Kai Andreas Konrad
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Kai Andreas Konrad has a total of 73 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Florian Morath
Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck; Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance
14 shared publications- Marcel Thum
Faculty of Business and Economics, TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany
9 shared publications Wieland Müller
University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics; Tilburg University - Department of Economics
8 shared publicationsSteffen Huck
7 shared publicationsChangxia Ke
Lingnan (University) College, Sun Yat-sen University
5 shared publications- Florian Morath
University of Innsbruck
5 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Strategic Effect of Weak Team Members in Dynamic Conflicts between Teams
Why do strong players allow weak players to join their team, even though weak players are notorious for free riding? This paper shows that the dynamic structure of a tug-of-war is suitable for mobilizing efforts by weak players and making the team to become stronger and to succeed. The strategic role of weak players emerges if the dynamics for the team develop unfavorably for the team. If the team falls behind, a discouragement effect sets in for the strong player. The player is inclined to throw the towel. This alarms the weak player. The player hoped to be able to free-ride and gain an expected windfall payoff. This payoff is lost if the strong player gives up. At that point the weak player actively seeks to motivate the strong player to perform at its best.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Strategic Effect of Weak Team Members in Dynamic Conflicts between Teams
Why do strong players allow weak players to join their team, even though weak players are notorious for free riding? This paper shows that the dynamic structure of a tug-of-war is suitable for mobilizing efforts by weak players and making the team to become stronger and to succeed. The strategic role of weak players emerges if the dynamics for the team develop unfavorably for the team. If the team falls behind, a discouragement effect sets in for the strong player. The player is inclined to throw the towel. This alarms the weak player. The player hoped to be able to free-ride and gain an expected windfall payoff. This payoff is lost if the strong player gives up. At that point the weak player actively seeks to motivate the strong player to perform at its best.
- Open Access
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
China's Rare Earth Policy: Prosperity Maximization or Great Power Geoeconomics?
An industrial economics analysis of China’s quasi-monopoly on refined rare earth materials shows: even if China strictly maximizes national prosperity and abstains from geopolitical power play, a significant price differential emerges between the export price and the price for domestic users. The price differential itself is not evidence of geopolitical intentions. However, this equilibrium price gap widens if we assume that China views itself as contesting in a geopolitical, tournament-like situation against the United States. These two results are derived within the framework of a tournament model that imbeds the characteristics of a dominant supplier with a fringe - market, but adds geopolitical goals to the dominant supplier’s objective.
- 29 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessChina's Rare Earth Policy: Prosperity Maximization or Great Power Geoeconomics?
An industrial economics analysis of China’s quasi-monopoly on refined rare earth materials shows: even if China strictly maximizes national prosperity and abstains from geopolitical power play, a significant price differential emerges between the export price and the price for domestic users. The price differential itself is not evidence of geopolitical intentions. However, this equilibrium price gap widens if we assume that China views itself as contesting in a geopolitical, tournament-like situation against the United States. These two results are derived within the framework of a tournament model that imbeds the characteristics of a dominant supplier with a fringe - market, but adds geopolitical goals to the dominant supplier’s objective.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 164
Strategic trade policy tools as weapons in the geopolitical conflict among great powers
- 21 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Economic Modelling
- Vol. 164
Open AccessStrategic trade policy tools as weapons in the geopolitical conflict among great powers
- Open Access
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
China's rare earth policy: Prosperity maximization or great power geoeconomics?
An industrial economics analysis of China's quasi-monopoly on refined rare earth materials shows: even if China strictly maximizes national prosperity and abstains from geopolitical power play, a significant price differential emerges between the export price and the price for domestic users. The price differential itself is not evidence of geopolitical intentions. However, this equilibrium price gap widens if we assume that China views itself as contesting in a geopolitical, tournament-like situation against the United States. These two results are derived within the framework of a tournament model that imbeds the characteristics of a dominant supplier with a fringe - market, but adds geopolitical goals to the dominant supplier's objective.
- 14 July 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessChina's rare earth policy: Prosperity maximization or great power geoeconomics?
An industrial economics analysis of China's quasi-monopoly on refined rare earth materials shows: even if China strictly maximizes national prosperity and abstains from geopolitical power play, a significant price differential emerges between the export price and the price for domestic users. The price differential itself is not evidence of geopolitical intentions. However, this equilibrium price gap widens if we assume that China views itself as contesting in a geopolitical, tournament-like situation against the United States. These two results are derived within the framework of a tournament model that imbeds the characteristics of a dominant supplier with a fringe - market, but adds geopolitical goals to the dominant supplier's objective.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e108
Fear of relationship dissolution: The influence of gendered post-breakup life course expectations
Differences in well-being in the life trajectories following the end of a relationship can be co-determinants of gender-specific differences in the fear of losing a relationship. Social norms, conventions, and institutional arrangements can lead to gender-specific consequences for economic well-being when a relationship ends. If these are anticipated, they can cause differences in this fear of loss.
