Frida Kuhlau
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Frida Kuhlau has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Kathinka Evers
Uppsala University, Sweden
4 shared publicationsAnna T. Höglund
Centre for Research Ethics and Bioethics, Uppsala, Sweden
2 shared publicationsStefan Eriksson
Uppsala University, Sweden
2 shared publications- Stefan Eriksson
Centre for Research Ethics & Bioethics, Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences Uppsala University Uppsala Sweden
2 shared publications Anna T Höglund
Uppsala University, Sweden
1 shared publication- Anna T. Höglund
Department of Public Health and Caring Sciences, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 March 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research Ethics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 6-19
The ethics of disseminating dual-use knowledge
In 2011, for the first time ever, two scientific journals were asked not to publish research papers in full detail. The research in question was on the H5N1 influenza virus (bird flu), and the concern was that the expected public health benefits of disseminating the findings did not outweigh the potential harm should the knowledge be misused for malicious purposes. This constraint raises important ethical concerns as it collides with scientific freedom and openness. In this article, we argue that constraining the dissemination of dual-use knowledge can in certain cases be justified because, for example: scientists have a responsibility for potentially harmful consequences of their research; the public need not always know of all scientific discoveries; uncertainty about the risks of harm may warrant precaution; and expected benefits do not always outweigh potential harm. However, the constraints in question are not absolute but can be both temporary and partial. We propose three core aspects for an ethics of dual-use dissemination: dual-use awareness, precaution, and acknowledgment of conflicting values. Additionally, to help scientists understand when constraints on dissemination may be justified we suggest three corresponding conditions that prompt scientists to recognize dual-use material or research, consider the potential impact of dual-use knowledge dissemination, and acknowledge and respond to external dissemination concerns.
- 20 March 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Research Ethics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 6-19
The ethics of disseminating dual-use knowledge
In 2011, for the first time ever, two scientific journals were asked not to publish research papers in full detail. The research in question was on the H5N1 influenza virus (bird flu), and the concern was that the expected public health benefits of disseminating the findings did not outweigh the potential harm should the knowledge be misused for malicious purposes. This constraint raises important ethical concerns as it collides with scientific freedom and openness. In this article, we argue that constraining the dissemination of dual-use knowledge can in certain cases be justified because, for example: scientists have a responsibility for potentially harmful consequences of their research; the public need not always know of all scientific discoveries; uncertainty about the risks of harm may warrant precaution; and expected benefits do not always outweigh potential harm. However, the constraints in question are not absolute but can be both temporary and partial. We propose three core aspects for an ethics of dual-use dissemination: dual-use awareness, precaution, and acknowledgment of conflicting values. Additionally, to help scientists understand when constraints on dissemination may be justified we suggest three corresponding conditions that prompt scientists to recognize dual-use material or research, consider the potential impact of dual-use knowledge dissemination, and acknowledge and respond to external dissemination concerns.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Applied Biosafety
- Vol. 17 (3) , 120-127
Ethical Competence in Dual use Life Science Research
Life scientists have with increasing intensity been requested to recognize and take responsibility for the potential dual use implications of their work. To assist in meeting these demands, a number of educational modules have been produced to raise awareness of relevant dual use and biosecurity issues. A main purpose of such efforts has been to nurture an active culture of dual use responsibility in the life sciences. Despite the inherent ethical nature of the dual use dilemma, it has traditionally been conceptualized within a security framework and has largely been neglected in the bioethics discourse. This article introduces the concept of ethical competence in dual use and argues that a culture of responsibility cannot be realized unless awareness is accompanied by the capacities to reflect and act in dual use situations. Ethical competence may play a valuable part in developing a culture of dual use responsibility despite the unpredictable and open ended nature of bioethical processes. However, such a competence is neither self-sustained nor self-sufficient. Organizational support and leadership are important to provide opportunities for building and sustaining dual use ethical competence (e.g., through education or mentoring). Moreover, other actors and their additional competences may occasionally be required to sufficiently safeguard dual use research.
