Torbjörn Bergman
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Torbjörn Bergman has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kaare Strøm
University of California, San Diego
2 shared publications Alejandro Ecker
University of Vienna
1 shared publication- Staffan Andersson
Linnaeus University
1 shared publication - Tim Bale
Queen Mary University of London
1 shared publication - Wolfgang C. Müller
University of Vienna
1 shared publication - Wolfgang C. Müller
Department of Political Science, Umeå University, SE-901 87 Sweden. E-mail: torbjorn.bergman@pol.umu.se
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-50
How Parties Govern: Political Parties and the Internal Organization of Government
- 16 May 2013
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-50
How Parties Govern: Political Parties and the Internal Organization of Government
- 12 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 45-70
Controlling Corruption in the Public Sector
Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal‐agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.
- 12 January 2009
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 32 (1) , 45-70
Controlling Corruption in the Public Sector
Much of the literature on political corruption is based on indices such as the ones presented by Transparency International, but the reliability and validity of these indices are questionable. The main alternative approach – qualitative case studies – often lacks a theoretical framework allowing for systematic empirical analysis. To remedy this shortcoming, this article places qualitative case studies into the framework of principal‐agent theory. The cases comprise two Swedish county councils (regional governments), both of which reorganised their administrations in similar ways in the 1990s. One experienced corruption scandals, but the other did not. In comparing them, the article links the propensity for corruption to institutional design – in particular, the mechanisms of delegation and control.
- 1 March 2006
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 189-202
A Taste of Honey Is Worse Than None at All?
Some parties support rather than join the executive, thereby operating in a grey area between opposition and office – in governance but not in government. Previous research on the New Zealand Greens’ experience as a support party has shown that this liminal position may prove a blessing or a curse – or, more likely, a mixture of both. This article compares the experience of the Swedish Greens. While the Swedish party gained more on policy, it suffered the same frustrations as its Kiwi counterpart with regard to consultation, to the media and to a government that could potentially find support elsewhere. It, too, avoided overwhelming internal tensions, but was likewise left wanting more. Neither party broke into government at the next election, but tried to put lessons learned into practice when supporting centre–left cabinets once again. That the challenges encountered were so similar suggests the possibility that they are common to support parties elsewhere.
- 1 March 2006
- Published by SAGE Publications in Party Politics
- Vol. 12 (2) , 189-202
A Taste of Honey Is Worse Than None at All?
Some parties support rather than join the executive, thereby operating in a grey area between opposition and office – in governance but not in government. Previous research on the New Zealand Greens’ experience as a support party has shown that this liminal position may prove a blessing or a curse – or, more likely, a mixture of both. This article compares the experience of the Swedish Greens. While the Swedish party gained more on policy, it suffered the same frustrations as its Kiwi counterpart with regard to consultation, to the media and to a government that could potentially find support elsewhere. It, too, avoided overwhelming internal tensions, but was likewise left wanting more. Neither party broke into government at the next election, but tried to put lessons learned into practice when supporting centre–left cabinets once again. That the challenges encountered were so similar suggests the possibility that they are common to support parties elsewhere.
- 7 March 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science
- Vol. 4 (1) , 42-54
comparative parliamentary democracy: a project report
Published by Palgrave Macmillan since 2005, EPS: European Political Science is a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research. European Political Science (EPS) is an international journal devoted to publishing contributions by and for the political science community. Its interpretation of 'political science' is wide and encompasses comparative politics, political economy, international relations, public administration, political theory, European studies and related disciplines.
- 7 March 2005
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science
- Vol. 4 (1) , 42-54
comparative parliamentary democracy: a project report
Published by Palgrave Macmillan since 2005, EPS: European Political Science is a journal of the European Consortium for Political Research. European Political Science (EPS) is an international journal devoted to publishing contributions by and for the political science community. Its interpretation of 'political science' is wide and encompasses comparative politics, political economy, international relations, public administration, political theory, European studies and related disciplines.
- 17 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 27 (2) , 203-225
Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an Emerging Separation‐of‐Powers System1
Early in the twentieth century, parliamentary democracy developed within an 1809 constitution based on separation of powers. By the mid‐1970s, the last remnants of this constitution had disappeared. After that, measures such as more openness in candidate nominations, positive preference voting and more scrutiny by parliamentarians were introduced to strengthen the democratic chain. But a weakening of political parties and an increased importance of external constraints are again moving Sweden towards ade factoseparation‐of‐powers system. There is once again a considerable discrepancy between the written constitutional framework and the ‘working constitution’. In particular, local and supranational constraints on national policy making provide reason for a reconsideration of the constitutional framework.
