Roberto Mazzoleni
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Roberto Mazzoleni has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Hamza Virk
Department of Mathematics Hofstra University 11549 Hempstead NY USA
1 shared publication - Richard R. Nelson
Columbia University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Entry deterrence and antibiotic conservation under post-entry Bertrand competition
We analyze how an incumbent antibiotic monopolist responds to the threat of post-entry Bertrand competition by a vertically differentiated rival. In a two-period model where current production drives future resistance, Bertrand competition leads to a winner-take-all outcome. We find that strategic deterrence is optimal regardless of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective rival drugs. In contrast with post-entry Cournot competition, anticipated price competition provides the incumbent with a stronger strategic incentive for conservation.
Open AccessEntry deterrence and antibiotic conservation under post-entry Bertrand competition
We analyze how an incumbent antibiotic monopolist responds to the threat of post-entry Bertrand competition by a vertically differentiated rival. In a two-period model where current production drives future resistance, Bertrand competition leads to a winner-take-all outcome. We find that strategic deterrence is optimal regardless of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective rival drugs. In contrast with post-entry Cournot competition, anticipated price competition provides the incumbent with a stronger strategic incentive for conservation.
- Open Access
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in EconomiA
- Vol. 27 (1) , 110-131
Bacterial cross-resistance and entry deterrence in a market for antibiotics
Purpose: The goal of the paper is to explore the deterrence strategy of a firm holding a patent on an antibiotic drug when confronting a threat of entry under varying conditions regarding bacterial cross-resistance to prospective competing antibiotic drugs. A second goal is to draw policy implications regarding patent policy as an instrument for combating antibiotic resistance. Design/methodology/approach: A two-period model is used to study the output decisions of a patent-holding incumbent confronting potential entry in the second period. First-period output decisions influence the effectiveness of the incumbent antibiotic and prospective competitors in the second period. We compare equilibrium output decisions under varying conditions regarding (1) the duration and scope of patent protection and (2) the degree of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective second-period entrants. Findings: Entry deterrence is more likely (less costly) as prospective entry costs for rivals increase. Whereas entry deterrence against generic competitors requires incumbents to increase output in the first period relative to a setting wherein the threat of entry is absent, a lower output level in the first period is a feature of an optimal entry deterrence strategy when prospective rivals benefit from a low level of bacterial cross-resistance. Stronger patent protection will not necessarily incentivize the patent holder to moderate current use such as to preserve antibiotic drug’s future effectiveness. Originality/value: The model contributes an important theoretical counterpoint to policy proposals advocating for stronger patents in response to the problem of antibiotic resistance. It also enriches the industrial organization literature on product quality differentiation (incumbent choice of first-period output affects the quality differential between antibiotics in the second period).
- 30 May 2025
- Published by Emerald Publishing in EconomiA
- Vol. 27 (1) , 110-131
Open AccessBacterial cross-resistance and entry deterrence in a market for antibiotics
Purpose: The goal of the paper is to explore the deterrence strategy of a firm holding a patent on an antibiotic drug when confronting a threat of entry under varying conditions regarding bacterial cross-resistance to prospective competing antibiotic drugs. A second goal is to draw policy implications regarding patent policy as an instrument for combating antibiotic resistance. Design/methodology/approach: A two-period model is used to study the output decisions of a patent-holding incumbent confronting potential entry in the second period. First-period output decisions influence the effectiveness of the incumbent antibiotic and prospective competitors in the second period. We compare equilibrium output decisions under varying conditions regarding (1) the duration and scope of patent protection and (2) the degree of bacterial cross-resistance to prospective second-period entrants. Findings: Entry deterrence is more likely (less costly) as prospective entry costs for rivals increase. Whereas entry deterrence against generic competitors requires incumbents to increase output in the first period relative to a setting wherein the threat of entry is absent, a lower output level in the first period is a feature of an optimal entry deterrence strategy when prospective rivals benefit from a low level of bacterial cross-resistance. Stronger patent protection will not necessarily incentivize the patent holder to moderate current use such as to preserve antibiotic drug’s future effectiveness. Originality/value: The model contributes an important theoretical counterpoint to policy proposals advocating for stronger patents in response to the problem of antibiotic resistance. It also enriches the industrial organization literature on product quality differentiation (incumbent choice of first-period output affects the quality differential between antibiotics in the second period).
