Emmanuel M. Pothos
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Emmanuel M. Pothos has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Nick Chater
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
2 shared publications- Andrew James Stewart
University of Manchester, Manchester, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2005
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Vol. 58 (4) , 733-752
Unsupervised Categorization and Category Learning
When people categorize a set of items in a certain way they often change their perceptions for these items so that they become more compatible with the learned categorization. In two experiments we examined whether such changes are extensive enough to change the unsupervised categorization for the items—that is, the categorization of the items that is considered more intuitive or natural without any learning. In Experiment 1 we directly employed an unsupervised categorization task; in Experiment 2 we collected similarity ratings for the items and inferred unsupervised categorizations using Pothos and Chater's (2002) model of unsupervised categorization. The unsupervised categorization for the items changed to resemble more the learned one when this was specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (both experiments), but less so when it was almost specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (Experiment 1, nonsignificant trend in Experiment 2). By contrast, no changes in the unsupervised categorization were observed when participants were taught a classification that was specified by a more fine tuning of the relative salience of the two dimensions.
- 1 May 2005
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Vol. 58 (4) , 733-752
Unsupervised Categorization and Category Learning
When people categorize a set of items in a certain way they often change their perceptions for these items so that they become more compatible with the learned categorization. In two experiments we examined whether such changes are extensive enough to change the unsupervised categorization for the items—that is, the categorization of the items that is considered more intuitive or natural without any learning. In Experiment 1 we directly employed an unsupervised categorization task; in Experiment 2 we collected similarity ratings for the items and inferred unsupervised categorizations using Pothos and Chater's (2002) model of unsupervised categorization. The unsupervised categorization for the items changed to resemble more the learned one when this was specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (both experiments), but less so when it was almost specified by the suppression of a stimulus dimension (Experiment 1, nonsignificant trend in Experiment 2). By contrast, no changes in the unsupervised categorization were observed when participants were taught a classification that was specified by a more fine tuning of the relative salience of the two dimensions.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (1) , 37-49
Preferring Rules to Similarity: Coherence, goals, and commitment
This response to the open peer commentary discusses what should be the appropriate explanatory scope of a rules versus similarity proposal and accordingly evaluates the Rules versus Similarity one. Additionally, coherence, goals, and commitment are presented as inferential notions, fully consistent with the Rules versus Similarity distinction, that allow us to predict when Rules would be preferred to Similarity.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (1) , 37-49
Preferring Rules to Similarity: Coherence, goals, and commitment
This response to the open peer commentary discusses what should be the appropriate explanatory scope of a rules versus similarity proposal and accordingly evaluates the Rules versus Similarity one. Additionally, coherence, goals, and commitment are presented as inferential notions, fully consistent with the Rules versus Similarity distinction, that allow us to predict when Rules would be preferred to Similarity.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (1) , 1-14
The rules versus similarity distinction
The distinction between rules and similarity is central to our understanding of much of cognitive psychology. Two aspects of existing research have motivated the present work. First, in different cognitive psychology areas we typically see different conceptions of rules and similarity; for example, rules in language appear to be of a different kind compared to rules in categorization. Second, rules processes are typically modeled as separate from similarity ones; for example, in a learning experiment, rules and similarity influences would be described on the basis of separate models. In the present article, I assume that the rules versus similarity distinction can be understood in the same way in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and that a unified model for rules and similarity is appropriate. A rules process is considered to be a similarity one where only a single or a small subset of an object's properties are involved. Hence, rules and overall similarity operations are extremes in a single continuum of similarity operations. It is argued that this viewpoint allows adequate coverage of theory and empirical findings in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and also a reassessment of the objectives in research on rules versus similarity.
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 28 (1) , 1-14
The rules versus similarity distinction
The distinction between rules and similarity is central to our understanding of much of cognitive psychology. Two aspects of existing research have motivated the present work. First, in different cognitive psychology areas we typically see different conceptions of rules and similarity; for example, rules in language appear to be of a different kind compared to rules in categorization. Second, rules processes are typically modeled as separate from similarity ones; for example, in a learning experiment, rules and similarity influences would be described on the basis of separate models. In the present article, I assume that the rules versus similarity distinction can be understood in the same way in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and that a unified model for rules and similarity is appropriate. A rules process is considered to be a similarity one where only a single or a small subset of an object's properties are involved. Hence, rules and overall similarity operations are extremes in a single continuum of similarity operations. It is argued that this viewpoint allows adequate coverage of theory and empirical findings in learning, reasoning, categorization, and language, and also a reassessment of the objectives in research on rules versus similarity.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 33 (1) , 171-181
Expectations about stimulus structure in implicit learning
In two experiments, artificial grammar learning was used to create learning tasks of identical symbolic complexity that differed in terms of the instructions and the appearance of the stimuli. In...
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 33 (1) , 171-181
Open AccessExpectations about stimulus structure in implicit learning
In two experiments, artificial grammar learning was used to create learning tasks of identical symbolic complexity that differed in terms of the instructions and the appearance of the stimuli. In...
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 95 (3) , 371-386
Information about the logical structure of a category affects generalization
This paper considers whether information about the logical structure of a category affects how people generalize. We carried out three experiments with the following structure: participants were first presented with a set of training items, and were subsequently asked to decide whether new items belonged to the same category as the training items. Each experiment had two conditions that differed only in terms of the category label provided for the training items; different category labels conveyed different information about the logical structure of the category to which the training items were supposed to belong. In all cases, participants' generalization was greatly affected by such information. Our results suggest that people make the default assumption that category labels correspond to groupings of highly similar objects.
- 1 August 2004
- Published by Wiley in British Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 95 (3) , 371-386
Information about the logical structure of a category affects generalization
This paper considers whether information about the logical structure of a category affects how people generalize. We carried out three experiments with the following structure: participants were first presented with a set of training items, and were subsequently asked to decide whether new items belonged to the same category as the training items. Each experiment had two conditions that differed only in terms of the category label provided for the training items; different category labels conveyed different information about the logical structure of the category to which the training items were supposed to belong. In all cases, participants' generalization was greatly affected by such information. Our results suggest that people make the default assumption that category labels correspond to groupings of highly similar objects.