- 17 May 2004
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 27 (2) , 203-225
Sweden: Democratic Reforms and Partisan Decline in an Emerging Separation‐of‐Powers System1
Early in the twentieth century, parliamentary democracy developed within an 1809 constitution based on separation of powers. By the mid‐1970s, the last remnants of this constitution had disappeared. After that, measures such as more openness in candidate nominations, positive preference voting and more scrutiny by parliamentarians were introduced to strengthen the democratic chain. But a weakening of political parties and an increased importance of external constraints are again moving Sweden towards ade factoseparation‐of‐powers system. There is once again a considerable discrepancy between the written constitutional framework and the ‘working constitution’. In particular, local and supranational constraints on national policy making provide reason for a reconsideration of the constitutional framework.
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 27 (2) , 89-113
Shifting Dimensions of Citizen Control1
European politics is still dominated by representative and parliamentary national systems of policy making. These systems can be seen as chains of political delegation from citizens through parliamentarians and executive office holders to civil servants. In these chains, a major trend for the past thirty years, and more strongly during the second half of that period, is a strengthening of agents’ accountability to the principals. But, simultaneously, citizens’ ability to exercise accountability through parliamentary democracy is eroding because of a decline in political party cohesion. Concurrently, constraints external to both the constitutional chain and political parties are growing stronger.The changes along these three dimensions lead to a situation in which democratic principals commonly decide more about less. Thus, while reforms have strengthened the constitutional parliamentary chain of governance, there is also an ongoing de‐parliamentarisation of modern politics. The main motivation for this special issue is to investigate this general phenomenon through a set of focused case studies of the Nordic (here known as ‘Scandinavian’) countries. These analyses show important differences in how these trends have been manifest. In one country, Finland, the parliamentary chain has actually grown in strength and importance in the last decade.
- 17 February 2004
- Published by Wiley in Scandinavian Political Studies
- Vol. 27 (2) , 89-113
Shifting Dimensions of Citizen Control1
European politics is still dominated by representative and parliamentary national systems of policy making. These systems can be seen as chains of political delegation from citizens through parliamentarians and executive office holders to civil servants. In these chains, a major trend for the past thirty years, and more strongly during the second half of that period, is a strengthening of agents’ accountability to the principals. But, simultaneously, citizens’ ability to exercise accountability through parliamentary democracy is eroding because of a decline in political party cohesion. Concurrently, constraints external to both the constitutional chain and political parties are growing stronger.The changes along these three dimensions lead to a situation in which democratic principals commonly decide more about less. Thus, while reforms have strengthened the constitutional parliamentary chain of governance, there is also an ongoing de‐parliamentarisation of modern politics. The main motivation for this special issue is to investigate this general phenomenon through a set of focused case studies of the Nordic (here known as ‘Scandinavian’) countries. These analyses show important differences in how these trends have been manifest. In one country, Finland, the parliamentary chain has actually grown in strength and importance in the last decade.
- 1 September 1997
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 4 (3) , 373-387
National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical variation and competing explanations
This article examines the link between fifteen national parliaments and decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers. The main purpose is to provide a comparative account of EU Affairs Committees and the national advisory processes of scrutiny and co-ordination that occur before a national government takes an official policy position in the Council. However, the variation that exists among the fifteen member states also raises the question of what explains it. In the second half of the article, it is argued that explanations of the variation should start from the complementary aspects of major interdisciplinary schools of thought such as culture theory, institutionalism and rational choice. This leads to a number of interesting new research questions.
- 1 September 1997
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of European Public Policy
- Vol. 4 (3) , 373-387
National parliaments and EU Affairs Committees: notes on empirical variation and competing explanations
This article examines the link between fifteen national parliaments and decision-making in the EU Council of Ministers. The main purpose is to provide a comparative account of EU Affairs Committees and the national advisory processes of scrutiny and co-ordination that occur before a national government takes an official policy position in the Council. However, the variation that exists among the fifteen member states also raises the question of what explains it. In the second half of the article, it is argued that explanations of the variation should start from the complementary aspects of major interdisciplinary schools of thought such as culture theory, institutionalism and rational choice. This leads to a number of interesting new research questions.