Michael D. Whinston
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Michael D. Whinston has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ilya Segal
Department of Economics, Stanford University
3 shared publications - Patrick Rey
Toulouse School of Economics (GREMAQ and IDEI);
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (1) , 75-81
Does retailer power lead to exclusion?
This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit‐maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.
- 1 March 2013
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 44 (1) , 75-81
Does retailer power lead to exclusion?
This article examines whether retailer bargaining power and upfront slotting allowances prevent small manufacturers (who have no bargaining power) from obtaining adequate distribution. In contrast to the findings of Marx and Shaffer (2007), who show that all equilibria involve limited distribution (i.e., exclusion of a retailer), we show that there is always an equilibrium in which full distribution is obtained, provided that full distribution is the industry profit‐maximizing outcome. The key feature leading to this differing result is that we do not restrict each retailer to offering the manufacturer a single tariff.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 109-125
A simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of efficient bargaining when the status quo specifies the expected efficient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision
- 14 January 2011
- Published by The Econometric Society in Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 6 (1) , 109-125
Open AccessA simple status quo that ensures participation (with application to efficient bargaining)
We consider Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanisms with independent types and either private values or interdependent values that satisfy a form of "congruence." We show that in these settings, interim participation constraints are satisfied when the status quo is the randomized allocation that has the same distribution as the equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. Moreover, when utilities are convex in the allocation, we can instead satisfy participation constraints with the deterministic status quo equal to the expected equilibrium allocation in the mechanism. For quasilinear settings, these observations imply the possibility of efficient bargaining when the status quo specifies the expected efficient decision provided that the total surplus is convex in the decision
- 1 May 2003
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 71 (3) , 757-791
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- 1 May 2003
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 71 (3) , 757-791
Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities
- 1 January 2002
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 70 (1) , 1-45
The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)
- 1 January 2002
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 70 (1) , 1-45
The Mirrlees Approach to Mechanism Design with Renegotiation (with Applications to Hold-up and Risk Sharing)