David DeSteno
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
David DeSteno has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Monica Y. Bartlett
3 shared publications- Nilanjana Dasgupta
Department of Psychological & Brain Sciences, Institute of Diversity Sciences, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Amherst, Massachusetts, USA
2 shared publications Aida Cajdric
Northeastern University
1 shared publication- Cade McCall
Department of Psychology, University of York
1 shared publication Derek D. Rucker
1 shared publication- Derek M. Isaacowitz
Northeastern University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 167-180
Modeling Warmth and Competence in Virtual Characters
- 1 August 2015
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 167-180
Modeling Warmth and Competence in Virtual Characters
- 1 October 2006
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 91 (4) , 626-641
Jealousy and the threatened self: Getting to the heart of the green-eyed monster.
Several theories specifying the causes of jealousy have been put forth in the past few decades. Firm support for any proposed theory, however, has been limited by the difficulties inherent in inducing jealousy and examining any proposed mediating mechanisms in real time. In support of a theory of jealousy centering on threats to the self-system, 2 experiments are presented that address these past limitations and argue for a model based on context-induced variability in self-evaluation. Experiment 1 presents a method for evoking jealousy through the use of highly orchestrated social encounters and demonstrates that threatened self-esteem functions as a principal mediator of jealousy. In addition to replicating these findings, Experiment 2 provides direct evidence for jealousy as a cause of aggression. The ability of the proposed theory of jealousy to integrate other extant findings in the literature is also discussed.
- 1 October 2006
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 91 (4) , 626-641
Jealousy and the threatened self: Getting to the heart of the green-eyed monster.
Several theories specifying the causes of jealousy have been put forth in the past few decades. Firm support for any proposed theory, however, has been limited by the difficulties inherent in inducing jealousy and examining any proposed mediating mechanisms in real time. In support of a theory of jealousy centering on threats to the self-system, 2 experiments are presented that address these past limitations and argue for a model based on context-induced variability in self-evaluation. Experiment 1 presents a method for evoking jealousy through the use of highly orchestrated social encounters and demonstrates that threatened self-esteem functions as a principal mediator of jealousy. In addition to replicating these findings, Experiment 2 provides direct evidence for jealousy as a cause of aggression. The ability of the proposed theory of jealousy to integrate other extant findings in the literature is also discussed.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 91 (3) , 519-523
Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: A reply to Barrett et al. (2006).
This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 91 (3) , 519-523
Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: A reply to Barrett et al. (2006).
This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.
- 1 May 2004
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 15 (5) , 319-324
Prejudice From Thin Air
Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.
- 1 May 2004
- Published by SAGE Publications in Psychological Science
- Vol. 15 (5) , 319-324
Prejudice From Thin Air
Two experiments provide initial evidence that specific emotional states are capable of creating automatic prejudice toward outgroups. Specifically, we propose that anger should influence automatic evaluations of outgroups because of its functional relevance to intergroup conflict and competition, whereas other negative emotions less relevant to intergroup relations (e.g., sadness) should not. In both experiments, after minimal ingroups and outgroups were created, participants were induced to experience anger, sadness, or a neutral state. Automatic attitudes toward the in- and outgroups were then assessed using an evaluative priming measure (Experiment 1) and the Implicit Association Test (Experiment 2). As predicted, results showed that anger created automatic prejudice toward the outgroup, whereas sadness and neutrality resulted in no automatic intergroup bias. The implications of these findings for emotion-induced biases in implicit intergroup cognition in particular, and in social cognition in general, are considered.
- 1 January 2004
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 86 (1) , 43-56
Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of Emotion-Induced Expectancies.
The authors argue that specific emotions can alter the persuasive impact of messages as a function of the emotional framing of persuasive appeals. Because specific emotions inflate expectancies for events possessing matching emotional overtones (D. DeSteno, R. E. Petty, D. T. Wegener, & D. D. Rucker, 2000), the authors predicted that attempts at persuasion would be more successful when messages were framed with emotional overtones matching the emotional state of the receiver and that these changes would be mediated by emotion-induced biases involving expectancies attached to arguments contained in the messages. Two studies manipulating discrete negative emotional states and message frames (i.e., sadness and anger) confirmed these predictions. The functioning of this emotion-matching bias in parallel with emotion-induced processing differences and the limitations of a valence-based approach to the study of attitude change are also considered.
- 1 January 2004
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
- Vol. 86 (1) , 43-56
Discrete Emotions and Persuasion: The Role of Emotion-Induced Expectancies.
The authors argue that specific emotions can alter the persuasive impact of messages as a function of the emotional framing of persuasive appeals. Because specific emotions inflate expectancies for events possessing matching emotional overtones (D. DeSteno, R. E. Petty, D. T. Wegener, & D. D. Rucker, 2000), the authors predicted that attempts at persuasion would be more successful when messages were framed with emotional overtones matching the emotional state of the receiver and that these changes would be mediated by emotion-induced biases involving expectancies attached to arguments contained in the messages. Two studies manipulating discrete negative emotional states and message frames (i.e., sadness and anger) confirmed these predictions. The functioning of this emotion-matching bias in parallel with emotion-induced processing differences and the limitations of a valence-based approach to the study of attitude change are also considered.