Stephen J. Choi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Stephen J. Choi has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kevin E. Davis
2 shared publicationsEric A. Posner
University of Chicago
1 shared publicationG. Mitu Gulati
Duke University
1 shared publication- Mitu Gulati
Duke Univ, Dept Law, 210 Sci Dr, Durham, NC 27708 USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 15 February 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 117-147
Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do It?
- 15 February 2016
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- p. 117-147
Customary International Law: How Do Courts Do It?
- 21 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 409-445
Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- 21 July 2014
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Empirical Legal Studies
- Vol. 11 (3) , 409-445
Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
- Open Access
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Foreign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
We examine factors that might explain how sanctions imposed in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions vary across the firms and countries impl
- 1 January 2012
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessForeign Affairs and Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
We examine factors that might explain how sanctions imposed in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) enforcement actions vary across the firms and countries impl
- 5 November 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 26 (2) , 290-336
Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed judges are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, there is little empirical evidence for this view. Using a data set of state high court opinions, we construct measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill, and independence. The measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and appointment. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected judges do, but elected judges write more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges are not less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges focus on providing service to the voters, whereas appointed judges care more about their long-term legacy as creators of precedent.
- 5 November 2008
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 26 (2) , 290-336
Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical Case for an Elected Rather than Appointed Judiciary
Conventional wisdom holds that appointed judges are superior to elected judges because appointed judges are less vulnerable to political pressure. However, there is little empirical evidence for this view. Using a data set of state high court opinions, we construct measures for three aspects of judicial performance: effort, skill, and independence. The measures permit a test of the relationship between performance and the four primary methods of state high court judge selection: partisan election, non-partisan election, merit plan, and appointment. Appointed judges write higher quality opinions than elected judges do, but elected judges write more opinions, and the evidence suggests that the large quantity difference makes up for the small quality difference. In addition, elected judges are not less independent than appointed judges. The results suggest that elected judges focus on providing service to the voters, whereas appointed judges care more about their long-term legacy as creators of precedent.
- 6 September 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 23 (3) , 598-626
Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?
This study provides evidence on the impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995. Others have furnished evidence that the PSLRA increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions. This increase is consistent with two hypotheses. First, the PSLRA may have reduced solely the incidence of nuisance litigation. Second, the PSLRA may have also reduced meritorious claims where the additional costs imposed by the PSLRA made such claims unprofitable from the perspective of plaintiffs' attorneys. The study provides evidence that pre-PSLRA nonnuisance claims lacking obvious “hard evidence” indicia of fraud (an accounting restatement or Securities and Exchange Commission action) would have faced (1) a lower probability of suit in the post-PSLRA period and (2) a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement in the post-PSLRA period.
- 6 September 2006
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
- Vol. 23 (3) , 598-626
Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act?
This study provides evidence on the impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995. Others have furnished evidence that the PSLRA increased the significance of merit-related factors in determining the incidence and outcomes of securities fraud class actions. This increase is consistent with two hypotheses. First, the PSLRA may have reduced solely the incidence of nuisance litigation. Second, the PSLRA may have also reduced meritorious claims where the additional costs imposed by the PSLRA made such claims unprofitable from the perspective of plaintiffs' attorneys. The study provides evidence that pre-PSLRA nonnuisance claims lacking obvious “hard evidence” indicia of fraud (an accounting restatement or Securities and Exchange Commission action) would have faced (1) a lower probability of suit in the post-PSLRA period and (2) a greater likelihood of receiving a dismissal or low-value settlement in the post-PSLRA period.