Natasha Palmer
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Natasha Palmer has a total of 15 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Anne Mills
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, London, UK
5 shared publications - Andy Haines
Department of Public Health, Environments and Society, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London, UK
2 shared publications Lucy Gilson
2 shared publicationsAbdul Wali
Health Policy Unit, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, London WC1E 7HT
1 shared publication- Barbara S. Carasso
London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London, WC1H 9SH, UK
1 shared publication - Caesar Cheelo
Southern African Institute for Policy and Research
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Resources for Health
- Vol. 10 (1) , 40
Health worker perspectives on user fee removal in Zambia
User fees for primary care services were removed in rural districts in Zambia in 2006. Experience from other countries has suggested that health workers play a key role in determining the success of a fee removal policy, but also find the implementation of such a policy challenging. The policy was introduced against a backdrop of a major shortage in qualified health staff.
- 30 October 2012
- Published by Springer Nature in Human Resources for Health
- Vol. 10 (1) , 40
Open AccessHealth worker perspectives on user fee removal in Zambia
User fees for primary care services were removed in rural districts in Zambia in 2006. Experience from other countries has suggested that health workers play a key role in determining the success of a fee removal policy, but also find the implementation of such a policy challenging. The policy was introduced against a backdrop of a major shortage in qualified health staff.
- 24 July 2006
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
- Vol. 26 (3) , 231-240
An awkward threesome—donors, governments and non‐state providers of health in low income countries
- 24 July 2006
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration and Development
- Vol. 26 (3) , 231-240
An awkward threesome—donors, governments and non‐state providers of health in low income countries
- Open Access
Contracting out health services in fragile states
Non-governmental organisations are contracted to provide most of Afghanistan's health services. What can we learn from their approach and is it sustainable in the longer term? Many Western health systems contract out healthcare services, including the NHS. Contracts are less common in low income countries, but contracts with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to deliver health services are increasingly being promoted in so called fragile states—countries affected by conflict, emerging from conflict, or otherwise lacking the will or capacity to implement pro-poor policies.1 Contracts with NGOs are seen as an effective way to expand services quickly. This is important to reach many of the poorest people living in these countries and thus to make progress towards the millennium development goals for health, but many questions about contracting remain unanswered. ![][1] The challenge of outsourcing In a pilot project in Cambodia, NGOs were contracted to provide district health services on behalf of the government. An extensive evaluation showed that districts with health services that were contracted out to NGOs delivered care more efficiently and equitably than those that remained under government control.2 These findings have encouraged promotion of the contracting out approach in weaker health systems.3 Many low income countries that are implementing or discussing contracting of health care belong to the group of around 40 countries currently referred to as fragile states—for example, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southern Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo.1 The contracts are usually funded by a donor in response to the need to expand services rapidly and the lack of functioning government infrastructure and workforce to deliver these services. As a result, perhaps paradoxically, the weaker the country's government capacity, the more likely it is that contracting is adopted. A notable example of this phenomenon is Afghanistan. After over 20 years of conflict, Afghanistan's health … [1]: /embed/graphic-1.gif
Open AccessContracting out health services in fragile states
Non-governmental organisations are contracted to provide most of Afghanistan's health services. What can we learn from their approach and is it sustainable in the longer term? Many Western health systems contract out healthcare services, including the NHS. Contracts are less common in low income countries, but contracts with non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to deliver health services are increasingly being promoted in so called fragile states—countries affected by conflict, emerging from conflict, or otherwise lacking the will or capacity to implement pro-poor policies.1 Contracts with NGOs are seen as an effective way to expand services quickly. This is important to reach many of the poorest people living in these countries and thus to make progress towards the millennium development goals for health, but many questions about contracting remain unanswered. ![][1] The challenge of outsourcing In a pilot project in Cambodia, NGOs were contracted to provide district health services on behalf of the government. An extensive evaluation showed that districts with health services that were contracted out to NGOs delivered care more efficiently and equitably than those that remained under government control.2 These findings have encouraged promotion of the contracting out approach in weaker health systems.3 Many low income countries that are implementing or discussing contracting of health care belong to the group of around 40 countries currently referred to as fragile states—for example, Cambodia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Southern Sudan, and Democratic Republic of Congo.1 The contracts are usually funded by a donor in response to the need to expand services rapidly and the lack of functioning government infrastructure and workforce to deliver these services. As a result, perhaps paradoxically, the weaker the country's government capacity, the more likely it is that contracting is adopted. A notable example of this phenomenon is Afghanistan. After over 20 years of conflict, Afghanistan's health … [1]: /embed/graphic-1.gif
- 23 March 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Social Science & Medicine
- Vol. 60 (11) , 2505-2514
Contracts in the real world: Case studies from Southern Africa
- 23 March 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Social Science & Medicine
- Vol. 60 (11) , 2505-2514
Contracts in the real world: Case studies from Southern Africa
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 365 (9459) , 570
Health financing and access to services
- 1 February 2005
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 365 (9459) , 570
Health financing and access to services
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 364 (9442) , 1365-1370
Health financing to promote access in low income settings—how much do we know?