- 14 August 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1409-1451
An interpretive history of challenges to neoclassical microeconomics and how they have fared
Contemporary microeconomics has witnessed a resurgence of behavioral, institutional, and evolutionary critiques of the neoclassical mainstream that came to dominate the field during the 1980s. Today’s critiques and proposals for reform have a long tradition in economics. While synthesizing the intellectual history of these challenges, this article explores the reasons why such critical strands of microeconomics fared poorly in the past, and—in contrast—what factors may account for their partial acceptance into the mainstream in recent times.
- 14 August 2013
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1409-1451
An interpretive history of challenges to neoclassical microeconomics and how they have fared
Contemporary microeconomics has witnessed a resurgence of behavioral, institutional, and evolutionary critiques of the neoclassical mainstream that came to dominate the field during the 1980s. Today’s critiques and proposals for reform have a long tradition in economics. While synthesizing the intellectual history of these challenges, this article explores the reasons why such critical strands of microeconomics fared poorly in the past, and—in contrast—what factors may account for their partial acceptance into the mainstream in recent times.
- 9 May 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 20 (3) , 721-749
Before Bayh-Dole: public research funding, patents, and pharmaceutical innovation (1945-1965)
What role did patents and exclusive licenses play as an incentive for research collaborations between publicly funded scientists and pharmaceutical firms before Bayh-Dole? Based on a study of NIH's patent policies and practices, the paper argues that patents played no role in supporting interactions between NIH grantees and pharmaceutical firms until 1962. The latter's growing demand for exclusive licenses during the 1960s was a strategic response to the rise in public funding of biomedical research, and the regulatory reforms introduced in 1962.
- 9 May 2011
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Industrial and Corporate Change
- Vol. 20 (3) , 721-749
Before Bayh-Dole: public research funding, patents, and pharmaceutical innovation (1945-1965)
What role did patents and exclusive licenses play as an incentive for research collaborations between publicly funded scientists and pharmaceutical firms before Bayh-Dole? Based on a study of NIH's patent policies and practices, the paper argues that patents played no role in supporting interactions between NIH grantees and pharmaceutical firms until 1962. The latter's growing demand for exclusive licenses during the 1960s was a strategic response to the rise in public funding of biomedical research, and the regulatory reforms introduced in 1962.
- 1 July 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Technology Transfer
- Vol. 31 (4) , 431-441
The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R&D Investment and Social Welfare
- 1 July 2006
- Published by Springer Nature in The Journal of Technology Transfer
- Vol. 31 (4) , 431-441
The Effects of University Patenting and Licensing on Downstream R&D Investment and Social Welfare
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 14 (6) , 499-515
University patents, R&D competition, and social welfare
Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.
- 1 September 2005
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Economics of Innovation and New Technology
- Vol. 14 (6) , 499-515
University patents, R&D competition, and social welfare
Although university patenting has increased dramatically over the past three decades, debates persist regarding the broad economic implications of the phenomenon. This article examines the social welfare implications of university patenting in a model of R&D competition in which firms develop innovations on the basis of the disclosure of a university invention. When such disclosure does not preempt the patenting of downstream innovations, university patenting enhances social welfare only if a regime of open access to university inventions is characterized by excessive aggregate R&D from the viewpoint of social welfare. When the university invention disclosure preempts patenting on firms’ innovations, the nature of the open access equilibrium in the R&D market depends on the threat of imitation ex post. Only when the threat of imitation is sufficiently strong firms will not invest in downstream R&D in the open access regime. In this case, university patenting promotes R&D investment and increases social welfare.