C. Daniel Batson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
C. Daniel Batson has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Connie L. Engel
University of Kansas
1 shared publication- Nadia Ahmad
University of Kansas
1 shared publication Scott R. Fridell
University of Kansas
1 shared publicationTecia Moran
University of Kansas, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 January 2001
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 31 (1) , 25-36
Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has defected?
What if participants in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self‐interest counsels defection; empathy‐induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy‐induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 26 January 2001
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 31 (1) , 25-36
Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has defected?
What if participants in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma know before making their decision that the other person has already defected? From the perspective of classic game theory, a dilemma no longer exists. It is clearly in their best interest to defect too. The empathy‐altruism hypothesis predicts, however, that if they feel empathy for the other, then a dilemma remains: self‐interest counsels defection; empathy‐induced altruism counsels not. This motivational conflict should lead at least some empathically aroused individuals not to defect. To test this prediction, we placed 60 undergraduate women in a one‐trial prisoner's dilemma in which they knew the other had already defected. Among those not induced to feel empathy, very few (0.05) did not defect in return. Among those induced to feel empathy for the other, almost half (0.45) did not defect. These results underscore the power of empathy‐induced altruism to affect responses in a prisoner's dilemma. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 1 November 1999
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 29 (7) , 909-924
Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma
- 1 November 1999
- Published by Wiley in European Journal of Social Psychology
- Vol. 29 (7) , 909-924
Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma
- 1 August 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 25 (8) , 1021-1032
Value Judgments: Testing the Somatic-Marker Hypothesis Using False Physiological Feedback
Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis claims that people rely on somatic markers—physiological responses to situations of gain or loss—to make value-relevant decisions, not simply on cool reason. To test this hypothesis, undergraduates were presented with false physiological feedback as they listened to audiotapes describing situations threatening two values, freedom and equality. They were then asked to make decisions that implicated these values. Decisions favored whichever value had received stronger feedback while listening to the value-threatening situations. Feedback did not, however, affect judgments about the relative importance of the values in general; these judgments were apparently based on cognitive retrieval from memory of a stored value hierarchy, which also—and independently— affected the value-related decisions. These results supported the somatic-marker hypothesis.
- 1 August 1999
- Published by SAGE Publications in Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
- Vol. 25 (8) , 1021-1032
Value Judgments: Testing the Somatic-Marker Hypothesis Using False Physiological Feedback
Damasio’s somatic-marker hypothesis claims that people rely on somatic markers—physiological responses to situations of gain or loss—to make value-relevant decisions, not simply on cool reason. To test this hypothesis, undergraduates were presented with false physiological feedback as they listened to audiotapes describing situations threatening two values, freedom and equality. They were then asked to make decisions that implicated these values. Decisions favored whichever value had received stronger feedback while listening to the value-threatening situations. Feedback did not, however, affect judgments about the relative importance of the values in general; these judgments were apparently based on cognitive retrieval from memory of a stored value hierarchy, which also—and independently— affected the value-related decisions. These results supported the somatic-marker hypothesis.