Thomas Ferguson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Thomas Ferguson has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jie Chen
University Statistician, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA, USA
3 shared publicationsArturo Chang
Department of Political Science, Williams College, Williamstown, MA, USA
1 shared publicationBenjamin I. Page
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
1 shared publicationJacob Rothschild
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL, USA
1 shared publicationMario Seccareccia
Economics, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada
1 shared publicationPaul Jorgensen
University of Texas Rio Grande Valley
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 52 (3-4) , 235-238
Alain Parguez and His Contributions to Political Economy: Introduction
- 2 October 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 52 (3-4) , 235-238
Alain Parguez and His Contributions to Political Economy: Introduction
- Open Access
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 52 (1) , 1-44
Myth and Reality in the Great Inflation Debate: Supply Shocks and Wealth Effects in a Multipolar World Economy
This article critically evaluates debates over the causes of U.S. inflation. We first show that claims that the Biden stimulus was the major cause of inflation are mistaken: the key data series—stimulus spending and inflation—move dramatically out of phase. While the first ebbs quickly, the second persistently surges. We then look at alternative explanations for the price rises. We assess four supply-side factors: imports, energy prices, rises in corporate profit margins, and COVID. We argue that discussions of COVID’s impact have thus far only tangentially acknowledged the pandemic’s far-reaching effects on labor markets. We conclude that while all four factors played roles in bringing on and sustaining inflation, they cannot explain all of it. There is an aggregate demand problem. But the surprise surge in demand did not arise from government spending. It came from the unprecedented gains in household wealth, particularly for the richest 10% of households, which we show powered the recovery of aggregate US consumption expenditure, especially from July 2021. The final cause of the inflationary surge in the U.S., therefore, was in large measure the unequal (wealth) effects of ultra-loose monetary policy during 2020–2021. This conclusion is important because supply-side (and thus potentially inflationary) pressures are unlikely to subside soon. Going forward, COVID, war, climate change, and the drift to a belligerently multipolar world system are all likely to keep straining global supply chains. Our conclusion outlines how policy has to change to deal with a world of steady, but irregular supply shocks, including Covid’s continuing impact on labor markets. By their nature, such shocks create problems that monetary policy can cope with only at an enormous cost; they require targeted solutions. But when supply plummets or becomes more variable, fiscal policy also has to adapt: existing explorations of ways to steady demand over the business cycle have to embrace much bolder macroeconomic measures to control over-spending when supply is temporarily constrained.
- 2 January 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 52 (1) , 1-44
Open AccessMyth and Reality in the Great Inflation Debate: Supply Shocks and Wealth Effects in a Multipolar World Economy
This article critically evaluates debates over the causes of U.S. inflation. We first show that claims that the Biden stimulus was the major cause of inflation are mistaken: the key data series—stimulus spending and inflation—move dramatically out of phase. While the first ebbs quickly, the second persistently surges. We then look at alternative explanations for the price rises. We assess four supply-side factors: imports, energy prices, rises in corporate profit margins, and COVID. We argue that discussions of COVID’s impact have thus far only tangentially acknowledged the pandemic’s far-reaching effects on labor markets. We conclude that while all four factors played roles in bringing on and sustaining inflation, they cannot explain all of it. There is an aggregate demand problem. But the surprise surge in demand did not arise from government spending. It came from the unprecedented gains in household wealth, particularly for the richest 10% of households, which we show powered the recovery of aggregate US consumption expenditure, especially from July 2021. The final cause of the inflationary surge in the U.S., therefore, was in large measure the unequal (wealth) effects of ultra-loose monetary policy during 2020–2021. This conclusion is important because supply-side (and thus potentially inflationary) pressures are unlikely to subside soon. Going forward, COVID, war, climate change, and the drift to a belligerently multipolar world system are all likely to keep straining global supply chains. Our conclusion outlines how policy has to change to deal with a world of steady, but irregular supply shocks, including Covid’s continuing impact on labor markets. By their nature, such shocks create problems that monetary policy can cope with only at an enormous cost; they require targeted solutions. But when supply plummets or becomes more variable, fiscal policy also has to adapt: existing explorations of ways to steady demand over the business cycle have to embrace much bolder macroeconomic measures to control over-spending when supply is temporarily constrained.
- 2 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 49 (2) , 102-123
The Roots of Right-Wing Populism: Donald Trump in 2016
Using survey data from the American National Election Study (ANES) and aggregate data on Congressional districts, this article assesses the roles that economic and social factors played in Donald J. Trump’s 2016 “populist” presidential candidacy. It shows the hollowness of claims that economic issues played little or no role. While agreeing that racial resentment and sexism were important factors, the article shows how various economic considerations helped Trump win the Republican nomination and then led significant blocs of voters to shift from supporting Democrats or abstaining in 2012 to vote for him. It also presents striking evidence of the importance of political money and Senators’ “reverse coattails” in the final result.
- 2 April 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 49 (2) , 102-123
The Roots of Right-Wing Populism: Donald Trump in 2016
Using survey data from the American National Election Study (ANES) and aggregate data on Congressional districts, this article assesses the roles that economic and social factors played in Donald J. Trump’s 2016 “populist” presidential candidacy. It shows the hollowness of claims that economic issues played little or no role. While agreeing that racial resentment and sexism were important factors, the article shows how various economic considerations helped Trump win the Republican nomination and then led significant blocs of voters to shift from supporting Democrats or abstaining in 2012 to vote for him. It also presents striking evidence of the importance of political money and Senators’ “reverse coattails” in the final result.
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 333-440
Industrial Structure and Political Outcomes: The Case of the 2016 US Presidential Election
- 17 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 333-440
Industrial Structure and Political Outcomes: The Case of the 2016 US Presidential Election
- 10 November 2005
- Published by Wiley in Journal of The Historical Society
- Vol. 5 (4) , 503-546
Investor Blocs and Party Realignments in American History
- 10 November 2005
- Published by Wiley in Journal of The Historical Society
- Vol. 5 (4) , 503-546
Investor Blocs and Party Realignments in American History
- 1 September 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 64 (3) , 872-876
Comment on “The German Twin Crisis of 1931”
It is lovely to see attention to this critical episode in the Great Depression. Isabel Schnabel repeats the familiar argument that bank behavior was a primary cause of the German crisis. We have argued elsewhere that the German crisis clearly began as a currency crisis, not a banking crisis. The purpose of this comment is to examine the data that Schnabel's article brings to bear on this question and evaluate the evidence it presents in support of its hypotheses.
- 1 September 2004
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The Journal of Economic History
- Vol. 64 (3) , 872-876
Comment on “The German Twin Crisis of 1931”
It is lovely to see attention to this critical episode in the Great Depression. Isabel Schnabel repeats the familiar argument that bank behavior was a primary cause of the German crisis. We have argued elsewhere that the German crisis clearly began as a currency crisis, not a banking crisis. The purpose of this comment is to examine the data that Schnabel's article brings to bear on this question and evaluate the evidence it presents in support of its hypotheses.