Zhi Sun

Emission trading scheme (ETS) promotes carbon emission reductions by leveraging market incentives for enterprises. However, the lack of enthusiasm among enterprises in China’s building carbon emission trading market signals some deficiencies in its incentive mechanism. This study establishes an evolutionary game model involving three parties, including the government and heterogeneous enterprises, to explore the behavioral evolution process of multiple game players and improve the incentive mechanism for carbon emission reduction. The results demonstrate that the development path of enterprises’ participation in the emission trading market undergoes four evolutionary stages: the initial stage, the transitional stage, the growth stage and the mature stage. Also, the results of sensitivity analysis demonstrate that (1) rewards and penalties are the tools for government regulation and market incentives; (2) enterprises are not very enthusiastic about participating in carbon trading activities and adopting carbon-reduction technologies; (3) the rise in carbon quota trading prices can prompt enterprises to actively reduce carbon emissions. Based on the results, this study proposes an executable implementation framework for the carbon-reduction incentive mechanism of public buildings under ETS, providing practical guidance for local governments to formulate and implement targeted carbon-reduction policies, aiming to boost the enthusiasm of building enterprises for low-carbon behaviors and decision-making choices.

Chinese public building carbon emissions trading system (CETS) pilots have employed different carbon quota methods over more than ten years. However, there are few quantitative comparisons on CETS emission reduction effects in different pilots based on the carbon quota analysis. This paper first calculates the annual carbon quotas of public buildings based on carbon quota allocation methodologies from municipal policy documents. Then, the factors affecting the carbon quotas of public buildings are analyzed. Finally, the emission reduction effects are analyzed and compared between the pilots. The findings are concluded as follows: (1) Public building stock area and energy efficiency demonstrate significant effects on the carbon quota. (2) The average annual carbon quota deficits of public buildings were 929,800 tons in Beijing and 596,000 tons in Shanghai, while the carbon quota was an annual surplus of 296,400 tons in Shenzhen, indicating that carbon quota allocations in Beijing and Shanghai pilots are more conducive to promoting the active participation of high-emission enterprises. (3) The emission reduction effect in Beijing is most pronounced, followed by Shanghai and finally Shenzhen. Accordingly, the reasons for the difference in emission reduction effects are analyzed. This study contributes to the carbon quota allocation and emission reduction of public buildings.