Lance J. Rips
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Lance J. Rips has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jeremy N. Bailenson
Psychology Department, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois
2 shared publicationsMatthew A. Kurbat
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA
1 shared publicationSarah K. Brem
Graduate School of Education, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California
1 shared publicationSteven K. Shevell
University of Chicago
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 December 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (6) , 172-177
Reasoning Dialogues
When people argue with others in conversation, they make a variety of conversational moves: They make claims, ask for justification of others claims, attack claims, and attack claims justifications. The arrangement of these moves gives argumentation its characteristic shape. This article illustrates a proposed format for conversations of this type, and it reviews some findings about the way people understand and evaluate these conversations. The findings suggest that judgments of the arguers burden depend not only on the content of their claims, but also on the conversation s structure. In addition, judgments of the strength of a justification an arguer s evidence or explanation are a function of the argument s setting.
- 1 December 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Current Directions in Psychological Science
- Vol. 8 (6) , 172-177
Reasoning Dialogues
When people argue with others in conversation, they make a variety of conversational moves: They make claims, ask for justification of others claims, attack claims, and attack claims justifications. The arrangement of these moves gives argumentation its characteristic shape. This article illustrates a proposed format for conversations of this type, and it reviews some findings about the way people understand and evaluate these conversations. The findings suggest that judgments of the arguers burden depend not only on the content of their claims, but also on the conversation s structure. In addition, judgments of the strength of a justification an arguer s evidence or explanation are a function of the argument s setting.
- 1 May 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 26 (3) , 532-552
A year’s memories: The calendar effect in autobiographical recall
When asked to recall autobiographical events from the past year, students tend to recall more incidents from the beginning and the end of school terms than from other periods. We investigated this calendar effect in Experiment 1 by comparing free recall at schools with different academic calendars. The event distributions tracked the individual calendars, helping to eliminate the possibility that the calendar effect is due to seasonal, nonschool factors, such as holidays. In Experiments 2-4, we checked explanations based on the ideas that events at term boundaries are more important or distinctive than others, that events are incorrectly dated too near the boundaries, and that boundaries serve as implicit cues for recall. These experiments revealed no evidence that importance or errors in dating could explain the effect. Manipulating cues, however, did change the size of the effect, implicating retrieval from very long-term memory as the effect's source. We suggest that when people have to search episodic memory, they consider their own calendar rhythms (such as a student's academic schedule) and let the temporal structure of their personal context guide their search.
- 1 May 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 26 (3) , 532-552
A year’s memories: The calendar effect in autobiographical recall
When asked to recall autobiographical events from the past year, students tend to recall more incidents from the beginning and the end of school terms than from other periods. We investigated this calendar effect in Experiment 1 by comparing free recall at schools with different academic calendars. The event distributions tracked the individual calendars, helping to eliminate the possibility that the calendar effect is due to seasonal, nonschool factors, such as holidays. In Experiments 2-4, we checked explanations based on the ideas that events at term boundaries are more important or distinctive than others, that events are incorrectly dated too near the boundaries, and that boundaries serve as implicit cues for recall. These experiments revealed no evidence that importance or errors in dating could explain the effect. Manipulating cues, however, did change the size of the effect, implicating retrieval from very long-term memory as the effect's source. We suggest that when people have to search episodic memory, they consider their own calendar rhythms (such as a student's academic schedule) and let the temporal structure of their personal context guide their search.
- 1 November 1996
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 10 (7) , 3-16
Informal Reasoning and Burden of Proof
- 1 November 1996
- Published by Wiley in Applied Cognitive Psychology
- Vol. 10 (7) , 3-16
Informal Reasoning and Burden of Proof
- 1 March 1995
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 72-104
The Current Status of Research on Concept Combination
Understanding novel phrases (e.g.upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories can combine, some of them lose their force when applied to a suitable dual model.
- 1 March 1995
- Published by Wiley in Mind & Language
- Vol. 10 (1-2) , 72-104
The Current Status of Research on Concept Combination
Understanding novel phrases (e.g.upside‐down daisy) and classifying objects in categories named by phrases ought to have common properties, but you'd never know it from current theories. The best candidate for both jobs is the Theory Theory, but it faces difficulties when theories are impoverished. A potential solution is a dual approach that couples theories (representations‐about categories) with fixed mentalese expressions (representations‐of categories). Both representations combine information in parallel when understanding phrases. Although there are objections to the notion that theories can combine, some of them lose their force when applied to a suitable dual model.