James Adams
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
James Adams has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Samuel Merrill
Wilkes University, USA
2 shared publicationsBernard Grofman
School of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA
1 shared publication- Samuel Merrill
Wilkes University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 44 (6) , 899-918
Candidates’ policy platforms and election outcomes: The three faces of policy representation
Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates’ and parties’ policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: How can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position, they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.
- 1 October 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 44 (6) , 899-918
Candidates’ policy platforms and election outcomes: The three faces of policy representation
Recent empirical studies by Alvarez and Nagler, Erikson and Romero, and others conclude that candidates’ and parties’ policy platforms only modestly affect their electoral support. This suggests that candidates/parties can win elections even when their policies differ sharply from the policy beliefs of the constituencies that elect them. This raises the question: How can voters exercise control over government policies via elections? We report applications to American and French presidential election data that suggest three paradoxical conclusions. On the one hand, we find that presidential candidates can moderate their policies with at most a modest change in vote share, but if they move by the same amount to a more extreme position, they face severe vote losses that could cripple their election prospects. Alternatively, movement by both candidates in the same direction or a policy shift by the voters may have a major effect on the outcome.
- 1 July 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 275-300
Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections
This paper analyzes factors that affect candidates’ position-taking incentives in multi-candidate and multi-party elections. Following Cox (1990), we define centrifugal incentives as those that motivate vote-seeking candidates to take more extreme positions relative to the center of the voter distribution. For a multivariate vote model that includes a Left-Right policy component, a party identification component and an unmeasured term that renders the vote choice probabilistic, we present theoretical and computer simulation results that quantify candidates’ incentives to shift their policies away from the center in the direction of their partisan constituencies’ mean policy preferences. Centrifugal incentives are found to increase with (1) the salience of policies and party identification, (2) the size of the candidate field, (3) the size of a candidate’s partisan constituency and (4) more extreme constituency policy preferences. Thus, ceteris paribus, candidates who represent large constituencies are motivated to present more extreme policies than are candidates who represent small ones.
- 1 July 2002
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Theoretical Politics
- Vol. 14 (3) , 275-300
Centrifugal Incentives in Multi-Candidate Elections
This paper analyzes factors that affect candidates’ position-taking incentives in multi-candidate and multi-party elections. Following Cox (1990), we define centrifugal incentives as those that motivate vote-seeking candidates to take more extreme positions relative to the center of the voter distribution. For a multivariate vote model that includes a Left-Right policy component, a party identification component and an unmeasured term that renders the vote choice probabilistic, we present theoretical and computer simulation results that quantify candidates’ incentives to shift their policies away from the center in the direction of their partisan constituencies’ mean policy preferences. Centrifugal incentives are found to increase with (1) the salience of policies and party identification, (2) the size of the candidate field, (3) the size of a candidate’s partisan constituency and (4) more extreme constituency policy preferences. Thus, ceteris paribus, candidates who represent large constituencies are motivated to present more extreme policies than are candidates who represent small ones.