Richard L. Marsh
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Richard L. Marsh has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jason L. Hicks
University of Georgia
5 shared publicationsJoshua D. Landau
University of Georgia
4 shared publications- Jason L. Hicks
Louisiana State University
2 shared publications Eric S. Bryan
University of Georgia
1 shared publication- Joshua D. Landau
Department of Behavioral Sciences, York College of Pennsylvania, York, PA 17405-7199, USA
1 shared publication Marc M. Sebrechts
Catholic University of America
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2000
- Published by University of Illinois Press in The American Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 113 (4) , 539-51
Dissociation of Two Kinds of Source Attributions
We examined the relationship between two different source attribution errors. One error found primarily in the cognitive psychology literature is the belief that one is an author of an idea when one is not. The other error, reported in the social psychology literature, occurs when people overestimate how long they have known an idea. Although somewhat different, both errors are a form of misappropriation of ideas to oneself. We investigated both attributions and found that when participants performed a more elaborate encoding task, erroneous claims of authorship were reduced but length-of-knowing judgments increased. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive processing that is likely to give rise to each source attribution.
- 1 January 2000
- Published by University of Illinois Press in The American Journal of Psychology
- Vol. 113 (4) , 539-51
Dissociation of Two Kinds of Source Attributions
We examined the relationship between two different source attribution errors. One error found primarily in the cognitive psychology literature is the belief that one is an author of an idea when one is not. The other error, reported in the social psychology literature, occurs when people overestimate how long they have known an idea. Although somewhat different, both errors are a form of misappropriation of ideas to oneself. We investigated both attributions and found that when participants performed a more elaborate encoding task, erroneous claims of authorship were reduced but length-of-knowing judgments increased. The results are discussed in terms of the cognitive processing that is likely to give rise to each source attribution.
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (2) , 320-327
The activation of unrelated and canceled intentions
The intention superiority effect is the finding that intentions to perform an activity are stored in a heightened state of activation. The effect has also been generalized to the finding that once an intention is fulfilled, it is inhibited relative to more neutral material about which no intentionality has been formed. In two experiments, we tested some ecological and naturally occurring situations taken from the literature on prospective memory and demonstrated that they have consistent consequences for the activation level of an intention. In Experiment 1, a constellation of unrelated activities displayed heightened activation prior to completion and displayed inhibition after completion. In Experiment 2, canceling the intention resulted in inhibition just as completing the intention does in this paradigm. The results are discussed in terms of their practical and theoretical importance to theories of prospective memory.
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (2) , 320-327
The activation of unrelated and canceled intentions
The intention superiority effect is the finding that intentions to perform an activity are stored in a heightened state of activation. The effect has also been generalized to the finding that once an intention is fulfilled, it is inhibited relative to more neutral material about which no intentionality has been formed. In two experiments, we tested some ecological and naturally occurring situations taken from the literature on prospective memory and demonstrated that they have consistent consequences for the activation level of an intention. In Experiment 1, a constellation of unrelated activities displayed heightened activation prior to completion and displayed inhibition after completion. In Experiment 2, canceling the intention resulted in inhibition just as completing the intention does in this paradigm. The results are discussed in terms of their practical and theoretical importance to theories of prospective memory.
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (2) , 355-363
Conceptual priming in a generative problem-solving task
Three experiments explored how participants solved a very open-ended generative problem-solving task. Previous research has shown that when participants are shown examples, novel creations will tend to conform to features shared across those examples (Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). We made the shared features of the examples conceptually related to one another. We found that when the features were related to the concept of hostility, participants' creations contained hostile features that were not part of any of the examples. These results suggest that participants will design novel entities to be consistent with emergent properties of examples shown to them. We also found that a mild hostility prime from unscrambling sentences had a similar conceptual effect. Together, the two effects suggest that conceptual priming of generative cognitive tasks will influence the cognitive aspects of the creative process.
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (2) , 355-363
Conceptual priming in a generative problem-solving task
Three experiments explored how participants solved a very open-ended generative problem-solving task. Previous research has shown that when participants are shown examples, novel creations will tend to conform to features shared across those examples (Smith, Ward, & Schumacher, 1993). We made the shared features of the examples conceptually related to one another. We found that when the features were related to the concept of hostility, participants' creations contained hostile features that were not part of any of the examples. These results suggest that participants will design novel entities to be consistent with emergent properties of examples shown to them. We also found that a mild hostility prime from unscrambling sentences had a similar conceptual effect. Together, the two effects suggest that conceptual priming of generative cognitive tasks will influence the cognitive aspects of the creative process.
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 6 (1) , 117-122
Remember-know judgments can depend on how memory is tested
Remember-know judgments reflect the subjective state of awareness that accompanies episodic memory retrieval. We tested an old-new recognition condition, an old-new recognition followed by...
- 1 March 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review
- Vol. 6 (1) , 117-122
Remember-know judgments can depend on how memory is tested
Remember-know judgments reflect the subjective state of awareness that accompanies episodic memory retrieval. We tested an old-new recognition condition, an old-new recognition followed by...
