Martin Schellhorn
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Martin Schellhorn has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andreas E. Stuck
Department of Geriatrics Inselspital University of Bern Hospital Switzerland
1 shared publication Christoph E. Minder
Department of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Bern, Switzerland
1 shared publicationJohn C. Beck
School of Medicine, University of California, Los Angeles, USA
1 shared publication- Klaus Göggelmann
Credit Suisse Asset Management, Uetlibergstrasse 231, CH-8070 Zürich, Switzerland CH
1 shared publication - Peter Winker
Justus Liebig University Giessen
1 shared publication - Wolfgang Franz
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW)
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 July 2001
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 10 (5) , 441-456
The effect of variable health insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits
In order to contain cost in the health care sector, the introduction of consumer incentives in health insurance has been suggested and realized in many countries. The Swiss health system reform of 1996 introduced a choice of deductible for health services in the mandatory basic health insurance. This paper estimates the effect of this choice on physician service utilization. A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied to take account of the endogeneity of the choice of the deductible in the estimation of the number of physician visits. This paper finds that most of the observed reduction in the number of physician visits among individuals who choose a higher deductible seems to be a result of self‐selection of individuals into the respective insurance contracts, and not to induced changes in utilization behaviour. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 16 July 2001
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 10 (5) , 441-456
The effect of variable health insurance deductibles on the demand for physician visits
In order to contain cost in the health care sector, the introduction of consumer incentives in health insurance has been suggested and realized in many countries. The Swiss health system reform of 1996 introduced a choice of deductible for health services in the mandatory basic health insurance. This paper estimates the effect of this choice on physician service utilization. A generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator is applied to take account of the endogeneity of the choice of the deductible in the estimation of the number of physician visits. This paper finds that most of the observed reduction in the number of physician visits among individuals who choose a higher deductible seems to be a result of self‐selection of individuals into the respective insurance contracts, and not to induced changes in utilization behaviour. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 6 September 2000
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 9 (6) , 533-545
Health services utilization of elderly Swiss: evidence from panel data
- 6 September 2000
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 9 (6) , 533-545
Health services utilization of elderly Swiss: evidence from panel data
- 30 May 2000
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 25 (2) , 247-259
Quasi-Monte Carlo methods in stochastic simulations: An application to policy simulations using a disequilibrium model of the West German economy 1960-1994
- 30 May 2000
- Published by Springer Nature in Empirical Economics
- Vol. 25 (2) , 247-259
Quasi-Monte Carlo methods in stochastic simulations: An application to policy simulations using a disequilibrium model of the West German economy 1960-1994