- 1 October 2004
- Published by Elsevier in The Lancet
- Vol. 364 (9442) , 1365-1370
Health financing to promote access in low income settings—how much do we know?
- 16 May 2003
- Vol. 81 (4) , 292-7
A new face for private providers in developing countries: what implications for public health?
The use of private health care providers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is widespread and is the subject of considerable debate. We review here a new model of private primary care provision emerging in South Africa, in which commercial companies provide standardized primary care services at relatively low cost. The structure and operation of one such company is described, and features of service delivery are compared with the most probable alternatives: a private general practitioner or a public sector clinic. In a case study of cost and quality of services, the clinics were popular with service users and run at a cost per visit comparable to public sector primary care clinics. However, their current role in tackling important public health problems was limited. The implications for public health policy of the emergence of this new model of private provider are discussed. It is argued that encouraging the use of such clinics by those who can afford to pay for them might not help to improve care available for the poorest population groups, which are an important priority for the government. Encouraging such providers to compete for government funding could, however, be desirable if the range of services presently offered, and those able to access them, could be broadened. However, the constraints to implementing such a system successfully are notable, and these are acknowledged. Even without such contractual arrangements, these companies provide an important lesson to the public sector that acceptability of services to users and low-cost service delivery are not incompatible objectives.
- 16 May 2003
- Vol. 81 (4) , 292-7
A new face for private providers in developing countries: what implications for public health?
The use of private health care providers in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) is widespread and is the subject of considerable debate. We review here a new model of private primary care provision emerging in South Africa, in which commercial companies provide standardized primary care services at relatively low cost. The structure and operation of one such company is described, and features of service delivery are compared with the most probable alternatives: a private general practitioner or a public sector clinic. In a case study of cost and quality of services, the clinics were popular with service users and run at a cost per visit comparable to public sector primary care clinics. However, their current role in tackling important public health problems was limited. The implications for public health policy of the emergence of this new model of private provider are discussed. It is argued that encouraging the use of such clinics by those who can afford to pay for them might not help to improve care available for the poorest population groups, which are an important priority for the government. Encouraging such providers to compete for government funding could, however, be desirable if the range of services presently offered, and those able to access them, could be broadened. However, the constraints to implementing such a system successfully are notable, and these are acknowledged. Even without such contractual arrangements, these companies provide an important lesson to the public sector that acceptability of services to users and low-cost service delivery are not incompatible objectives.
- 28 February 2003
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 12 (12) , 1005-1020
Classical versus relational approaches to understanding controls on a contract with independent GPs in South Africa
Contracts have played a central role in public sector reforms in developed countries over the last decade, and research increasingly highlights their varied nature. In low and middle income countries the use of contracts is encouraged but little attention has been paid to features of the setting that may influence their operation. A qualitative case study was used to examine different dimensions of a contract with private GPs in South Africa. Features of the contract are compared with the notions of classical and relational contracts. Formal aspects of the contract such as design, monitoring and resort to sanctions were found to offer little control over its outcome. The relational rather than classical model of contracting offered a more meaningful framework of analysis, with social and institutional factors found to play an important role. In particular, the individual nature of GP practices highlighted the role played by individual motivation where a contract exercised little formal control. Due to the similarity of factors likely to be present, results are argued to be relevant in many other LMIC settings, and policy‐makers considering contracts for clinical services are advised to consider the possibility of experiencing a similar outcome. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
- 28 February 2003
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 12 (12) , 1005-1020
Classical versus relational approaches to understanding controls on a contract with independent GPs in South Africa
Contracts have played a central role in public sector reforms in developed countries over the last decade, and research increasingly highlights their varied nature. In low and middle income countries the use of contracts is encouraged but little attention has been paid to features of the setting that may influence their operation. A qualitative case study was used to examine different dimensions of a contract with private GPs in South Africa. Features of the contract are compared with the notions of classical and relational contracts. Formal aspects of the contract such as design, monitoring and resort to sanctions were found to offer little control over its outcome. The relational rather than classical model of contracting offered a more meaningful framework of analysis, with social and institutional factors found to play an important role. In particular, the individual nature of GP practices highlighted the role played by individual motivation where a contract exercised little formal control. Due to the similarity of factors likely to be present, results are argued to be relevant in many other LMIC settings, and policy‐makers considering contracts for clinical services are advised to consider the possibility of experiencing a similar outcome. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.