- 1 January 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (1) , 94-105
The inadvertent use of prior knowledge in a generative cognitive task
In four experiments with 332 participants, participants were asked to generate novel nonwords for English categories. When participants were shown examples embedded with regular orthographic structures, participants’ nonwords tended to conform orthographically to the examples, despite instructions to avoid using features of the examples. The effect was found with immediate testing (Experiment 1) and delayed testing (Experiment 2). The effect was also found with arbitrary features (Experiments 1–4), as well as with naturally occurring orthographic regularities (Experiment 4). Participants had difficulty avoiding the use of this prior knowledge, despite being able to list the features they were asked to avoid (Experiment 3). The results are discussed in terms of the inadvertent use of prior knowledge in generative cognitive tasks.
- 1 January 1999
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 27 (1) , 94-105
The inadvertent use of prior knowledge in a generative cognitive task
In four experiments with 332 participants, participants were asked to generate novel nonwords for English categories. When participants were shown examples embedded with regular orthographic structures, participants’ nonwords tended to conform orthographically to the examples, despite instructions to avoid using features of the examples. The effect was found with immediate testing (Experiment 1) and delayed testing (Experiment 2). The effect was also found with arbitrary features (Experiments 1–4), as well as with naturally occurring orthographic regularities (Experiment 4). Participants had difficulty avoiding the use of this prior knowledge, despite being able to list the features they were asked to avoid (Experiment 3). The results are discussed in terms of the inadvertent use of prior knowledge in generative cognitive tasks.
- 1 July 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 26 (4) , 633-643
An investigation of everyday prospective memory
Prospective memory, remembering to carry out one’s planned activities, was investigated using a naturalistic paradigm. Three experiments, with a total of 405 participants, were conducted. The goal...
- 1 July 1998
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 26 (4) , 633-643
An investigation of everyday prospective memory
Prospective memory, remembering to carry out one’s planned activities, was investigated using a naturalistic paradigm. Three experiments, with a total of 405 participants, were conducted. The goal...
- 1 January 1998
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 24 (2) , 336-349
Event-based prospective memory and executive control of working memory.
In 5 experiments, the character of concurrent cognitive processing was manipulated during an event-based prospective memory task. High- and low-load conditions that differed only in the difficulty of the concurrent task were tested in each experiment. In Experiments 1 and 2, attention-demanding tasks from the literature on executive control produced decrements in prospective memory. In Experiment 3, attention was divided by different loads of articulatory suppression that did not ultimately lead to decrements in prospective memory. A high-load manipulation of a visuospatial task requiring performance monitoring resulted in worse prospective memory in Experiment 4, whereas in Experiment 5 a visuospatial task with little monitoring did not. Results are discussed in terms of executive functions, such as planning and monitoring, that appear to be critical to successful event-based prospective memory.
- 1 January 1998
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition
- Vol. 24 (2) , 336-349
Event-based prospective memory and executive control of working memory.
In 5 experiments, the character of concurrent cognitive processing was manipulated during an event-based prospective memory task. High- and low-load conditions that differed only in the difficulty of the concurrent task were tested in each experiment. In Experiments 1 and 2, attention-demanding tasks from the literature on executive control produced decrements in prospective memory. In Experiment 3, attention was divided by different loads of articulatory suppression that did not ultimately lead to decrements in prospective memory. A high-load manipulation of a visuospatial task requiring performance monitoring resulted in worse prospective memory in Experiment 4, whereas in Experiment 5 a visuospatial task with little monitoring did not. Results are discussed in terms of executive functions, such as planning and monitoring, that appear to be critical to successful event-based prospective memory.
- 1 March 1997
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 25 (2) , 173-181
Processing strategies and secondary memory in very rapid forgetting
- 1 March 1997
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 25 (2) , 173-181
Processing strategies and secondary memory in very rapid forgetting
- 1 September 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 24 (5) , 669-680
How examples may (and may not) constrain creativity
Three experiments were performed to test Smith, Ward, and Schumacher’s (1993) conformity hypothesis— that people’s ideas will conform to examples they are shown in a creative generation task. Conformity was observed in all three experiments; participants tended to incorporate critical features of experimenter-provided examples. However, examination of total output, elaborateness of design, and the noncritical features did not confirm that the conformity effect constrained creative output in any of the three experiments. Increasing the number of examples increased the conformity effect (Experiment 1). Examples that covaried features that are naturally uncorrelated in the real world led to a greater subjective rating of creativity (Experiment 2). A delay between presentation and test increased conformity (Experiment 3), just as models of inadvertent plagiarism would predict. The explanatory power of theoretical accounts such as activation, retrieval blocking, structured imagination, and category abstraction are evaluated.
- 1 September 1996
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 24 (5) , 669-680
How examples may (and may not) constrain creativity
Three experiments were performed to test Smith, Ward, and Schumacher’s (1993) conformity hypothesis— that people’s ideas will conform to examples they are shown in a creative generation task. Conformity was observed in all three experiments; participants tended to incorporate critical features of experimenter-provided examples. However, examination of total output, elaborateness of design, and the noncritical features did not confirm that the conformity effect constrained creative output in any of the three experiments. Increasing the number of examples increased the conformity effect (Experiment 1). Examples that covaried features that are naturally uncorrelated in the real world led to a greater subjective rating of creativity (Experiment 2). A delay between presentation and test increased conformity (Experiment 3), just as models of inadvertent plagiarism would predict. The explanatory power of theoretical accounts such as activation, retrieval blocking, structured imagination, and category abstraction are evaluated.