- 1 June 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 49, e108
Fear of relationship dissolution: The influence of gendered post-breakup life course expectations
Differences in well-being in the life trajectories following the end of a relationship can be co-determinants of gender-specific differences in the fear of losing a relationship. Social norms, conventions, and institutional arrangements can lead to gender-specific consequences for economic well-being when a relationship ends. If these are anticipated, they can cause differences in this fear of loss.
- 18 November 2025
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 715-721
Rent seeking
- Open Access
- 11 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (4) , 666-689
Alliance Formation in Regional Space: Shifting the Battlefront Between Competing Hegemonial Powers
Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.
- 11 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (4) , 666-689
Open AccessAlliance Formation in Regional Space: Shifting the Battlefront Between Competing Hegemonial Powers
Motivated by the history of military alliances during and after the Cold War, we study the sequential expansion of the hegemonial alliances of two great powers. Geography matters for the allocation of the collateral damage of a future military conflict. Current frontline countries bear a major burden. They would prefer to pass this collateral damage on to new members. This motive can drive expansion, which comes to an end only when all remaining non-affiliated countries have been absorbed by one of the two alliances. Those countries are willing to make concessions as part of the accession negotiations, and the overall value of the concessions can reach multiples of the actual collateral damage of military conflict. As a result, alliance expansion may continue beyond what would be optimal from a security perspective.
- Open Access
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Gas pipeline business: Market power, sabotage, and sanctions
- 5 August 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Energy Economics
- Vol. 149
Open AccessGas pipeline business: Market power, sabotage, and sanctions
- Open Access
- 28 May 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 37 (3) , 338-355
Multiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma
We study the volunteer’s dilemma if the set of possible volunteers is partitioned into small teams that can coordinate internally but not across teams. If coordination is costless, the aggregate equilibrium payoff is determined by the number of teams only. The team size is relevant for individual players’ payoffs. They prefer larger teams. The optimality of the team structure is also considered if the coordination cost in teams is an increasing and strictly convex function of team size. Such costs can make very large teams suboptimal. Also, such costs suggest a partitioning into teams of roughly equal size.
- 28 May 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Rationality and Society
- Vol. 37 (3) , 338-355
Open AccessMultiple teams and the volunteer’s dilemma
We study the volunteer’s dilemma if the set of possible volunteers is partitioned into small teams that can coordinate internally but not across teams. If coordination is costless, the aggregate equilibrium payoff is determined by the number of teams only. The team size is relevant for individual players’ payoffs. They prefer larger teams. The optimality of the team structure is also considered if the coordination cost in teams is an increasing and strictly convex function of team size. Such costs can make very large teams suboptimal. Also, such costs suggest a partitioning into teams of roughly equal size.
- Open Access
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 26 (1) , 23-56
Paternalism attitudes and the happiness value of fundamental freedoms
Governmental regulations and prohibitions may effectively reduce self-harming behavior, but might also restrict personal freedom rights. This paper investigates into individuals’ preferences for the trade-off between being protected from taking self-harming actions by the state, and the desire to be free to choose. We introduce the Paternalism Preference Index to measure this preference. Our results indicate considerable heterogeneity in how individuals support, or object to, such governmental prescriptions. More importantly, we show the importance of the paternalism preference in a survey on life satisfaction during the Covid-19 pandemic. We find a reversed relationship between the preference for paternalistic state interventions and the valuation of personal freedoms. Individuals who prefer to have a larger choice set at the expense of committing potentially self-harming actions derive a higher value from personal freedoms in terms of life satisfaction.
- 4 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Economics of Governance
- Vol. 26 (1) , 23-56
Open AccessPaternalism attitudes and the happiness value of fundamental freedoms
Governmental regulations and prohibitions may effectively reduce self-harming behavior, but might also restrict personal freedom rights. This paper investigates into individuals’ preferences for the trade-off between being protected from taking self-harming actions by the state, and the desire to be free to choose. We introduce the Paternalism Preference Index to measure this preference. Our results indicate considerable heterogeneity in how individuals support, or object to, such governmental prescriptions. More importantly, we show the importance of the paternalism preference in a survey on life satisfaction during the Covid-19 pandemic. We find a reversed relationship between the preference for paternalistic state interventions and the valuation of personal freedoms. Individuals who prefer to have a larger choice set at the expense of committing potentially self-harming actions derive a higher value from personal freedoms in terms of life satisfaction.