Valerie Tiberius
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Valerie Tiberius has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alicia Hall
Department of Philosophy , California State University , Fresno, 2380 East Keats Avenue M/S MB105, Fresno, CA 93740-8024, USA
1 shared publication- Daniel Haybron
Department of Philosophy, Saint Louis University, St. Louis, USA
1 shared publication Jason Swartwood
Department of Philosophy , University of Minnesota , Minneapolis, MN, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 29 (2) , 459-461
James Lenman, The Possibility of Moral Community: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024. Hardback, ISBN: 9780198885085. 188 pages
- 20 March 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 29 (2) , 459-461
James Lenman, The Possibility of Moral Community: Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2024. Hardback, ISBN: 9780198885085. 188 pages
- 23 March 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-4
Well-Being, Philosophical Theories of
- 9 January 2021
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-3
Life Satisfaction Judgments
- 19 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 565-569
The Future of Eudaimonic Well-Being: Subjectivism, Objectivism and the Lump Under the Carpet
- 19 October 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 565-569
The Future of Eudaimonic Well-Being: Subjectivism, Objectivism and the Lump Under the Carpet
- 2 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 1384 (1) , 113-116
Wisdom and humility
- 2 September 2016
- Published by Wiley in Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
- Vol. 1384 (1) , 113-116
Wisdom and humility
- 10 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (1) , 219-226
Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life
- 10 February 2016
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Value Inquiry
- Vol. 50 (1) , 219-226
Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life
- 29 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 1 (4) , 712-733
Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?
This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy (WBP), assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for ‘pragmatic subjectivism’: given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens’ ‘personal welfare values’: those values—and not mere preferences—that individuals see as bearing on their well-being. Finally, we briefly consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice. While our discussion takes for granted the legitimacy of well-being policy, we suggest that pragmatic subjectivism strengthens the case for such policy.
- 29 December 2015
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of the American Philosophical Association
- Vol. 1 (4) , 712-733
Well-Being Policy: What Standard of Well-Being?
This paper examines the norms that should guide policies aimed at promoting happiness or, more broadly, well-being. In particular, we take up the question of which conception of well-being should govern well-being policy (WBP), assuming some such policies to be legitimate. In answer, we lay out a case for ‘pragmatic subjectivism’: given widely accepted principles of respect for persons, well-being policy may not assume any view of well-being, subjectivist or objectivist. Rather, it should promote what its intended beneficiaries see as good for them: pleasure for hedonists, excellence for Aristotelians, etc. Specifically, well-being policy should promote citizens’ ‘personal welfare values’: those values—and not mere preferences—that individuals see as bearing on their well-being. Finally, we briefly consider how pragmatic subjectivism works in practice. While our discussion takes for granted the legitimacy of well-being policy, we suggest that pragmatic subjectivism strengthens the case for such policy.