice and test whether transparency about the advice source matters. We find that dishonesty-promoting advice increases dishonesty, whereas honesty-promoting advice does not increase honesty. This is the case for both artificial intelligence and human advice. Algorithmic transparency, a commonly proposed policy to mitigate artificial intelligence risks, does not affect behaviour. The findings mark the first steps towards managing artificial intelligence advice responsibly.
- Open Access
- 25 April 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (18)
Conditional bribery: Insights from incentivized experiments across 18 nations
Bribery, a grand global challenge, often occurs across national jurisdictions. Behavioral research studying bribery to inform anticorruption interventions, however, has merely examined bribery within single nations. Here, we report online experiments and provide insights into crossnational bribery. We ran a pilot study (across three nations) and a large, incentivized experiment using a bribery game played across 18 nations ( N = 5,582, total number of incentivized decisions = 346,084). The results show that people offer disproportionally more bribes to interaction partners from nations with a high (vs. low) reputation for foreign bribery, measured by macrolevel indicators of corruption perceptions. People widely share nation-specific expectations about a nation’s bribery acceptance levels. However, these nation-specific expectations negatively correlate with actual bribe acceptance levels, suggesting shared yet inaccurate stereotypes about bribery tendencies. Moreover, the interaction partner’s national background (more than one’s own national background) drives people’s decision to offer or accept a bribe—a finding we label conditional bribery.
- 25 April 2023
- Published by National Academy of Sciences in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 120 (18)
Open AccessConditional bribery: Insights from incentivized experiments across 18 nations
Bribery, a grand global challenge, often occurs across national jurisdictions. Behavioral research studying bribery to inform anticorruption interventions, however, has merely examined bribery within single nations. Here, we report online experiments and provide insights into crossnational bribery. We ran a pilot study (across three nations) and a large, incentivized experiment using a bribery game played across 18 nations ( N = 5,582, total number of incentivized decisions = 346,084). The results show that people offer disproportionally more bribes to interaction partners from nations with a high (vs. low) reputation for foreign bribery, measured by macrolevel indicators of corruption perceptions. People widely share nation-specific expectations about a nation’s bribery acceptance levels. However, these nation-specific expectations negatively correlate with actual bribe acceptance levels, suggesting shared yet inaccurate stereotypes about bribery tendencies. Moreover, the interaction partner’s national background (more than one’s own national background) drives people’s decision to offer or accept a bribe—a finding we label conditional bribery.
- Open Access
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Bribery across nations
Bribery, a grand global challenge, often occurs across national jurisdictions. Behavioral research studying bribery to inform anti-corruption interventions, however, has merely examined bribery within single nations. Here, we report online experiments and provide first insights into cross-national bribery. We ran a pilot study (across three nations), and a large, incentivized experiment using a bribery game played across 18 nations (N= 6,472, total number of incentivized decisions = 401,904). Results show that people offer disproportionally more bribes to interaction partners from nations with a high (vs. low) reputation for foreign bribery, measured by macro-level indicators of corruption perceptions. People widely share nation-specific expectations about a nation's bribery acceptance levels. However, these nation-specific expectations negatively correlate with actual bribe acceptance levels, suggesting shared yet inaccurate stereotypes about bribery tendencies. Moreover, the interaction partner’s national background (more than one’s own national background) drives people’s decision to offer or accept a bribe – a finding we label conditional bribery.
- 27 January 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessBribery across nations
Bribery, a grand global challenge, often occurs across national jurisdictions. Behavioral research studying bribery to inform anti-corruption interventions, however, has merely examined bribery within single nations. Here, we report online experiments and provide first insights into cross-national bribery. We ran a pilot study (across three nations), and a large, incentivized experiment using a bribery game played across 18 nations (N= 6,472, total number of incentivized decisions = 401,904). Results show that people offer disproportionally more bribes to interaction partners from nations with a high (vs. low) reputation for foreign bribery, measured by macro-level indicators of corruption perceptions. People widely share nation-specific expectations about a nation's bribery acceptance levels. However, these nation-specific expectations negatively correlate with actual bribe acceptance levels, suggesting shared yet inaccurate stereotypes about bribery tendencies. Moreover, the interaction partner’s national background (more than one’s own national background) drives people’s decision to offer or accept a bribe – a finding we label conditional bribery.
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 178, 148-173
Similarity increases collaborative cheating
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 178, 148-173
Similarity increases collaborative cheating
- Open Access
Endogenously Emerging Gender Pay Gap in an Experimental Teamwork Setting
We studied gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams in a repeated teamwork setting. In our experiment, the participants (N = 168, 84 women and 84 men) chose whether to perform a cooperative task only with members of the own gender or in a mixed-gender team. We found that independent of the choice of team, in the initial period, men contributed significantly more to the team projects than women. Men preferred the successful men-only teams in the subsequent periods, resulting in significantly higher profits for men compared to women. This endogenously emerging “gender pay gap” only closed over time.
Open AccessEndogenously Emerging Gender Pay Gap in an Experimental Teamwork Setting
We studied gender diversity and performance in endogenously formed teams in a repeated teamwork setting. In our experiment, the participants (N = 168, 84 women and 84 men) chose whether to perform a cooperative task only with members of the own gender or in a mixed-gender team. We found that independent of the choice of team, in the initial period, men contributed significantly more to the team projects than women. Men preferred the successful men-only teams in the subsequent periods, resulting in significantly higher profits for men compared to women. This endogenously emerging “gender pay gap” only closed over time.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 577-594
How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment
How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Experimental Economics
- Vol. 19 (3) , 577-594
How to hire helpers? Evidence from a field experiment
How to hire voluntary helpers? We shed new light on this question by reporting a field experiment in which we invited 2859 students to help at the ‘ESA Europe 2012’ conference. Invitation emails varied non-monetary and monetary incentives to convince subjects to offer help. Students could apply to help at the conference and, if so, also specify the working time they wanted to provide. Just asking subjects to volunteer or offering them a certificate turned out to be significantly more motivating than mentioning that the regular conference fee would be waived for helpers. By means of an online-survey experiment, we find that intrinsic motivation to help is likely to have been crowded out by mentioning the waived fee. Increasing monetary incentives by varying hourly wages of 1, 5, and 10 Euros shows positive effects on the number of applications and on the working time offered. However, when comparing these results with treatments without any monetary compensation, the number of applications could not be increased by offering money and may even be reduced.
- 23 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 55, 48-64
Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation
- 23 January 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
- Vol. 55, 48-64
Conditioning on what? Heterogeneous contributions and conditional cooperation
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 80 (1) , 200-209
Who follows the crowd—Groups or individuals?
- 30 September 2011
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 80 (1) , 200-209
Who follows the crowd—Groups or individuals?