- 1 September 2012
- Published by SAGE Publications in Applied Biosafety
- Vol. 17 (3) , 120-127
Open AccessEthical Competence in Dual use Life Science Research
Life scientists have with increasing intensity been requested to recognize and take responsibility for the potential dual use implications of their work. To assist in meeting these demands, a number of educational modules have been produced to raise awareness of relevant dual use and biosecurity issues. A main purpose of such efforts has been to nurture an active culture of dual use responsibility in the life sciences. Despite the inherent ethical nature of the dual use dilemma, it has traditionally been conceptualized within a security framework and has largely been neglected in the bioethics discourse. This article introduces the concept of ethical competence in dual use and argues that a culture of responsibility cannot be realized unless awareness is accompanied by the capacities to reflect and act in dual use situations. Ethical competence may play a valuable part in developing a culture of dual use responsibility despite the unpredictable and open ended nature of bioethical processes. However, such a competence is neither self-sustained nor self-sufficient. Organizational support and leadership are important to provide opportunities for building and sustaining dual use ethical competence (e.g., through education or mentoring). Moreover, other actors and their additional competences may occasionally be required to sufficiently safeguard dual use research.
A PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE FOR DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
Most life science research entails dual‐use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual‐use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges against the principle exist – for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague – the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy‐makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context‐dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness‐raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes.
A PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE FOR DUAL USE RESEARCH IN THE LIFE SCIENCES
Most life science research entails dual‐use complexity and may be misused for harmful purposes, e.g. biological weapons. The Precautionary Principle applies to special problems characterized by complexity in the relationship between human activities and their consequences. This article examines whether the principle, so far mainly used in environmental and public health issues, is applicable and suitable to the field of dual‐use life science research. Four central elements of the principle are examined: threat, uncertainty, prescription and action. Although charges against the principle exist – for example that it stifles scientific development, lacks practical applicability and is poorly defined and vague – the analysis concludes that a Precautionary Principle is applicable to the field. Certain factors such as credibility of the threat, availability of information, clear prescriptive demands on responsibility and directives on how to act, determine the suitability and success of a Precautionary Principle. Moreover, policy‐makers and researchers share a responsibility for providing and seeking information about potential sources of harm. A central conclusion is that the principle is meaningful and useful if applied as a context‐dependent moral principle and allowed flexibility in its practical use. The principle may then inspire awareness‐raising and the establishment of practical routines which appropriately reflect the fact that life science research may be misused for harmful purposes.
TAKING DUE CARE: MORAL OBLIGATIONS IN DUAL USE RESEARCH
In the past decade, the perception of a bioterrorist threat has increased and created a demand on life scientists to consider the potential security implications of dual use research. This article examines a selection of proposed moral obligations for life scientists that have emerged to meet these concerns and the extent to which they can be considered reasonable. It also describes the underlying reasons for the concerns, how they are managed, and their implications for scientific values.Five criteria for what constitutes preventable harm are suggested and a number of proposed obligations for life scientists are considered against these criteria, namely, the obligations to prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or share sensitive information; to oversee and limit access to dangerous material; and to report activities of concern.Although bioterrorism might be perceived as an imminent threat, the analysis illustrates that this is beyond the responsibility of life scientists either to prevent or to respond to. Among the more reasonable obligations are duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern. Responsibility, therefore, includes obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm. A central conclusion is that several of the proposed obligations are reasonable, although not unconditionally.
TAKING DUE CARE: MORAL OBLIGATIONS IN DUAL USE RESEARCH
In the past decade, the perception of a bioterrorist threat has increased and created a demand on life scientists to consider the potential security implications of dual use research. This article examines a selection of proposed moral obligations for life scientists that have emerged to meet these concerns and the extent to which they can be considered reasonable. It also describes the underlying reasons for the concerns, how they are managed, and their implications for scientific values.Five criteria for what constitutes preventable harm are suggested and a number of proposed obligations for life scientists are considered against these criteria, namely, the obligations to prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or share sensitive information; to oversee and limit access to dangerous material; and to report activities of concern.Although bioterrorism might be perceived as an imminent threat, the analysis illustrates that this is beyond the responsibility of life scientists either to prevent or to respond to. Among the more reasonable obligations are duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern. Responsibility, therefore, includes obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm. A central conclusion is that several of the proposed obligations are reasonable, although not unconditionally.